Cross channel fraud detection framework in financial services using recurrent neural networks by Patel, Yogesh
1 | P a g e  
 
Cross Channel Fraud Detection Framework in Financial 
Services using Recurrent Neural Networks 
 
 
This dissertatin is submitted for the degree of  









School of Computing and Digital Media 
London Metropolitan University 
166-220 Holloway Road, London, N7 8DB 
 




I would like to take a moment to say thanks to many people, without them it would not have been possible to 
complete my journey. I would first like to thank my supervisor, Prof. Karim Ouazzane who provided 
unprecedented time, support and guidance, throughout this tenure. Always motivated me when things got hard, 
always pointed me in the right direction and taught me to never give up even in moments of doubt. I would 
further like to thank my collaborators Dr. Vassil Vassilev, Dr Jun Li and Thekla Polykarpou, who have also been 
instrumental with their feedback. This project would not have been as good without your help.  
 
I would like to extend my thanks for my friends Peter Foster, George Walker, Gabriel Dominguez Conde and 
others who helped me learn some very complicated machine learning models and maths behind them. Whom I 
spent countless hours debating, brainstorming and experimenting various solutions and having lots of fun along 
the way. Over the last few years, I have also been privileged to work with many great people at Callsign, who 
have helped me grow and given me the space to complete my thesis.  
 
Finally, I would also like to thank my family, especially my wife, Shital for been extremely supportive. My children 
Riana and Darshan to provided core motivation to finish my degree with expediency, so I can spend some more 
time with them. My mum and my brother deserve a special thank too, for their continued encouragement.  
 
 




London, September 16, 2019. 
 
  


















I would like to dedicate this thesis to my loving family…  
4 | P a g e  
 
Abstract: 
The reliability and performance of real time fraud detection techniques has been a major 
concern for the financial institutions as traditional fraud detection models couldn’t cope with 
the emerging new and innovative attacks that deceive banks. The problems are further 
exacerbated with evolving customer behaviour as existing fraud detection models unable to 
cope with class imbalance problem and longer feedback loop. This thesis looks at the holistic 
view of fraud detection and proposes a conceptual fraud detection framework that can detect 
anomalous transaction quickly and accurately, as well as dynamically evolve to maintain the 
efficiency with minimum input from subject matter expert. The framework is used to analyse 
Internet Banking (IB) transactions and contextual information to reduce the false positives 
and improve fraud detection rates. Based on the proposed framework, Long Short-Term 
Memory (LSTM) based Recurrent Neural Network model for detecting fraud in remote 
banking is implemented and performance is evaluated against Support Vector Machine (SVM) 
and Markov models.  
The main research element is to model events as state vectors so that sequence-based 
learning can be applied, followed by a weak classifier to deal with noise. Firstly, the study 
focuses on Feature Engineering where along raw attributes such as IP Address, Amount and 
other, two novel features for remote banking fraud are evaluated, i.e., the time spend on a 
page and the time between page transition. The second focus is on modelling which is 
performed on an anonymised real-life dataset, provided by a large financial institution in 
Europe. The results of the modelling demonstrate that given the labelled dataset all models 
can detect payment fraud with acceptable accuracy.  
Various tests proved that the LSTM model achieves a F1 score of 97.7% whereas the SVM and 
Markov model achieve 93.5% and 95.0% respectively. As the time elapsed, the LSTM model 
performance significantly improves as the sequence of events became larger. As the dataset 
increases that time it takes to train traditional models becomes a bottleneck. This proves the 
hypothesis that the events across banking channels can be modelled as time series data and 
then sequence-based learners such as Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) can be applied to 
improve or reduce the False Positive Rate (FPR) and False Negative Rate (FNR). 
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Dictionary: 
Payment Fraud Making unauthorised payments completed by a cyber 
criminal to deceive banks and their customers. For the 
purpose of this report, this involves intercepting and 
altering payee details and amounts on Payable Orders 
via online account takeover as well as compromise of 
the credit and debit card details. 
Channel A proxy for a bank to interact with its customers. This 
is typical via the portal, telephone, branch, e-
commerce site, the point of sale (POS) and mobile. 
Cross Channel Fraud Cyber criminals making use of multiple channels to 
defraud a bank. i.e. customer changes the address via 
bank’s portal and calls the bank to re-order a new 
credit/debit card. 
False Positive Rate The ratio between the number of geneiun events 
marked as fraud event. 
False Negative Rate The ratio between the numnber of fraud events 
marked as geneiun events. 
I.I.D Independently and identically distributed variable 
origin from the same probability distribution as the 
others but mutually independent to others. 
Modus Operandi (MO) A method that fraudster will use to continuously 
defraud the banks. 
Transaction The term transaction in this thesis is referred to as 
banking transaction that involves money movement 
such as transferring money from one account to 
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another or payment of goods. In any other context, 
the term will be explicitly stated. 
Data Model Data model defines the how data is connected to each 
other and their relationships. It provides a logical 
structure of the database. 
Neural Network Model This model will be used to classify events as fraudulent 
or legal based on the neural network algorithm that 
has been trained over a set of historical events. 
Fraud Model Generic term used to classify events as fraudulent or 
legal based on different machine learning algorithms 
that has been trained. In this report, the term will be 
often referred to as just model  
Customer Behavioural Modelling Term used to represent a set of customer activities 
performed on the bank’s channels by the customer.  
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Glossary: 
POS Point of Sale 
CNP Card Not Present 
PSD2 Payment Services Directive 
UK United Kingdom 
FPR False Positive Rate  
FNR False Negative Rate 
FFA Financial Fraud Action 
ATM Automated Teller Machine 
OTP One Time Password 
KNN K-Nearest Neighbour 
NB Naïve Bayes 
SVM Support Vector Machine 
ANN Artificial Neural Networks 
ML Lib Machine Learning Library for Big Data 
OLTP Online Transaction Processing 
RFM  Recency, Frequency, and Monetary 
SMOTE Synthetic Minority Over-Sampling Technique 
PCA Principle Component Analysis 
RIDIT Statistical scoring method used to analyse ordered qualitative 
measurements 
TRSGM  Transaction Risk Score Generation Method 
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IJIRCCE The International Journal of Innovative Research in Computer and 
Communication Engineering 
NN-BP Neural Network Back Propagation 
HMM Hidden Markov Models 
CA Cluster Analysis 
MLP Multi-Layered Perceptron 
EM Expectation Maximisation 
QRT Questionnaire Responded Transaction 
IOT Internet of Things 
AI Artificial Intelligence 
EMV Euro Pay, MasterCard and Visa 
Fraud MO Fraud Modus Operandi 
RNN Recurrent Neural Network 
ROC  Receiver Operating Curve 
 
  




Fraud losses continue to increase year by year, it has been reported that globally businesses 
are losing an average of 6.8% of their total expenditure as a direct result of fraud. Fraud has 
always been a major concern for the financial institutions. Fraud in financial services is defined 
by the deceitful activities of the fraudsters that result in financial profits or other benefits to 
them, as emphasised in the Oxford dictionary: 
"Wrongful or criminal deception intended to result in  
a financial or personal gain." 
Since, the dawn of the internet, cyber criminals have been increasingly perpetrating financial 
institution's defences what now seems like a relatively straightforward manner. This has 
resulted in a more fine-grained definition of fraud provided by Van Valsselear et al. (7) as: 
"Fraud is an uncommon, well-considered, imperceptibly concealed, time-evolving and 
often carefully organised crime which appears in many types of forms." 
Examples are, criminals either stole credit cards or compromise merchants’ point of sale (POS) 
devices to carry out fraudulent transactions. Similarly, in online banking, fraudsters 
compromise; customers’ device (personal computer or mobile) and move money out of 
customers' accounts using the bank's e-commerce sites. These are also referred to as 
cybercrime, where criminal targets computer, network or devices. Some examples of 
cybercrimes include fraud and phishing.  
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) provides a flexible way to address 
cybersecurity by a framework for managing cyber threats (145). The five core functions are 
defined as: 
• Identify: understanding the business context in which any organisations are being 
defrauded. 
• Protect: once a threat such as fraud is identified, provide appropriate measures to 
protect an organisation to any further damage.  
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•  Detect:  provide an ability to detect a threat such as online banking fraud through the 
use of anomaly detection and event correlation. 
• Respond: provides a list of action to be taken when a threat is detected and may 
include detail analysis, provide mitigations and future improvements. 
• Recover: provides a set of activities to bring services back to the normal status that 
were impacted during a cybersecurity incident, with emphasis on availability and 
resiliency. 
While all of the above core functions are essential parts of effective fraud risk management 
strategy, this research is primary focused on detection especially on fraud detection function. 
For example, ability to detect fraud in real-time when fraudsters make unauthorised 
payments from the customer’s account via the bank’s channels such as an online portal.  
Fraud via an internet and e-commerce contributes to over 30% of overall fraud according to 
Fraud Action UK (2). The fast development in the payment ecosystem has led to new threats 
as cyber criminals have established new and innovative attacks across multiple banking 
channels to deceive banks and their genuine customers.  The innovation in digital banking 
such as Apple Pay and Android Pay coupled with regulatory changes such as Payment Service 
Directive 2 provides a bigger landscape for the fraudster to operate on (1). In 2018, 
innovations in machine learning and openness from industry to invest in advanced security 
stopped more than £1.6 billion of unauthorised fraud. However, fraudsters still successfully 
managed to steal £1.2 billion. 
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Figure 1.1. Fraud Losses in the UK (2) 
As seen in Figure 1.1 above, in 2018; there is an increase of 27% of an internet and e-
commerce fraud. Through the use of social engineering tactics, phishing and sophisticated 
malware, fraudsters were able to compromise customers into revealing their online banking 
credentials. An example includes a phishing scam where an attacker uses fraudulent e-mail 
claiming to be from a bank in order to trick customers into disclosing confidential information 
such as bank account information. A more sophisticated fraud modus operandi (MO) will 
include an impersonation scam where fraudster often call their victim pretending to be a bank 
and claiming there has been a suspicious activity on their bank account, they would then claim 
to provide a fix by installing a software. They will then install a malware on the computer, 
which will be used to steal account details as well as security credentials. This type of fraud is 
referred to as Remote Access Takeover (RAT). If that fails, they will claim that account details 
need to be re-verified or money needs to be transferred to a “safe” account. These stolen 
details are then used to then make unauthorised payment. 
Fraud management is getting a lot more attention both in the financial services as well as 
academia. White papers published by some of the commercial fraud detection companies 
highlights the existing methods are primarily rule-based and channel specific, with some 
making use of a neural network for profiling customer behaviour (3) (4). They are based on 
first detecting the fraud technique and then writing appropriate rules for subsequently 
mitigating that fraud technique. They are considered as inadequate and ineffective against 
zero-day attacks as they do not proactively identify fraudulent transactions, thus causing bad 
customer experience. Most researchers in academia have researched on increasing the 
accuracy of the fraud detection through multiple techniques. A lot of research has been 
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already carried out using machine learning algorithm to detect fraud, but almost all of them 
have been channel specific (5) and primarily focused on credit card fraud detection. Several 
classifiers such as linear regression, KNN, C5.0, NB, SVM and ANN among other have been 
used to train datasets in identifying fraud and have done reasonably well on the available data 
(6). While the existing techniques of machine learning provide insight into the difficulties 
involved in various learning environments and they have an ability to generalise whenever it 
is required to classify an instance, they do not provide a holistic approach to fraud detection. 
Also, they suffer from low detection accuracy and high false positives especially when 
fraudsters change their tactics and the emergence of the new fraud MOs are so frequent (7). 
Fraud expertise is required to handcraft the data and retraining of the fraud models which 
are often slow and full of errors. Furthermore, different types of anti-fraud measures such as 
management information (MI) reports are being used to prevent attacks such as Phishing (i.e. 
Anti-phishing working group). However, these measures lack the real-time element and lack 
malware protection against the growing number of phishing websites.  
This research is focused on the possibility to create a novel real-time fraud detection 
framework to detect social engineering and malware fraud.  The intent is to make use of the 
advanced machine learning techniques to reduce the false positive rate (FPR) and false 
negative rate (FNR) on online banking transactions. The overall summary diagram is included 
in Figure 1.4 that outlines the key research findings. Such as making use of point estimates 
over the probability distribution function where there is a huge variance in dataset and a need 
to quickly generalise model from observed data. An example of such is to consider events 
across multiple banking channels that can be modelled as time series data for an individual 
customer and just based on few samples applying machine learning algorithms that can model 
for time series data as sequences such as Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) can be evaluated 
(8).  
1.1. Research Problem 
The key research question which presents the scientific relevance of this investigation is to 
develop innovate framework based on the deep learning and machine learning techniques. 
Using point estimates over raw dataset to improve on sequence learning techniques to 
remove any uncertainty in classifying an event as either fraud or non-fraud in an online 
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banking context for financial institutions. Furthermore, to investigate and learn about the 
customer’s behaviour patterns to make inference about the social engineering or malware 
attempt from a fraudster.  
This study will address the research questions presented below: 
• Can events across multiple channels be considered as time-series events in order to 
build a classifier that can detect inherent anomaly regardless of the skewness, noise 
in the data? (See Section 3.3.1) 
• How to reduce uncertainty of the model prediction by reducing false negative rate 
when there are only a few labelled data, or the observed labels are noisy as a result of 
manual measurement imprecision during labelling? (See Section 4.2) 
• Can a correct use of model and technique be used (i.e. sequence-based machine 
learning techniques such as HMM or RNN) to represent customer behaviour as they 
interact with the online channel? (See Section 4.3) 
• Can a model structure be able to generalise to new abnormal behaviour not seen 
during training? Thus, using point estimates to model deterministic function that 
contains uncertainty information in order to reduce false negative rate. (See Section 
5.2.1) 
Initial statistical analysis on the dataset of known frauds indicated that event correlation 
analysis could potentially reveal patterns of activity within an internet banking session, which 
is a strong indicator of fraud.  
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Figure 1.2 above show social engineering journeys takes longer to complete than genuine 
journeys, this could be an example when customer may be on the phone to fraudster. 
Similarly, malware journeys appear to be quicker than genuine journeys when it comes to 
adding a new payeeand then making a payment to that beneficiary, which is may be indicator 
that a Botnet might be automating the journeys. 
The outcome of this research will be used to provide better protection to the banking customer 
and improve the security posture of the banking security controls.  
1.2. Aims and Objectives of this Research 
The aim of this research is to develop cross channel fraud detection framework, that will help 
advance the field of payments. This will be achieved by creating a novel framework where the 
cross-pollination of transaction types and contextual information can be used to reduce the 
false positive and improve the detection rate. One will focus on the development of fraud 
framework that can obtain confidence using techniques and theoretical foundations of deep 
learning and machine learning techniques. Ensembling of these techniques will allow us to 
improve the fraud detection rate that was not possible until recently. The effectiveness of the 
fraud detection system is determined by alerts it generates, its accuracy of detecting 
fraudulent events and speed at which it can train model to capture new threats. Our research 
in working with several leading UK banks and showed that maintaining the accurate system, 
generating/working on alerts and quickly responding to new fraud MOs requires extensive 
efforts across multi-disciplined fraud team. The value chain diagram below outlines the 
general flow. 
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Figure 1.3. Value Chain Diagram for Fraud Detection (This is further expanded in Chapter 3) 
Figure 1.3 describes fragmented soloed real-time fraud detecting systems split by channel 
and reliant on the manual intervention of the fraud expert to update the detecting engine by 
tuning the fraud rules. This is often referred to as fraud model tuning. Both the commercial 
systems and academic research tends to focus on fraud model tuning and fraud detection 
aspects for improving false positive rate based on profiling customer behaviour. The current 
research in the space showed neural network based solutions are the de-facto standards for 
detecting fraud (9) (10) (11).  The above value chain diagram is for illustrative purpose only to 
show fraud detection is difficult, due to complex payments methods and complex user 
interaction channels. Covering entire ecosystem is outside the scope of this research, this 
research is focused on fraud detection on the internet banking channel. 
Below are some of the reasons the current approaches fail to provide adequate detection: 
• Evolving Customer Behaviour: Normal behaviour of the customer is constantly 
evolving as the flexibility grows in terms of how the customer manages their money. 
The fast rate at which the customer behaviour is changing, the traditional Neural 
Network based models no longer accurately represent the customer activities and 
their payment behaviour. This is due to the limitation of traditional neural network 
architecture as they can only deal with fixed length input and assumes data to be 
identically and independently distributed (i.i.d). (8)  This research will work on 
Research Scope 
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outlining a flexible algorithm that can operate over sequences of events and over a 
longer period of time to accurately model customer behaviour. (i.e. RNN). 
• Class imbalance problem: the ratio between fraudulent transactions and non-
fraudulent transactions is not equal, means identifying fraudulent transactions is hard 
to achieve using default model parameters. An expert is required to configure various 
parameters and settings. This thesis will investigate the use of synthetic data 
generating techniques as well as some of the sampling-based techniques (such as cost 
based sampling) to address this problem. Also, evaluate and fine tune the advanced 
machine algorithm that will provide optimal fraud model performance.  
• Cross-Channel Fraud MOs: Categorisation of fraudulent events and non-fraudulent 
events are becoming even more difficult to detect by a human expert as the fraudsters 
utilising cross-channel tactics. Cross-channel fraud is the new reality as the 
sophistication of criminal activity rapidly increases. Fraudsters are exploiting the 
"blind spots" across various channels. Evaluate the cross-pollination of data and 
looking at the contextual data to improve the model performance. 
• Longer Feedback Loop: fraudulent transaction required to be labelled manually and 
suspicious transactions required further investigation by an expert, before they can 
be labelled as actual fraud. This effort takes several days to months before data is 
available to re-tune the models. However, this is an expensive process and often the 
contextual information required to label data accurately is not feasible. The systems 
architecture will provide faster feedback to the fraud models to tag fraud that might 
have been missed during the real-time evaluation. This will reduce the expensive 
expert time requirement. 
The main objectives of this research are: 
• To investigate the current state of research in fraud detection and to identify the main 
problems, existing approaches and available methods for achieving fraud detection 
with improved performance. See Chapter 2 for further details. 
• To investigation data availability across multiple channels to produce appropriate data 
sets and criteria that will form to be subject to the analysis. Also, to investigate 
25 | P a g e  
 
techniques to process raw transactional banking dataset for fraud detection. See 
Chapter 3 for further details. 
• To research into the methods for machine learning for analysing of the 
multidimensional banking data represented as profiles and real-time transaction 
data. For example, anomaly detection on the customer spends pattern and behaviour 
could be analysed using techniques such as neural networks. See Chapter 4 for more 
details. 
•  To design ensemble technique and elicit the best ensemble classifier. To implement 
and execute fraud framework that ensembles deep learning and other deterministic 
models on a suitable platform in a context of fraud detection.  Demonstrating that 
customer behaviour during a banking session can be used to detect social engineering 
and malware fraud. See Chapter 4 for more details. 
• To analyse the use of the constructed fraud model, the efficiency of the selected 
methods and to create ensemble classifier. Evaluate the efficiency by performing 
validation, offline and online testing. Validation of the developed framework will be 
performed using both benchmark data and real-life data; offline testing will be carried 
out using historical data and then online testing will be performed with real-time data. 
See Chapter 5 for more details. 
1.3. Research Methodology 
The methodology of the proposed research combines several methods, which are needed to 
address the different objectives in an adequate way. Due to the complexity of the solution, 
the methodology will combine analytical, constructivist and empirical approaches. The 
analytical approach will mainly be used during the research stage when there is a need for 
critical analysis and comparison of alternative methods is investigated. The constructivist 
approach will be used for modelling, formulating building blocks of the framework and 
constructing software. The empirical approach will be used to compare the predictions with 
the actual data and to make cross-comparison between the different use-cases. 
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1.3.1. Analytical Approach 
o Data acquisition – collate data from an array of data repository. The data from 
various sources will need to be collected to build a rich set of customer profiles. 
Making use of different acquisition functions that can model uncertainty about 
the unlabelled data points in order to decide on their potential 
informativeness. Three different categories of data will be collected: 
§ Tracking customer interactions - page navigations, device usage. 
§ Transactional information - transactions from online banking, credit, 
and debit card transactions. 
§ Customer insight – details about geo-location, date of account opening, 
amount of outstanding loans. 
o Data preparation – developing robust and automated techniques for data 
cleansing, quality grading, and assurance.  This will also involve formalisation 
of sampling methods to factor in unbalanced nature of the dataset. In 
particular, the focus will be on using technique such as Synthetic Minority 
Over-sampling Technique (SMOTE) (105) to under-sample from larger label 
transactions and oversample from smaller label sample. Also, there will be also 
techniques developed to periodically refresh data. 
o Data and model exploration - investigate the correlation between contextual 
information and it’s relevant to the transaction events. This will provide deeper 
insight into fraudulent transactions. Furthermore, investigate which machine 
learning algorithm best fits the needs and build a fraud model around that.  
o Analytical approach is further expanded in Section 4.2. 
1.3.2. Constructivist Approach 
o Model development and optimisation – firstly to obtain an appropriate 
machine learning toolset that can provide a basic platform to achieve our 
mentioned objectives. This will include the support for advanced machine 
learning algorithms such as deep neural networks, recurrent neural network, 
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a support vector machine and others. It will also provide a means for 
measuring performance. To build a model to cater for the event data that is 
non-stationary in nature. The model will continually learn and adapt to new 
fraud threats as they emerge. Followed by building a framework and run a 
series of experiments on the data set and compare the performance measure.  
o Productionisation- Create a fraud management platform, to meet real-world 
working conditions. It can aggregate inputs from multiple channels and 
systems, which ingests information, enriches machine learning models, and 
provides consolidated reporting in addition to providing a holistic view of 
fraud. Demonstrate that preserving historical data is useful for quickly training 
a new model, but it is also important to remove outliers as they can skew the 
results.  
o Constructivist approach is further expanded in Sections 4.3 
1.3.3. Empirical Approach 
o Analysing and Reporting - both ML algorithm/s and performance of the system 
will be evaluated with respect to the predictions with the actual data. Various 
comparison between the different use cases across channel will be analysed 
and report on the finding will be created. 
o Empirical approach is covered in detail in Chapter 5. 
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1.4. Summary Overview Diagram 
  




Synthetic Data Generation 
Modelling Process 
Cross Channel Fraud Detection System 
Models Evaluation 
Data Analysis 
Figure 1.4 - Cross Channel Payment Fraud Detection Framework (CCPFDF) 
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1.5. The Contributions to the Knowledge  
The research conceptualises a cross channel fraud detection system that allows events to be 
modelled as state vectors and applied to learning algorithm, followed by a weak classifier to 
deal with noise in labelled data for training. It detects and discovers a possible hidden 
structure and regularity patterns associated with transactional and contextual data when 
modelled as time series of variable length. More specifically, the research contributions 
include: 
• The intelligent payment fraud detection process by developing sequence learners 
based on real-life bank transactions. 
• Comprehensive uncertainty analysis, comparative analysis and evaluation of the 
sequence learners 
• Conceptualisation of fraud detection framework with multi-components and stages to 
facilitate the payment fraud detection process. 
• A logical data model for cross channel fraud detection system that can cater for 
transactional data from different channel, namely remote banking and cards. 
• Novel approach in synthetic data generation using Generative Adversarial Network 
(GAN) network. 
• LSTM, SVM and Markov Chain models development for online fraud detection using 
feature engineering combining contextual and temporal data based on real-life bank 
transactions. 
• Model evaluation technique to verify model performance and limitations, and justify 
the model results based on data, statistical and modelling techniques. 
1.6. Structure of the Report 
To report the findings of the research in detail, this document is organized as follows: 
Chapter 2: Literature Survey 
In this chapter, various research papers have been reviewed and studied in the context of the 
fraud detection domain.  
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The nature of the existing researches, methodologies and proposed solutions to problems 
closely related to machine learning models such as supervised and unsupervised learning are 
studied.  
Chapter 3: Conceptualisation of fraud detection framework 
This chapter forms the core of the thesis, provides details about the conceptual framework 
for cross channel fraud detection. The core focused been on feature engineering where 
normalisation and data model are discussed. Followed by a neural network model that 
provides insights into classification and self-learning capabilities. 
Chapter 4: Model Implementation 
Based on the conceptual framework discussed in Chapter 3, this chapter provides systems 
architecture of the framework and provides implementation of the Support Vector Machine, 
Long Short-Term Memory and Markov Models.  Real banking transactional data is researched, 
and detail analysis is provided in exploratory analysis section. 
Chapter 5: Evaluation  
The chapter adopts a comprehensive approach to evaluate and compare the performances 
of the models based on well-defined indicators and datasets. The hyperparameters used by 
various models and its impact on the models are described in this chapter. 
Chapter 6: Conclusion and Future Work 
This final chapter provides conclusion on the thesis, describes what has been achieved, recaps 
on the research contribution and recommendations for the future work.  
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2.  
Background and Literature Survey 
This chapter discusses the various studies spanning across various researches carried out on 
fraud detection and related works. Research literature review was conducted by firstly 
collecting the literature based on research objectives and questions. Key words such as 
Financial Services; Payment Fraud Detection System (PFDS); Recurrent Neural Network 
(RNN); Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM); Support Vector Machines (SVM) where used to 
search the well-known databases of journals and articles. Articles and papers were selected 
the relevant literature that was pertinent to the topic of this thesis by looking at how an 
author has addressed the research question, key concepts, theories, methods and models 
used. This was followed by the results and evaluation of the results.   Accordingly, it will 
account for the definitions of concepts and issues that affect the detection of fraudulent 
activities using different techniques and approaches by examining their accuracy and 
limitations. The chapter starts by presenting an introduction to fraud in the banking sector 
and latest emerging threats. Subsequently, fraud detection techniques such as classical rule-
based expert systems, supervised and unsupervised will be studied. The chapter concludes 
with outlining the direction of this research. 
2.1. Fraud in the banking sector 
The latest Nelson report (12) shows the global fraud loss of $21.84 billion for the year ending 
2015. That approximately 7 cents for every 100 dollars spent. A well-defined definition of the 
fraud is given by Van Vlasselaer et al. (7). 
“Fraud is an uncommon, well-considered, imperceptibly concealed, 
time-evolving and often carefully organised crime which appears in 
many types of forms.” 
When looking at the banking sector viewpoint, the fraud is uncommon in a sense that not 
many people commit fraud and it’s a rare occurrence hence hard to detect.  Fraud detection 
problem has often been dubbed as “needle in a haystack problem”. Fraud is well-considered, 
well concealed and carefully organised, fraud is no longer been done by “script kids” but 
through a well-planned set of activities by organised cybercrime gangs (2). Fraud is time-
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evolving as fraudsters try to defraud banks over multiple channels, exploiting the weak spot. 
Fraudsters change their tactics faster than the bank could respond. This scenario is often 
referred to as “cat and mouse game”.  Fraudsters use a wide range of approaches and 
patterns using cross-channel techniques and hence fraud appears in many types of forms. A 
list below provides an overview of some of the fraud in the banking sector. 
Action Fraud UK defines fraud as (2): 
“Financial fraud includes 1st and 3rd party fraud on all core banking 
products/services (including credit and charge cards, current 
accounts and debit cards, savings accounts, cheques, overdrafts and 
loans): channels (including point of sale, remote purchases, 
online/telephone banking, branch counter) and customers (personal 
and business).” 
The Table 2.1 below provides an overview of some of the fraud in the banking sector, but not 
limited to (A well-defined list can be found at (13)): 
Fraud Type Description 
Credit card/debit card fraud As defined by action fraud police UK, credit/debit card fraud is also 
referred to as plastic fraud that involves compromising of any personal 
information that is on the credit and debit cards that can be used to 
commit fraud. Fraudsters might use this information to purchase goods 
via card present or card not present channels (14).  The subtypes under 
the plastic fraud are counterfeit card, online purchase (Cared Not 
Present), ID theft and lost & stolen card.   
Insurance Fraud There are many subtypes under the insurance fraud namely home 
insurance, car insurance, medical insurance and applicable to both the 
consumer and the seller. For example, the seller may include selling 
policies from non-existent companies to earn commissions. Consumer 
fraud includes falsified medical history to lower the premium or faked 
damage (for example, staged accident). 
Money laundering Deceitfully submitting a large sum of money that are obtained from or 
used for crimes such as terrorist activities, drug trafficking and other 
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serious financial crimes. One of the popular subtypes under money 
laundering is the mule account creation. 
Identity Theft Unlawfully gaining important personal information in order to take over 
another person’s identity. The identity theft could result in fraudster 
applying for a credit/debit card pretending to be a legitimate customer 
and carrying out card fraud. 
Internet banking fraud / remote 
banking fraud 
Remote banking fraud is considered to be theft committed using online 
technology to illegally remove money from a bank account or transfer it 
to a different bank account. Remote banking fraud occurs via the 
following channel: internet banking, telephone banking, and mobile 
banking. 
Cheque fraud There are mainly three subtypes of cheque fraud namely: counterfeit, 
forged and fraudulently altered. 
• Counterfeit: printed on a fake paper to look like the genuine 
cheque 
• Forged: genuine cheque stolen from the customer and their 
signature are forged to withdraw the funds. 
• Fraudulently altered: a genuine cheque that has been altered 
by a fraudster before it is paid. 
Table 2.1 Types of Fraud in the banking sector 
Various papers and books have been written that describe the motivation and psychological 
reasons behind committing fraud. One of the most popular books (15) by Donald Cressey 
where he developed a model for the occupational offenders referred to as the “fraud triangle” 
as shown in Figure 2.1, that provides inside into why people commit fraud.  
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Figure 2.1. Fraud Triangle (15) 
The original model developed for embezzlement occupational fraud, however, this could 
easily be extended to cover the fraud in general (7). The triangle describes three elements 
required for fraud to be attempted they are: 
• Pressure: this outlines motivation of committing fraud. An individual is most likely to 
commit fraud when he or she is under pressure either due to financial, social or any 
other nature.  
• Opportunity: this outlines misuse of trust. An individual creates an opportunity either 
due to weak security controls or in a position of trust. This concern results in a fraud 
opportunity to exists, fraud to be committed and concealed. 
• Rationalisation: this outlines a psychological desire such as personal code of ethics or 
belief into committing fraud. This is concerns with a view of the fraudsters that they 
are acting legitimately.  
Several theories and approaches have been identified that are based on the above model (16) 
(17). The common theme is on the basis that a conflict of interest may exist between an 
employee and employer which may lead to disgruntles amongst the employee(s) and 
employee (s) rationally commit fraud when the opportunity arsis.  
Fraud in a banking sector is a multifaceted phenomenon. As discussed in the latest report by 
Action Fraud Police UK (2), while most of the fraud losses are due to plastic fraud there is a 









Figure 2.2. Fraud losses by Type (2) 
 
The online banking fraud grew by 23% in the last year, this represents a percentage ratio 
which is higher than the growth of the plastic fraud. The growth contributes to the latest 
trends of phishing and social engineering attacks to carry out impersonation and deception 
scams. Phishing attacks happen when fraudsters pretending to be a genuine company such 
as a bank to trick their customers into disclosing sensitive information such as login 
credentials by redirecting customers to a fake website. Furthermore, plastic fraud is also on 
the increase for card presents and card not presents scams through skimming and lost and 
stolen cards (18).  
 
The above evidential figures and trends are rough estimates however they do indicate the 
importance of efficient and effective fraud detection and prevention system. The subsequent 
section describes various research elements into the fraud detection system. 
2.2. Rule-Based Expert Systems Approach 
Traditionally rule-based expert systems are used for detecting fraudulent transaction (14). 
These systems are based on the intuition and expertise of the subject matter expert.  
Typically, this involves detail manual investigation of the suspicious cases, for example when 
a customer calls the bank to state they are seeing transactions on the bank statement that 
they don’t recognise. Subsequent investigation may lead to new fraud mechanism used by 
the fraudster. Rules are then written or updated to limit the further fraud exposure.   
An example of such rule for credit card fraud detection is shown in Figure 2.3 below:  
IF: 
36 | P a g e  
 
• TRANSACTION AMOUNT is above threshold OR 
• Use of PRIMARY ACCOUNT NUMBER (PAN) above the threshold (i.e. more 
than 3 times in an hour) with the same Merchant OR 
• CREDIT CARD has been used with a RESTRICTED Merchant OR 
• CREDIT CARD has been used in a RESTRICTED Country 
THEN: 
• MARK transaction as suspicious AND 
• DECLINE transaction AND 
• ALERT fraud investigation team 
                                              Figure 2.3. Rule-Based Expert System for Credit Card Fraud Detection 
In the example above “thresholds” are determined by fraud subject matter expert (19). It is 
difficult to maintain, manage and implement such rules. It also requires a complex 
environment as the fraud schemes and techniques are constantly changing and rules need to 
be updated frequently.  
One of the disadvantages of such rule-based system is that fraudsters can easily learn the 
thresholds as well as the rules by trial and error to quickly devise innovative workarounds. 
Furthermore, another limitation of the rule-based system lies in the nature on how they are 
developed based on previously known fraud cases which make it difficult for them to 
generalise to new emerging fraud patterns (20). This requires deciding when the existing 
thresholds and rules should be updated, deleted or when the new thresholds and rules should 
be added. 
In the paper published in 1994 by Leonard (21), describes an implementation of a rule-based 
expert system to detect credit card fraud. The construction of the rule-based model is based 
on detecting deviation from the norm on the spend patterns using the expert system. They 
analysed 12,710 accounts of which 578 where accounts labelled as fraud and compared 
against 3 different model.  
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                                                                          Figure 2.4. Classification Results (21) 
The results in Figure 2.4 showed naïve model achieved 95.45% detection rate, however, the 
cost of 11,560 means a very high False Positive Rate of 95.18% meaning it misclassified 
majority of the legitimate account as fraudulent.  In comparison, the expert system model 
correctly classified 65.92% correctly, providing a very good accuracy rate compare to naïve 
model.  The holdout or the blind test will also have performed using the expert system model 
which showed the accuracy rate like expert system model test and the fraud classification has 
also improved slightly to 70.76%.  
Several techniques exist to mitigate the need to handcraft the rules and thresholds one such 
technique makes use of genetic programming to evolve logical rules for detecting credit card 
fraudulent transactions (22). The system classifies data into 3 fuzzy sets: “LOW”, “MEDIUM” 
and HIGH for the column. The classification is based on the algorithms such as trapezoidal and 
arctangent to create fuzzy clusters (22). The idea is to determine which columns are a strong 
contributor for classification of fraudulent events. It then uses genetic programming for rule 
generation and rule evaluation process. The framework of such system is presented below: 
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Figure 2.5. Evolutionary Fuzzy System framework (22) 
Several experiments performed using such fuzzy system as shown in Figure 2.5, that validates 
their claims that such system can be used to accurately and intelligibly classify fraudulent 
transactions with the lower false positive rate. One of the perceived limitations of such system 
is that it assumes data to be static and structured while this is not the case in most real-life 
systems. Also, the evolved rules generated performs a basic function, which may not be 
suitable in a cross-channel scenario.  
The rules-based expert system is not just limited to the credit card fraud detection. A lot of 
research is made on using such system for fraud detection in telecommunications (23). The 
research paper outlines a need for fraud detection in telecommunications to cater for fraud 
techniques such as social engineering, fraud due to loopholes in rules, fraud based on new 
regulation, masquerading as another user and others. The authors examined the rule-based 
approach and according to the authors of this paper, one of the main drawbacks of the system 
that is based on the thresholds is that once a threshold is violated it treats customers as 
fraudsters. This situation is reversed, if the fraudsters are always below the threshold, the 
violation is never triggered. They proposed an alternative method that is to monitor customer 
behaviour and compare the characteristics using the adaptive exponential weighted moving 
average (EWMA). The formula of EWMA is given by: 
 
(eq. 2.1) 
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Where Xp  is the customer signature based on the timestamp n, Xn is a new value, Xp is an old 
value, Dc is the current information and θ is the non-linear function. They demonstrated the 
lack of a rule-based system and highlighted a need for a more scalable, robust and efficient 
fraud detection system that can cater for running large machine learning models rather than 
the simple rule-based system. 
Almost all the research in this section showed that rule-based expert systems are quite 
efficient at detecting fraud however they are quite laborious in nature and requires manual 
interventions from a subject matter expert. One of the biggest disadvantages the research 
highlighted is to try to generalise to a new fraud pattern that has not been seen before. In 
general, there is a need for a more robust fraud detection system that requires less human 
expertise and provides faster feedback loop when anomalies in events are detected.  
2.3. Un-Supervised Learning Approach 
 A wide variety of unsupervised techniques exists to detect fraudulent transactions across 
different fields as a credit card, remote banking, telecommunications and many others. The 
common theme across all these techniques is to find a deviation from norm (14). The norm 
can be defined as an average behaviour of a customer or behaviour of an average customer 
across different time period (7) and then flagging transactions as “fraud” to highlight the 
deviation away from the norm. From the fraud detection viewpoint, unsupervised techniques 
try to model the distribution of the normal behavior and flag any observation that shows the 
greatest deviation from this normal behaviour, this is sometimes referred to as outlier 
detection (23).  This does not require any pervious labelled data and operates by creating 
clusters of observations that are similar. 
2.3.1. Clustering 
The goal of the clustering algorithm is to discover groups of similar observations within the 
data or to determine the distribution of the input space called density estimation (24) that 
from the similarity. In the banking sector, clustering can be used for plastic and non-plastic 
fraud detection. The density estimation can be derived from customer characteristics such as 
sociodemographic, behavioural or on account characteristics such as a transaction.  Also, 
density estimation or similarity distance can be achieved through various distance metrics 
algorithms such as Minkowski distance as defined below (7): 




This equation can be used to calculate the distance for continuous data where ! is the number 
of input variables, " and # are two observed variables. When $ set to 1 the equation becomes 
Manhattan distance $ set to 2 the equation becomes Euclidean distance.  There are various 
different options to calculate the distance such as single-link, complete link, centroid-link and 
group-average link as shown in Figure 2.6 below (25): 
 
       Figure 2.6. Similarity between two observed clusters (25) 
In general, minimum variance cluster value is calculated using Ward’s method and it is shown 
below: 
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 (eq. 2.3) 
This equation provides distance between the two cluster where ." , .! , ."!  are the centroid. A 
number of the cluster can then be decided using the dendrogram. 
2.3.1.1. Hierarchical Clustering Methods 
Commonly used clustering technique in fraud detection is the hierarchical clustering methods 
such as divisive or agglomerative hierarchical clustering methods (26).  




Figure 2.7. Hierarchical Clustering method using Agglomerative and Divisive Methods 
In Figure 2.7 above, the agglomerative method starts by treating individual observation and 
tries to cluster them while the divisive method threats all the observation as a single cluster 
and they try to break into small sub-clusters. The ideal solution lies somewhere in the middle 
of the two extremes (7). 
A paper published by L. Torgo and E. Lopes (27) makes use of the agglomerative clustering 
algorithm to detect fraud by creating an outlier ranking. The main motivation behind their 
paper is that the outliers cannot easily be part of “normal” cluster and it’s reflected during 
the merging process. Their methodology provides a way to optimal use of the inspection 
resources when forming clusters by creating a ranking. By creating such ranking, the paper 
claims to efficiently generate the probability of observation been fraudulent. They create 
synthetic data to prove their point. V. Hanagandi et al. (28) use density-based clustering 
approach to producing a fraud score for credit card transactions. Their work makes use of 
radial basis function (RBF) along with a clustering algorithm to classify fraudulent transaction 
based on the historical data. 
2.3.1.2. K-Means Algorithm  
Another well-known algorithm to clustering for fraud detection is the K-Means algorithm. This 
algorithm is used to find hidden information to a large and diverse data by applying a non-
linear transformation to the data. By treating the equation 2 as squared Euclidean distance 
the measure of dissimilarity can be calculated based on a non-linear function of the input data 
42 | P a g e  
 
for a given cluster centre. K-Means algorithm can be summarised as  shown in Table 2.1 below 
(29):    
1. Select K observations as the initial centroids (seed).  
2. Allocate all the points that are closest to the centroid (using Euclidean 
distance).  
3. Re-compute the centroid of each cluster.  
4. Keep repeating steps 2 and 3 until the centroids don’t change or a 
threshold in terms of a number of iterations is reached. 
Table 2.1 K-Means pseudo-algorithm 
The algorithm aims at minimising the sum of squared error objective function given by (30): 
2 = 	∑ ∑ ∥ "!




"*+   (eq. 2.4) 
Where ∥ "!(") − ." ∥# is the squared Euclidean distance between " and 5, 6 is the number of 
clusters, ! is the number of points in a cluster. 
The paper (31) produced by P Chougule et al. describes combining genetic algorithms with k 
means for credit card fraud detection. They create 3 different clusters namely low risk, 
medium risk and high risk, the transaction will belong to one of the clusters. Once the stable 
centroids are achieved, a genetic algorithm was applied to improve the efficiency. A level of 
improvement was shown when applying the genetic algorithm. However, the paper describes 
the use of biometrics data and in their paper, they fail short of explaining any correlations of 
data sources such as biometrics in their findings.  P Bhati et al. (29) makes combines K-means 
with Hidden Markov Model (HMM). K-means is used to create clusters and outliers within the 
clusters are determined by HMM. The results are then validated using Luhn Algorithm. Their 
paper concluded by highlighting the use of HMM improves their results significantly when 
compared with using K-Means only. The limitation of their paper is that only single attribute 
was used (i.e. credit card number), working with more attributes will make the system more 
complex to implement and evaluate.  
2.3.1.3. Adaptive Methods 
In an investigation lead by L. Zheng et al (32), a logical graph of behaviour profiles (LGBP) that 
is a total order-based model to represent the logical relation of attributes of transaction 
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records is proposed for fraud detection of online shopping. Each attribute in the transaction 
records are totally ordered and classified by their values. Then based on the LGBP, a path-
based transition probability and an information entropy-based diversity coefficient are 
defined in order to characterize the user’s diversity and transaction behaviours. Also, they 
defined a state transition probability matrix to capture temporal features of transactions and 
then build a behaviour profiles for each use. Based on these profiles, an incoming transaction 
was verified as fraud or not. The paper concluded that the proposed model overcome the 
weakness of Markov chain models since it characterized the diversity of user behaviours. 
An adaptive algorithm that can detect credit card fraud as it occurs (real-time) was explored 
by John B (33). The solution is based on the use of an Artificial Neural Network, Hidden Markov 
Model and a One-Time Password. After the successful authentication of the One-Time 
password, the system extracts the user’s profile from the bank database, which this profile 
classified using Artificial Neural Networks. And then using Hidden Markov Model, the financial 
profile of the user was generated. The combination of the three methods was used for fraud 
detection. The proposed method was tested using synthetic data and successfully detected 
and prevented fraud.  
Paper produced by R. Bolton and D. Hand (14) presented two techniques known as Break 
Point Analysis and Peer Group Analysis to detect fraud on the credit card transactions. They 
analysed intra-account behaviour changes over the certain moving time period (24 
transactions for Break Point Analysis and 17 weeks for Peer Group Analysis). Any deviation 
such as a burst of activity within that period is an indication of deviation from the norm. The 
comparison was done by ranking the accounts using t-statistic such as t-test and t-score. The 
behaviour changes are compared to the customer own past activities (for break point) and to 
the peers (peer group analysis) using distance algorithms such as Mahalonabis Distance and 




  (eq. 2.5) 
Where yn target account, 8)∈,999999 observations on the account (i.e. average amount per week or 
day) and σ is the standard deviation. In their experiments, more superior results were 
achieved using Peer Group Analysis then to Break Point Analysis. They also highlighted the 
limitation with the work which generalise well to local anomalies but not towards global 
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anomalies. Further research showed techniques such as breakpoint analysis are incorporated 
in the commercial software such as FICO’s Falcon where it combines with feedforward 
Artificial Neural Networks trained using back-propagation training algorithm (34). 
2.3.2. Self-Organising Maps (SOM) 
Another class of unsupervised learning is Self-Organising Maps which is part of the neural 
network family. SOM makes use of the neural network architecture to create data clusters in 
high-dimensions and makes use of competitive learning (35), where only one neural will be 
active per group (winning neuron). SOM architecture is organised in a lattice structure where 
the full coordinated system, based on place-coded probability distribution is created around 
the location of the winning neurons. The motivation behind the SOM originated from how 
the brain is organised in a way that takes different sensory inputs by different parts of the 
brain and represented as computational maps in topological order. The most commonly used 




                                                               Figure 2.8. Kohonen Model 
 
The process of creating SOM network such as Kohonen model can be summarised as (35): 
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• Competition: a discriminant function is used as for the basis for competition among 
the neurons.  a neuron with the highest value of the discriminant function is the 
winning neuron. (i.e. using distance algorithm). 
• Cooperation: the neurons around the winning are excited and forms a cluster around 
that neurons (i.e. using Gaussian distribution). 
• Synaptic adaptation: re-evaluate the discriminant function of the all the excited 
neurons to update their synaptic weights in order to form a pattern based on the 
input.  
Based on the above process, the algorithm can be summarised as shown in Table 2.3 below: 
Initialise the weights randomly for each neuron in the lattice 
Create probabilistic based sample from the input space so that activation 
pattern can be created 
Find the best matching neuron at a certain timestamp by minimising the 




ǁ#(-) − /%ǁ 
Where i(x) input space at a certain time stamp, x is the input vector and 
w is the weight vector 
 
The below formula is used to update weights for all the excited neurons 
/%(- + 1) = 	/%(-) + 	3(-)ℎ%,'())(-)(#(-) −	/%(-)) 
Where 3(-) is given as the learning rate and ℎ%,'())(-) is defined as a cluster 
function centred around the winning neuron 
Repeat steps 2-4 until feature map becomes stable 
Table 2.3 Types of Fraud in the banking sector 
The inherently nonlinear characteristics of SOM make it useful for solving clustering problems 
within the fraud detection domain.  
In a paper (37) from Martin H et al. proposes the use of the self-organizing neural network to 
attack the fraud detection problem in credit card transactions. The paper suggests the 
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adoption of SOM over K-means as their experiments highlight the SOM to be a superior at 
unsupervised cluster analysis the K-means. The paper concludes with outlining that the most 
important feature of SOM is their natural ability to find dense areas in the input space. A 
similar approach to using SOM is suggested in the article by Vladimir, et al. (38) where they 
enabled an automated creation of transaction monitoring system using historical data such 
as accounts and transactions. Through using these two datasets, customer profiles were 
created and constantly monitored for any deviation. They assumed that fraudulent 
transaction will reside in a different space then legal transaction. This can be achieved using 
SOM topology.   D. Olszewski (39) makes use of the SOM for visualisation technique in order 
to detect fraudulent accounts. The paper utilises SOM in order to visualise account into 2D 
space for easy of analysis by a human expert and combine this with classification algorithm 
to improve detection rate. The account clusters are created using SOM’s U-Matrix. U-Matrix 
provides a visualising technique by calculating the average distance between the neuron and 
its neighbours. This visualising technique highlights dark colours indicating a large distance 
and can be inferred as cluster boundaries (40). Their architecture consists of two-dimensional 
lattice and consists of a number of coherent partitions. Their proposed method generalised 
for telecommunications fraud, credit card fraud and intrusion detection system.  
J Hollmen (41) in his thesis on “Probabilistic to fraud detection” for mobile calls. He describes 
the problem of fraud detection as a pattern recognition problem. Purposes algorithm such as 
HMM, SOM and EM for detection that is based on the call data of mobile phone subscribers.   
2.3.3. Others approach to fraud detection 
Relatively very few research papers exist that examines Graph Mining and Link Analysis as the 
approaches to fraud detection. Few white papers are provided by commercial organisations 
that outline the effectiveness of using graph mining and link analysis approaches. A white 
paper published by CGI Inc. (42) describes the use of social network analysis to provide deeper 
insight into the cross accounts, cross product lines for determining potential mule rings or 
group of account holders participating in fraudulent activities. They make use of the graph 
theory (nodes and vertices) to identify deep hidden relationships to identify fraud rings. The 
measurements are based on density (how deep is the network), centrality (nodes that are 
close to high activity nodes) and other measures such as cluster co-efficiency. Another 
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whitepaper by Detica Inc. (43) outlines their platform called NetReveal that performs entity 
centric profiling to create a unique fingerprint of an entity and then to flag any suspicious 
activity. The platform can detect hard links such as same address or soft links such as multiple 
withdrawals from the same ATM.  Currently, both of the above commercial products support 
the investigation of fraud as a post event rather than real-time fraud detection.  
Another unique technique of unsupervised neural network-based approach is suggested by 
Dorronsoro et al. (44) that makes use of non-linear discriminant analysis. The paper segments 
the account numbers into different geographical regions and then applies a discriminant 
function to lower the class variance between the different regions created. The paper outlines 
the achievement of high efficiency and low false positive rates. 
A paper (45) by Anshul S et al. uses a Hidden Markov Model to detect credit card fraud. The 
approach described in this paper uses HMM to profile customer behaviour patterns on credit 
card spend. It then assigns category such as low, medium and high for each incoming 
transaction. If the incoming transactions violate a pre-defined threshold value, it marks that 
transaction as fraudulent.  The results showed that HMM producing high false positives but 
good at detecting an outlier. Future research in HMM is to extend this technique to profile 
also human behaviour while they are navigating the banking portal’s pages. 
Fletcher Lu et al. (46) combines Benford’s law with reinforcement learning to find new fraud 
patterns. In their paper, they describe this method as Adaptive Benford’s Law. This novel 
approach works by removing the requirements of “no built-in minimum or max values” for 
numeric data and applies Benford law for by considering 1st, 1st and 2nd and 1st, 2nd and 3rd 
digit sequence of a dataset. It extends outlier detection method with Benford law and 
reinforcement learning component. Deviating from the expected Benford law distribution is 
an indicator of anomalous behaviour and then applying reinforcement learning to the 
underlying attributes deducting the anomalous behaviour. This idea can be further expanded 
by looking to combine supervised and unsupervised fraud detection for technique on a cross-
channel data set. 
In a research published by Yiyang B et al. (47) an ensemble approach was used for financial 
fraud detection combining the bagging technique, which can reduce the variance of the 
classification model by resampling the data set and the boosting technique in order to reduce 
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the bias of the model. The bagging process divides the data into two classes and then they 
are fitted into the boosting classifier. Oversampling and under sampling were used to balance 
the distribution of minority and majority classes for each sub-training data set. In order to 
reduce the variance and bias of the base learner, Adaboost was integrated into the model for 
each sub classifier. Then the final output was generated from the voting combination of each 
sub classifier.  The drawback of this approach is the drop of the performance when the 
classifiers are combined. This is because of the use of the minority class in each base learner 
and the existence of noise data in the minority class.  
In research paper (48) published by Mandeep S and Pravendir S outlined a hybrid approach 
called TRSGM (Transaction Risk Score Generation Method) to calculate a risk score for each 
incoming transaction. They combined Bayesian learning, k-means and DBScan algorithms to 
detect suspicious behaviour based on its deviation from the good pattern. Their results 
showed good accuracy based on the synthetic data they created. Their approach remains 
inconclusive for real-world data that is noisy and in large volumes. As suggested by many 
papers (49) (50) (51) K-means clustering algorithm is a simple and efficient algorithm for credit 
card fraud detection. In addition, as pointed out in research paper (52), one of the major 
disadvantages of using Bayesian networks is that it requires significantly higher computational 
power to produce similar outputs as a threshold-based system with low computational power 
requirements. 
Paper (53) issued in IJIRCCE magazine another use of applying Bayes theorem with DBScan 
but this time using a heuristic to eliminate the conflict of existing Dempster-Shafer theory. 
Dempster has given the rule to combine evidence coming from different independent 
sources. However, Dempster’s rule of combination has been criticised as sometimes it gives 
some illogical results. Therefore, the above-proposed model is susceptible to failures. 
Dempster-Shafer theory, that allows for combining evidence from multiple and 
heterogeneous data sources and get to a degree of belief that takes into account all the 
available evidence.  
Paper produced by Jianyun Xu et al. (40) provides a framework in the form of association rule 
and pattern matching to evaluate anomalies in new transactions. It proposes FP-Tree Based 
Pattern Matching algorithm and alerts accumulating algorithm to accurately differentiate the 
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anomaly behaviour from profile users’ behaviour.  The results published shows ROC of this 
proposed framework outperforming other well-known classifiers such as Naïve Bias, SVN, NN-
BP, C4.5 as shown in Figure 2.9 below. 
 
                  Figure 2.9. ROC curve comparison among the different algorithms [8] 
In (54) investigation lead by Li Z, et al. a Kernel-based Supervised Hashing (KSH) model is used 
to detect credit card fraud. KSH is based on the idea of approximate nearest neighbour that 
can provide the most similar existing fraud samples for a transaction when the transaction is 
predicted to be fraud. The KSH had the advantages of being suitable for large and high-
dimensional datasets and time consumption especially in the training stage which is much 
lower than other models.  
In paper (55) from Duman, introduces a classification problem of credit card fraud detection 
with variable misclassification costs function as the available limit of the card. The aim was to 
minimise the misclassification cost. The solution of such a problem is a combination of genetic 
algorithms and scatter search, which is based on the behaviour of the fraudsters as well as of 
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the customers. The suggested algorithm followed the steps of genetic algorithm, but it had 
some components from scatter search such as the recombination operator instead of 
crossover operator of genetic algorithm. The performance of the model was based on 
experimenting with different values of the parameters. The authors made a conclusion that 
the most effective variable in detecting fraud is the regions for a credit card holder and that 
the obtained findings might not be generalized to the global fraud detection problem as some 
variables were missing. 
In research produced by Shamil M et. al. (56) considers methods of data analysis and machine 
learning based on social and transaction graphs for fraud detection. The suggested algorithms 
for detecting fraudulent transactions are a local outlier factor algorithm based on local 
sensitive hashing method for finding normal situations or anomalies. Developed algorithm for 
feature calculation and specific sub-graph patterns by identifying “Volcanoes” and “Black 
Holes”. “Black hole” refers to a sub-graph, which has only incoming edges from the vertices 
of the graph not included in this sub-graph. “Volcano” refers to a sub-graph which has only 
outgoing edges to the vertices of the graph not included in this sub-graph. The task of 
identifying “volcanoes” and “black holes” is a combinatorial problem. For feature calculation 
the algorithm is described using vertex-centric approach and is iterative with the maximum 
number of transactions. The developed algorithm demonstrates quality classification results 
comparable with a Random Forest when applied on a real transaction graph.   
A whitepaper produced by a leading analytics engine provider, SAS (57) provides a framework 
for detecting, preventing and managing financial crimes, which are cross-channel. The 
framework includes components for detection, alert management and case management 
along with capabilities for building advanced analytics. However, this is a commercial offering 
and requires in-depth knowledge of the SAS software, which is rare in the research and 
academia. In addition, there are no known cases where the cross-channel fraud detection 
capabilities been utilised by any of the financial institutions.  
Recently there has been a lot of activity in the research area of unsupervised feature learning 
often referred to as deep learning. As examined in the fraud literature review the existing 
machine-learning techniques have several limitations in their ability to process raw data and 
it requires domain expertise (58) to engineer and create a set of features relevant for fraud 
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detection and machine learning modelling.  Recently some work has been carried out (94) 
(96) that shows this limitation can be addressed to an extent using the principles of deep 
learning. Since extracting features from raw data and processing through efficient machine 
learning algorithm is one of the crucial tasks of fraud detection, the next section outlines some 
of the research been done in a very active field of Deep Learning. 
2.3.4. Critique of the Unsupervised Learning Approach 
The research highlighted the key outlier detection approach is the clustering approach. The 
non-parametric nature of creating clusters and sub-clusters makes this a viable approach to 
fraud detection and quite commonly use in ensembled approaches. Using this approach, the 
need for a prior knowledge about fraud patterns can be minimised and the existing 
knowledge can be incorporated in a semi-supervised clustering approach. The research 
highlighted that the advantage of using hierarchical clustering is that does not require clusters 
to be defined upfront. However, the disadvantage is that it does not scale well with large data 
set. While the k-means algorithm can scale well, it does require clusters to be defined upfront. 
Many key papers highlighted the use of k-means over hierarchical clustering is preferred.  
The research into SOM highlighted their usefulness as a visualisation technique and making 
use of neural network concepts to create coherent clusters as an alternative to k-means. 
Kohonen’s topology has been studied to address the fraud detection space with limited 
success, the limitation (35) highlighted are: 
1. Correctly estimating the probability density function for its input 
2. There is no objective function to optimise 
Considering, the non-linear stochastic nature of the fraud detection, the above limitations 
makes SOM harder to converge. There is a need to study SOM topology such as kernel-SOM 
in the fraud detection space.  There is also a need to experiment with the break point analysis 
and peer group analysis (14) to cater for a wide range of cross channel transactions to 
determine their effectiveness.  
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2.4. Supervised Learning 
2.4.1. Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) 
A lot of real-life problems associated with pattern recognition and classification problems are 
solved using an artificial neural network. The motivation behind the neural networks is 
adapted from the human brains and its analogy of parallel computation to adapt the neural 
connection accordingly (36). The idea behind an ANN is to use learning algorithm by modelling 
how the information is processed by the brain’s nervous system called Neuron. An Artifical 
neuron receives an input signal combines that with a weight. An output is produced by an 
activation function if the output signal is strong enough as depicted in Figure 2.10 below (36): 
 
Figure 2.10. Artificial Neural Network Implementation 
The first implementation of such algorithm was proposed by McCulloch Pitts (59) known as 
binary threshold neuron given by the formula below: 
: = ; + ∑ <!"! 	!   (eq. 2.6) 
# = 	 = 1	?@	:	 ≥ 0		
0	CDℎFG<?HF
  (eq. 2.7) 
Where, <!  is the weight of the ?-3	neuron and "!  is the input into the ?-3	neuron and b is bias. 
The output is given by the sum of all the neurons greater given as 1 and 0 otherwise.  
A more general model called (59) perceptron where introduced by Frank Rosenblatt in 1985. 
A report published by Minsky and Papert (60) highlighted that complex pattern recognition 
cannot accurately be modelled by a single perceptron and multiple layers are required for 
universal approximation theorem to sustain. Rosenblatt model was further generalised by 
adding more layers and more neurons as shown below (60):  
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Figure 2.11. Multi-Layer Perceptron (Feed Forward Neural Network) (89) 
The above Figure 2.11 consists of an input layer, a hidden layer and an output layer. Hidden 
layer is used to produce a set of features based on the input and given to output for 
prediction. In the hidden layer feature transformation based on the input, layers are based 
on a non-linear function such as: 
 












, #: −1 → 1                                          (eq. 2.9) 
  
 
In the output layer, the transformation is generally based on the linear function: 
• Linear function:  
@(:) = :, #:−∞ → +∞                                          (eq. 2.10) 
 
The recent advancement in the artificial neural network has used the properties of the binary 
/ linear threshold function to improve the performance of the ANN is called Rectified Linear 
Neuron (ReLU) that outputs nonlinear function of the total input. The ReLU function can be 
defined as: 
@(:) = max	(0, :)                                                 (eq. 2.11) 
Since, the discovery of the ReLU several research papers (61) (62) have highlighted with 
empirical evidence of the ReLU over performing other activation functions.  The points below 
provide certain properties of ReLU that make this function beneficial (62): 
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• non-differentiable nature of ReLU precisely at zero, which provides a sparse 
representation.   
• Faster to converge. 
• Avoids vanishing grading problem (63). 
In the financial services, an ANN is widely used in application such as credit scoring (64), (65) 
and fraud detection [6,7, 13, 22, 66].  A paper published by Ghosh et al. (67) made use of ANN 
to show an improvement of 20% to 40% on a real data for Mellon Bank. They made use of the 
P-RCE neural network that consists of RBF and feed forward neural network to train their 
network to output fraud scores.  
Emanuel Mineda Carneiro et al. presented a paper (68) that showed good detection rate on 
credit card fraud by combining cluster analysis with the multi-layer perceptron (MLP) neural 
network.  Iterative Naïve Bayesian Inference Agglomerative Clustering (INBIAC) algorithm was 
used to perform Cluster Analysis (CA) to automatically normalise qualitative data.   
Ganesh K, et al. (69) made use of Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) in a supervised manner for 
fraud detection. Fraud label data was presented to the Artificial neural network (ANN). Their 
paper showed ANN to be a good technique even when the data is noisy since the weights of 
the neurons in the hidden layers can correlate with other neurons. 
Recently, the paper produced by Syeda et al. (70) suggests the use of parallel granular neural 
networks for fast credit card fraud detection. It outlines a process for speeding up the data 
mining and knowledge discovery process. Similarly, a paper by Maes et al. (71) outlines a 
credit card fraud detection technique that combines Artificial Neural Network with Bayesian 
Belief Network. The paper highlights the use of Bayesian Belief Network to improve the 
detection rate can be improved and showed that the training of the network can be relatively 
faster than a neural network with back propagation algorithm. It showed that the neural 
network has a high tolerance to noisy data, however, it requires longer training times and re-
training the network is difficult as the fraud evolves. 
The paper (72) produced by Azeem K et al. outlined the use of Simulated Annealing algorithm 
applied on the Neural Networks for real time fraud detection on Credit Card transactions. This 
paper showed that training ANN with simulated annealing performs better over other training 
algorithms such as Back Propagation.  However, the result showed many cases that are 
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misclassified resulting in a high false positive rate (where legitimate customers are classified 
as fraud). 
2.4.2. Support Vector Machines (SVMs)  
SVM is another popular machine learning technique used in the fraud detection domain. Several 
research papers (73) (74), (75) found SVM ensembled with other machine learning techniques to 
improve the model performance of the dataset. SVM methodology of the binary classification is 
well suited for fraud detection as the output of fraud detection can be described by binary class 
as legal or illegal (fraudulent). 
SVMs are useful alternatives to neural networks when the learning objective is a non-convex 
problem represented as multiple local minima. In such circumstances, neural network tends to 
get stuck in an area known as saddle point (76), (77). Also, another advantage of SVM over Neural 
Network is a large number of hyperparameters that are required to be tuned in neural networks 
(77). 
The above two disadvantages of the neural network can be overcome by SVM. The objective of 
an SVM is to create an optimal hyperplane that can separate the two classes as seen in Figure 
2.12 below: 
 
Figure 2.12. Support Vector Machine (77) 
In the above diagram, the dotted lines are identified as a hyperplane which outlines a classification 
boundary. The optimisation can be achieved by maximising the margin between the two classes 
as further apart as they can be, this is highlighted as the gap in the diagram. This can be achieved 
by calculating the Euclidian norm and points that are closest to the hyperplane are known as 
support vector (77).  For non-linear separable classes, a hyperparameter is used in the objective 
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function. For such non-linear cases, the input space is mapped to a higher dimensional feature 
space so that linear separability can be achieved.  One of the key functions to achieve a higher 
dimensional feature space is called the kernel function (77).  The above diagram is a convex 
optimisation problem, that can be achieved using quadratic cost function known as Lagrangian 
optimisation as there will be only one local/global minima (7).  The most popular kernel functions 
are (78): 
• Linear Kernel – Maps inputs directly to the binary classifier. 
• Polynomial Kernel – used to map non-linear input space to a higher dimension feature 
space.  
• Radial Basis Function Kernel: similar to the polynomial kernel, however, empirical 
evidence suggested the RBF kernel outputs the other two kernels but requires additional 
parameters that need to be tuned. 
In a paper produced by Chen et al. (79) they make use of a support vector machine (SVM) to 
train the data that is collected as questionnaire-responded transaction (QRT) data of users. It 
then uses SVM to predict new transactions. In a recent paper, Chen et al. (79) presented a 
personalised approach by combining SVM and ANN to improve the credit card fraud detection 
with a limited amount of transaction data. While their research highlighted an improvement 
when compared to their previous experiments, they also highlighted the need for a fraud 
domain expert for prior knowledge that needed to be embedded in the model. The research 
also highlighted a need for the fully automated system as their system required heavy manual 
intervention.  
Sahin and Duma (75) explored the use of SVM for credit card fraud detection and compared 
the results with Decision Trees. First, they determine the appropriate features that would 
successfully discriminate fraudulent with legal transactions. Profiling technique is used to create 
profiles of the stratified samples. Their results highlight SVM can generalise better than the 
decision trees with a limited set of data. The growth in dataset resulted in SVM model to degrade 
its performance while the decision tree methods improve its performance. 
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2.4.3. Decision Trees 
Decision trees are considered as a supervised machine learning model that uses the 
underlying dataset to create a recursive hierarchical decision and their retrospective 
consequences (80). An example diagram of a decision tree is shown in figure 2.13 below: 
 
Figure 2.13. Example of a decision tree (81) 
In the above diagram, the root node is used for testing the condition for which the 
classification is required. The last node is used for classification (i.e. fraud or not fraud). The 
internal nodes are used to recursively reach to the last node.  Many popular algorithms have 
been proposed as (80): 
• C.5: is a simple algorithm when compared to the other.  It achieves its results by 
splitting and cropping of the data. It calculates an information gain by splitting the 
data in a certain way. The threshold is used for stopping the splitting followed by error-
based cropping after the growing phase to come to an assignment decision. The 
information gain is calculated using the following Entropy equation: 
O(7) = 	−$5PCQ#($6) (eq. 2.11) 
• CART: classification and regression tree used to construct binary trees and has only 
two outgoing edges. Towing Criteria is used as splitting algorithm and cropping is done 
using Cost Complexity Criteria (82). Provides prior probability distribution using Gini 
Index as given by: 
R?!?(7) = 2$5$6  (eq. 2.12) 
• CHAID: Chi-squared Automatic Interaction Detection, which aims to find output based 
on the pair of values that is least significantly different.  
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Decision trees are quite widely used in the fraud detection domain. Sahin and Duman (75) 
makes use of decision trees to select a list of variables that has the stastical strength of been 
good predictors. A hybrid approach proposed by S Chen, et al. (83) that uses the decision to 
create a segmentation of data and then applies logistic regression to further refine their 
results. They showed such hybrid approaches when combined provide a good predictive 
model compare to an individual algorithm.  As highlighted by S Patil, et al. (84) improvement 
can be made to the knowledge-based authentication question for credit card application 
fraud detection process when decision trees are used in to define a set of questions that are 
much more intrinsic than simple security questions. The tree search can then be further used 
to eliminate the potential default candidates.  
2.5. Deep Learning 
Deep learning provides several techniques about learning multiple levels of representation 
that can quickly determine hidden characteristics and relationships in the data that will 
provide a good generalisation. Hinton et al. outlined the concept of deep learning in 2006 
research paper (85). The paper highlighted, using deep learning one can process information 
using non-linear functions and hierarchical architectures. The objective is (86) to make these 
higher-level representations more abstract and based on the lower level features. 
Since then the popularity of deep learning today is drastically increased, as Bengio Y, et al. 
suggested (87), using deep learning techniques can achieve a good level of generalisation, due 
to the four main characteristics: 
• Lots of data: With the advancement in internet and next revolution been the Internet 
of Things (IoT) there is a vast amount of raw and labelled data that is now available, 
compare to 1990s.  
• Very flexible models: advancements in models, meaning that the next generation of 
models understands the context of the world. 
• Increases in computer power: In order to process lots of data, computer power is also 
growing. The advancement in GPUs means they are 10milion faster than they were in 
1990. 
• Powerful priors: according to Bengio Y (87), (88) the use of non-parametric models 
and classical kernel methods had all of the above characteristics. The single most 
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characteristic that separates the deep learning models is their ability to compute 
priors that can defeat the curse of dimensionality and generalise better. In (87) various 
such priors are outlined, but it is worth noting that apart from smoothness prior the 
two other priors that play an important role in helping reduce curse of dimensionality 
are distributed representation, which can learn features from low-level to high-level 
abstractions and notion of deep frameworks that can provide multiple levels of 
feature learning. 
The fundamentals of deep learning date back to 1980 when they were first introduced by D. 
Rumelhart, et al. in their book called Parallel Distributed Processing (89). They coined the term 
“Connectionism” and outlined that the concepts are not represented symbols in our brain but 
by patterns of activation. The deep learning principles are built on similar beliefs. The idea is 
that symbols can only be manipulated by rules and when symbols are considered as objects, 
in their true nature they do not have any similarity built between them. For example, the 
concept of dogs and cats are closer together in some space and further away from the person. 
2.5.1. Evolution journey of Artificial Intelligence 
Figure 2.14 below outlines an evolutionary journey of Artificial intelligence (AI) over time (87). 
 
Figure 2.14. History of AI (87) 
In the classical rule-based system, the domain knowledge and feature where handcrafted so 
that the system knows how to linearly compose these features to give some output. With the 
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advancement of machine learning the notion of composing features on top of features were 
introduced but still require heavy manual intervention. However, it was believed that only 
one level depth (1-h(x)) is enough to represent anything efficiently as highlighted by the 
seminal paper (90). It uses K-Nearest Neighbour which takes the input spaces and breaks it 
down into pieces (known as regions) and for each of those regions, there are examples that 
will tell you the answer. It showed that the complexity of the functions that is represented is 
growing linearly as the number of examples increases in each of those regions. 
In representation learning such as Neural Networks, the above problem was solved as a 
number of regions can be represented with a linear number of parameters using hidden layer. 
Simple Neural Networks requires manually breaking the input space into multiple regions and 
using hidden units H(x) that discovers semantically meaningful concepts.  
In deep learning, this manual intervention is reduced, and more and more features can be 
added on top of other features which are automatically discovered and composed together 
in the various levels to produce the output.   
2.5.2. Deep Learning Architectures 
Deep learning provides enhancement to the neural networks. The traditional neural network 
consists of a single hidden layer considered as a shallow network. Deep learning consists of 
many hidden layers each providing different representation and hence different abstraction 
that can generalise well.  The terminology in deep learning is different to the terminology 
known for neural networks (87). The terms such as nodes, connections, etc. are not used 
anymore instead new terms have been coined that are closer to technology architecture 
terminology. These terms are referred to as modules and library of modules so a notion of 
“wiring of the system” can be applied to automatically figure out input from the output and 
to compute gradient with respect to all the parameters internal to the system. 
Some of the common architecture for deep learning are: 
• Deep belief networks (DBN): consist of many hidden layers, however, the top two 
layers have un-directed connections between them. This result in a network that is 
probabilistic and stochastic (91) as shown in Figure 2.15 below. 
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Figure 2.15. Deep Belief Network Architectures (91) 
 
• Boltzmann machine (BM): considered as a stochastic binary machine. The network is 
represented as symmetrically connected nodes (91) as shown in Figure 2.16 below.  
 
Figure 2.16. Boltzmann Machine (91) 
 
• Restricted Boltzmann machine (RBM): there is no connection between the hidden 
neurons and the connections between the visible layer and the hidden layer are 
undirected (91). RBM have proven to be capable of providing a good level of posterior 
distribution which is a big advantage over directed belief network as shown in Figure 
2.17 below. 
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Figure 2.17. Restricted Boltzmann machine with three visible units and four hidden units (no bias 
units) (91) 
Ugo F, et al. (92) explores the effectiveness of a detection approach using the 
Discriminative Restricted Boltzmann Machine and applied it to the network intrusion 
dataset. Their results show a moderate level of success to the real-life data. It 
combines the expressive power of generative models with good classification accuracy 
to infer part of its knowledge from incomplete training data. In this paper, the 
Discriminative Restricted Boltzmann Machine, a recently proposed classifier based on 
the family of energy-based models, has been applied to network anomaly detection 
in a semi-supervised fashion. A similar topology can be used in the fraud detection 
system where the data from many different channels can be combined to improve the 
detection rate of the model.  
 
• Deep neural networks (DNN): DNN is generally referred to as a feed forward multi-
layered neural network.  It contains many hidden layers and provides probabilistic 
interpretation by providing linear and non-linear activation functions. It also generally 
referred to as fully connected multilayer perceptron and often initialized by using 
stacked RBMs or DBNs (91) as shown in Figure 2.18 below. 






• Convolutional deep neural networks (CDNN): A Convolutional Deep Neural Network is 
comprised of one or more convolutional layers (often with a subsampling step) and 
then followed by one or more fully connected layers as in a standard multilayer neural 
network. Convolutional neural networks use three basic ideas: local receptive fields, 
shared weights, and pooling (93) as shown in Figure 2.19 below. 
 
Figure 2.19. CNN layers arranged in 3 dimensions (91) 
Kang Fu, et al. (94) outlined a methodology where credit card transaction data is 
represented as feature matrix and applied convolutional network for fraud detection 
to capture the intrinsic patterns in the data. They overcome the class imbalanced 
problem by applying cost-based sampling to alleviate the fraudulent dataset. In their 
proposal, they calculated trading entropy based to model customer profiles by 
measuring customer’s preferences over the different timeframe. Feature engineering 
was performed, and latent variables were calculated and arranged in a way that can 
be easily passed through the CNN’s filter bank. Their model was run on the real 
Figure 2.18. Deep Neural Networks 
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banking data and empirically proved that their model outperforms the existing bank’s 
model. 
• Recurrent neural networks: Recurrent neural networks (RNNs) can be considered as 
another class of deep networks for unsupervised (as well as supervised) learning, 
where the depth can be as large as the length of the input data sequence (91), (95) as 
shown in Figure 2.20 below. 
 
Figure 2.20. Recurrent Neural Networks (91) 
 
A variant of RNN called Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) is used to profile customer 
behaviour over several time steps. The recurrent neural network is used for processing 
sequence of values and it can share parameters across different part of the model 
(91). It this sharing of statistical strength over a long time across difference input 
sequence length makes it generalise well for time-series problem. The state of the 
system at given point in time can be given by: 
7- = @7(7(-/+), 8-) (eq. 2.13) 
Where St is the state of the system at time t, @7 deterministic function, Xt is the input 
vector. The above equation can be diagrammatically represented as shown in Figure 
2.21 below: 
 
Figure 2.21. RNN states over different input time space (91) 
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The above diagram outlines that the current state of the system xt is dependent on 
the previous state of the system at xt-1.  
Ando Y, et al. (8) applies recurrent neural networks (RNN) to profile fraudulent 
behaviour rather than profiling legal behaviour. The paper suggests using the similar 
RNN technique to effectively model sequential data, for example, speech recognition, 
natural language processing and handwritten characters recognition to apply at a web 
log data that contains fraudulent transactions such as stolen credit cards to build pre-
paid cards or to use the stolen card for online auction purchase. They compare the F-
measure of the RNN (LSTM and non-LSTM) and SVM (linear kernel and RBF kernel) and 
show RNN with LSTM outperforming the other three types. In a thesis published by 
Benard Wise (96), he provides a good overview on the use of LSTM to model customer 
behaviour in order to better detect credit card fraud. Benard analysed this problem 
by comparing LSTM with Feed Forward Neural Networks and SVM and the 
experiments showed LSTM outperformed FFNN and SVM.  
In a paper produced by Xurui L et al. (97), a sandwich structured sequence learning 
model called “within-between-within” (WBW) is used for credit card fraud detection 
by stacking an ensemble model, a deep sequential learning model and another top-
layer ensemble classifier. Firstly, artificial feature engineering work like RFM and 
weight of evidence (WOE) is carried out. Next, gradient boost decision tree (GBDT) 
model is involved to optimize features within a single transaction. Then gated 
recurrent unit (GRU) model is applied on transformed sequential samples to learn 
relationships between transactions better. Finally, a top-layer Random Forest 
classifier is trained using optimized transaction eigenvectors.  The “WBW” sequence 
learning architecture was compared with simpler structures like “WB” or “BW” and 
other common classification models like SVM and Logistic Regression and has been 
proved to be more efficient. For further enchasing the model’s performance the paper 
suggested using various timestamp ranges and attention mechanism. 
The findings of the research by Benjamin R et al. (98) they showed that LSTM recurrent 
neural network model is able to represent sequences of communications between 
computers on a network and identify outlier network traffic. The NetFlow was 
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tokenized and compressed into sequences of “words” that form “sentences” 
representative of a conversation between computers. Then these sentences are used 
to generate a model that learns the semantic and syntactic grammar of the newly 
generated language. The language model is then used to predict the communication 
between two IPs and the prediction error is used as a measurement of how typical or 
atypical the observed communication were. The model was tested in three scenarios; 
dataset with no attacks, with both attack and non-attack traffic present and dataset 
with denial-of-service attacks. The proposed model was able to detect malicious 
network traffic without the assistance of labelled training data and without visibility 
into each machine’s internal state or processes. The network model with both attacks 
and non-attacks present outperformed the other models. 
2.6. Summary & Conclusion 
The research carried out as part of the literature review outlined a vast number of papers 
both part of the academic journals as well as white papers from the commercial organisations 
focusing in the field of fraud detection. The range of paper covers various approaches such as 
supervised, unsupervised and hybrid techniques to a fraud detection problem. The research 
showed the use of the classical approach to fraud detection such as an expert rule-based 
approach that is based on the experience, the intuition of a domain knowledge expert wasn’t 
able to keep pace with evolving fraud and other techniques were required (99). Most of the 
research has been done in the field of credit card fraud detection using most popular machine 
learning techniques such as Neural Networks, Hidden Marko Models, logistic regression and 
other (52), (100). 
A limited set has looked at the problem in a holistic customer-centric manner (101), where 
patterns and customer behaviour “learnt” can be utilised in cross-transactions. One such 
system described in (102) attempts to combine insurance data from multiple data sources 
and models are executed on big data. 
Currently, machine learning community is driving the majority of the research in deep 
learning. The review showed the importance of building and learning deep hierarchies of 
features to resolve problems such as breaking down (91) the unknown factors of variation in 
the input space resulting in poor generalisation. The current challenges in the deep learning 
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are around optimisation (103) that needs to be further researched. Li Deng et al. showed with 
speech recognition examples; a deep learning algorithm is very effective on large datasets 
than smaller ones. The concerns around learning rate, the effectiveness of regularisation, the 
number of hidden layers and the number of neurons per layer, etc. does also require an 
understanding of the architecture and still very sensitive just like neural networks. 
Not a lot of research has been done in using these deep learning concepts to detect fraudulent 
events in financial intuitions. The research showed one such empirical evidence where deep 
learning is used for fraud detection by PayPal (104), however, does not provide any detail on 
the actual architecture or feature learning aspects. Further study is required to understand if 
deep learning techniques such as unsupervised learning for automatically discovering data 
representation or even can combine with supervised learning to detect fraud and improve 
the detection rate. 
Based on all the findings, literature review and author’s experience, the research elements 
described in the proposal of applying advanced machine learning techniques on data set for 
cross-channel fraud detection is still valid. One may extend some of the technique described 
in the literature review such as SMOTE (105) and Discriminative Restricted Boltzmann 
Machine (92) to be applied to fraud dataset. However, the advancement in the machine 
learning techniques such as deep learning means there could be a possibility to build a 
complex hybrid model that can combine the generative power off feature learning algorithms 
via unsupervised learning with a supervised learning algorithm. Supervised models can be 
trained on existing labelled fraud data to improve the overall fraud detection rate especially 
detection that miss classified cases.   
The research provided insight into RNN as a technique used for supervised credit card fraud 
detection. There are very limited set of published articles that uses RNN for fraud detection. 
However, research article published do provide insight into the detection mechanism based 
on RNN aimed at finding behaviour that deviates from normal behaviour achieved relatively 
good success in particular where labelled data is few and scares. This technique of detecting 
fraud that is different in nature from historical fraud (like supervised learning) or in other 
words technique that makes use of new, unknown mechanisms resulting in a novel fraud 
pattern as the time evolves. The researched articles showed that RNN a powerful technique 
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for modelling time series events. This provides a proof of our hypothesis that cross channel 
transactions can indeed be modeled as sequences of time series events. Therefore, the main 
goals of this research will remain un-changed as the research showed a significant amount of 
work is still required to look at the financial data set for efficient fraud detection. 
2.7. Literature Synthesis 
This section describes the pertinent literature that has been amalgamated in creating the 
cross-channel fraud detection system as shown in Table 2.4. 
Literature  How it is used Section 
Rule based 
expert system 
Used as part of the User Agent Model as part of the change 
analysis, when a user agent string is changed. 
Appendix – A: UA Model 
Clustering Clustering is used as part of the data analysis and as part of 
the normalisation technique (i.e. PCA, SMOTE). 
Data Analysis 
Normalisation 
Modelling Results – Chapter 
5 
Benford Law Benford Law is used to calculate the probability of a specific 
digit to be found in the transaction amount. 
Append – A: Benford Law 
Markov Model Markov Model is created as part of the cross-channel fraud 
detection system to evaluate with other models such as 




Synthetic data generation is taken to determine the 
effectiveness of new algorithms. Thesis provides a novel 
approach of generating synthetic, with an aim to generate 
data quickly and efficiently that is a close representation of 





This building block will create a fraud detection model using 
neural network topology. 




The SVM model is trained by starting with one variable and 
continue by adding one by one based on features, Amount, 
SVM 
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User agent and IP address. SVM is used to evaluate with 




RNN can be conceptually modelled to arbitrary map input 
sequences and to perform fraud detection. In this thesis a 
variant of RNN known as LSTM is used to evaluate with 
other models such as Markov Model and SVM 
RNN 
Table 2.4 Types of Fraud in the banking sector 
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3.  
Cross Channel Fraud Detection System - CCFDS (Conceptualisation of 
fraud detection framework) 
3.1. Overview 
As discussed in Chapter 1, financial services such as banks face an increase in the payment 
fraud across their multiple channels. Existing approaches adopted by the banks are primarily 
rule based expert systems. These systems are channel centric and inadequate to detect cross 
channel fraud or zero-day attacks. These inefficiencies are further exacerbated by requiring 
fraud domain experts to maintain a large repository of complex rules and manual 
investigation that takes a long time.  Research in Chapter 2 outlined a various machine 
learning approaches to fraud detection that are based on predictive analytics and in specific 
few successful approaches are based on supervised neural network techniques in the credit 
card space (72). However, these supervised techniques require a large volume of labelled 
data. Unsupervised based machine learning techniques that are based on behavioural 
profiling can detect various anomalies such as zero-day attacks and previously unseen fraud 
MO. However, such existing systems are plagued with a high false positive rate as they fail to 
differenciate between anomalous events and legal events. To resolve this deficiency requires 
manual intervention and hence harder to achieve overall efficiency. 
This research is for a novel payment fraud detection system (PFDS) that can detect anomalous 
events quickly, accurately across multiple channels and can dynamically evolve to maintain 
the efficiency with minimum input from subject matter expert. The intent is to advance the 
state of the art of PFDS by proposing a framework that is cross-channel and self-tuning and 
achieve the following contributions: 
• Provide flexible ingestion layer to capture customer interaction over multiple channels 
to create single customer view. 
• Automate the process of flagging complex suspicious transactions over multiple 
channels in real time.  
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• Automate tuning of control parameters eliminating the need for domain expertise and 
the underlying detection algorithm. 
• Propose a new machine learning model for optimal performance of a PFDS. 
• Automate the optimization process on the line to achieve the goals established in the 
proposed performance model. 
Figure 3.1 below displays a framework that illustrates the relationship between the 
theoretical and technical concepts proposed.  
 
Figure 3.1. Conceptual Fraud Detection System Framework 
The above diagram highlights an approach for achieving the desired contribution. The 
framework will consist of the following building blocks: 
• Feature engineering: this building block will examine and analyse the events collected 
from bank’s channel and create latent variables that will form a feature matrix that 
can be processed easily by the neural network model. Techniques such as data 
modelling through entity relationship diagram, data normalisation, principle 
component analysis, feature set creation will be examined in this section. Further 
elaboration can be found in Section 3.2. 
• Neural Network model: this building block will create a fraud detection model using 
neural network topology. This section will examine the state-of-the-art neural 
network model that can perform automated improvement to its hyper parameters 
when a degradation of the model is detected as a process of automated tuning. This 
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section will also cover a section for evaluating model performance. It will also perform 
the following function: 
o Scoring: this building block will be responsible for outputting a score from 0 
to 100 that outlines a probability of current event been fraud. The higher the 
score the higher likelihood of an event been fraudulent. 
o Dynamic Classification: this building block will be responsible for converting 
the probability score to a fraud / not-fraud label. 
 
• The output of this framework is a label that classifies an event as either a fraud or not 
a fraud.  
Further elaboration can be found in Section 3.3. 
Two environments will be created as shown in Figure 3.2 below: 
 
Figure 3.2. Two Environment: Model Development and Model Execution 
The model development environment will be responsible for developing the model using 
historical data. Once the model is trained and validated, it will be deployed on to the model 
execution environment. In this environment, the real time events will be ingested and 
evaluated for fraud /not-fraud classification. The following sections describe the above 
building blocks in more details.   
• Section 3.2 describes the process of feature engineering and feature extractions. 
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• Section 3.3 describes the architecture of the neural network model that will be used 
for event scoring and classification. This section concludes with the proposed 
evaluation approach.  
3.2. Feature Engineering 
 
 
Figure 3.3. Feature Engineering 
Feature engineering as shown in Figure 3.3, will be the fundamental part of this research. This 
process will make use of the domain knowledge to create features that can be easily 
processed by the proposed neural network model. The examination of the data will be 
performed here to learn about the impact of data correlation on different channels such as 
cards and internet banking. Work in (106) provides a definition of a feature as “aggregate 
view across life-cycle artefacts”. This definition will be used to break the feature engineering 
process as:  
• Understand the property of the data in relation to the fraud detection problem to gain 
insight into the data required for the neural network model. For example, the impact 
of data variables such as amount, timestamp, device data, behaviour data and others 
will be examined here. 
• Carrying our various experiments combined with domain expertise to analyse which 
data elements contribute to model efficiency. For example, few transactions with a 
small amount of money, followed by a large sum of money is an indication of fraud. 
Therefore, the amount plays a vital role as a data element. 
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The approach to feature engineering can be outlined in Figure 3.4 below: 
 
Figure 3.4. Feature Engineering Flow 
This approach can be summarised as: 
• Based on the raw data and techniques such as RFM (Recency – Frequency – Monetary) 
design a set of features (107). 
• Validate the features by running a set of experiments. 
• Create more features and repeat the process. 
To gain a better understanding of the data space and how data from different customer 
interaction channels such as internet banking and POS can be related. Let X be the set of all 
75 | P a g e  
 
possible events {"+, "#, "8, … ")} of a bank’s customer across two channels namely cards and 
internet banking.  
For the internet banking channel this could represent customer journey on the internet 
banking site such as customer login, adding a payeeor making payment as shown Figure 3.5 
below:  
 
Figure 3.5. State event diagram for online banking 
When a customer login to their internet banking account, their journey can be modelled using 
the above diagram where each page (defined as a circle) is represented as a “state” of a 
customer and “event” is represented as state transition (defined as an arrow). The above 
diagram depicts a customer journey and key states as shown in Table 3.1: 
State Description 
Online Login Online login page where customer can enter username and password. 
2nd Factor Authentication A page where customer can carry out 2nd factor authentication to further 
prove their identity. 
Landing Page A landing page where customer is shown a list of their active accounts 
and products. 
View Statement A page where the customer can view all their statement. 
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View Account Details A page showing details about the selected account is displayed with top 
10 most recent transactions. 
Change Details A page where customer have an option to select their specific details. 
Change of Telephone A page where customer can change their telephone number. 
Change of address A page where customer can change their address. 
Change of password A page where the customer can change reset their online banking 
password. 
Make Payments A page where customer can make payment to a payeeor setup a 
standing order or direct debit. 
Add new Beneficiary A page where the customer can add a new payeeby inputting 
beneficiary’s account number and sort code. 
Existing Beneficiary A page where customer can make payment to existing beneficiary. 
Confirm payment A page for customer to confirm the payment. 
Logout An event via a button to log customer out. 
Table 3.1 Online Banking User Journey Description 
For the card payment journey, the term “event” could represent the customer purchasing 
items from the e-Commerce site by making “card not present” transaction or customer 
purchasing items by making “card present” transaction using Point of Sale Terminal. The type 
of events across different cards channels is shown in Figure 3.6 below. In this context, the 
states are the transaction events (depicted as Txn N): 
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Figure 3.6. State event diagram for Cards Usage 
The above diagram depicts the possible states for the credit/debit card transactions given in 
Table 3.2 below: 
State Description 
Transaction (Txnn) Customer paying for their purchase 
Table 3.2 User Journey for Cards Transaction 
From the machine learning standpoint, this can be formulated as the ') as the set of all cards 
events and W) be the set of all Internet Banking events. Given this the input events 8 can then 
be defined as (') 	∪ 	 W))	 when card event is presented with internet banking event. Similarly,  
(') ∩ W))	 when card event is presented which is independent to internet banking event and 
vice versa. Let Z be the vector representation of the information available for each event 
{[+, [#, … [)}. Typically, this would include: 
• Transactional data – captures key attributes of a customer transaction that defines 
their characteristics and generally stored in OLTP relational databases. This includes 
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monetary events (i.e. Account Bill Pay) as well as service events (i.e. change of 
address). When applied to the fraud domain this type of data can be used in the setting 
of RFM (Recency, Frequency, and Monetary) (107), where data can be aggregated in 
accordance with a various time dimension.  Unsupervised learning algorithm such as 
clustering can then be applied (20) for fraud detection.  
• Personal and Account data – Transaction data can be augmented by personal and 
account data for better fraud detection. For instance, it shows that several factors 
such as age, gender and income contribute to people committing fraud (7). 
• Behavioural data – Behavioural data is defined as information that provides context 
into individual’s behaviour. When reference in the context of fraud detection on 
bank’s channel this will include data collected on the customer side as well as on the 
bank’s side.  For example, for online banking data collected on the customer side will 
include mouse movements and keystrokes (Reference own paper). The bank side data 
will include page navigation, time spend on page, etc. (19).  
Let \ be a classifier that has the following values {@G]^_, !CD	@G]^_}, then model can be 
defined in Figure 3.7 below: 
 
Figure 3.7. Payment Fraud Detection System 
Where, "!  is the event, [!  is the information about the event and :!is the classification output.  
Probabilistic view can be defined as: 
0 < a("! 	 ∈ 	 ')|[!) < 1 for card events and (eq. 3.1) 
0 < a("! 	 ∈ 	 W)|[!) < 1 for internet banking events (eq. 3.2) 
The above two equations can be used to derive probability when events from different 
channels are analysed independently in Figure 3.8 below: 
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Figure 3.8. Fraud Probabilities for Cards vs Online Banking 
Or a joint probability is given as: 
0 < a("! 	 ∈ 	 ')|[! 	, W)|[! 	) < 1 (eq. 3.3) 
 
Figure 3.9. Joint Fraud Probabilities for Cards and Online Banking 
The joint probabilities as depicted in Figure 3.9 above can be further explored once the data 
associated with each of the events are well understood. The next section on the data model 
provides an insight on the data.  
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3.2.1. Data Model 
 
Figure 3.10. Data Model 
As described in Figure 3.10, this section provides a Logical Data Model (LDM) that highlights 
the cross-pollination of data for cross channel events. It provides a unified view of the data 
used for Payment Fraud Detection System regarding of the channels.  
There are four main subject areas within the logical model: 
• Static Data (customer, account, address, customer-account linkage, product holdings 
etc.); 
• Contextual Data (covering non-monetary data such as session data and logon 
requests); 
• Monetary Transaction Data (covering transfer transaction, credit card transaction, 
POS transaction); and 
• Reference Data (transaction type, fraud type, payment type etc.) 
Figure 3.11 below provides a database schema representation of the Logical Data Model. 
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Table 3.3 below describes the entities: 
Entity Description 
BankingTransaction This entity presents, events that are received from the channels. They describe 
account activity involving money and customer’s behaviour on a specific channel. 
TransferTransaction A transaction that is done by the party on the online channel, which involves the 
transfer of money from the party’s account to a remitter. 
CardTransaction This will include relevant data about the card transaction and define a type of card 
transaction as CardPresent or Card Not Present Transaction. 
POSTransaction This entity will include data about the card present transaction. When a card and 
party is present at the same time. For non-chip and pin cards, data from the magnetic 
strip on the back of the card will be used.  
MerchantTransaction This entity will include data about the card not present transaction when the party 
or card are not present.  
Session Provides information about the user activities on a browser or a mobile to a specific 
unique id for a specific amount of time.  This unique id is passed back and forward, 
between the bowser/mobile app and the web server on the bank’s side until the time 
expires or the user logs out.   
PhoneSession Provides information related to the phone and user behaviour as part of a session. 
Phone’s context data will be passed back to the server. 
WebSession Provides information related to the web browser and the user behaviour as part of a 
session. Browser’s context data will be passed back to the server. 
MalwareData Malware data found on the device, using external service.  
Device Details about the device used by the party to execute a banking transaction. 
Party The Party defined as a customer to the financial institution that will be monitored by 
the PDFS. In specific, the party represents a person who holds account/s within a 
financial institution. 
Card Details about the actual card involved in a particular transaction. This includes credit 
cards, debit cards, cash cards, etc. 
Account The account entity is the actual financial account on which the monetary transaction 
is performed, and which is related to the Party. 
Table 3.3 Entities for Data Processing Service 
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Table 3.4 below provides a description on the relevant attributes associated with each entity: 
Entity Name: BankingTransaction 
Attribute Name Data Type Description 
transactionID Varchar Unique identity for each transaction represented as the 
primary key. 
accountID Varchar A unique identifier for the account that the transaction is 
performed on.  
Channel Varchar Constant values of all supported channels (Online, Phone, 
Mobile, POS, ATM).  
currencyCode Varchar The local currency code. 
userID Varchar The user that is associated with the transaction (or 
transaction version). 
sessionID Varchar A unique identifier for a session (either web or phone). 
transactionLocalDateTime Timestamp The local date and time of the transaction. When receiving 
transaction version, this field holds the local time and date 
of the current version. 
transactionType Varchar The client transaction type. This also includes the client 
specific services (information change), such as address 
change, password change etc. 
Table 3.4 BankingTransaction Entity Definition 
  
Entity Name: TransferTransaction 
Attribute Name Data Type Description 
transactionID Varchar Unique identity for each transaction represented as the 
primary key. 
transferExecutionDate Varchar The date the transfer will actually take place (not the setup 
date i.e. not the transactionLocalDateTime). 
transferPaymentSpeedCd Varchar The speed at which the payment will be executed. 
(i.e. faster payments or BACS). 
remitterAccountNo Varchar Account number of the remitter where the money will be 
deposited. 
remitterSortCode Varchar Sort code of the remitter where the money will be 
deposited. 
Table 3.5 TransferTransaction Entity Definition 
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Entity Name: CardTransaction 
Attribute Name Data Type Description 
transactionID Varchar Unique identity for each transaction represented as the 
primary key. 
authenticationMethodUsed Varchar The code describing the actual authentication method 
for the transaction.  
authorisationDecisionCode Varchar The result of the authorization process. 
cardFeeAmount Varchar The surcharge amount converted to the bank's base 
currency. 
cardNo Varchar Also known as PAN. The card number, which is an 
identification of the card. 
cardVerificationCd Varchar Card Verification standard response code. 
meassageType Varchar A 4-digit numeric field which classifies the high-level 
function of the message ISO (MTI). 
messagePurpose Varchar The transaction type as deduced from the Message Type 
Indicator (MTI) and other fields, for example - Refund 
authorisation requests.  
track_1_2_indicator Varchar Indicates whether track 1 or 2 was read from the card. 
track1Name Varchar The name of the cardholder that is encoded on the 
magnetic stripe. 
cardPinUpdateDate Timestamp The update date of the card PIN. 
 
Table 3.6 CardTransaction Entity Definition 
Entity Name: POSTransaction 
Attribute Name Data Type Description 
transactionID Varchar Unique identity for each transaction represented as the 
primary key. 
avsResponseCode Varchar The code that identifies the result of comparing address 
verification information received in the transaction with 
address verification information contained in the 
cardholder address fields. Standard ISO values are 
acceptable.  
 
cardPresentInd Varchar Indicates whether or not the card was present during the 
activity. 
3DsecureResponseCode Varchar Online security protocol response code (VbV, 
SecureCode). 
contactlessInd Varchar Indicates if the transaction authentication method was 
using RFID (as in DE22 - POS Entry mode). 
Table 3.7 POSTransaction Entity Definition 
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Entity Name: MerchantTransaction 
Attribute Name Data Type Description 
transactionID Varchar Unique identity for each transaction represented as the 
primary key. 




Varchar For clearings of payment transactions only, shows the 




Varchar For electronic terminals, distinguishes between e-









Varchar Acquirer reference data, needed for clearings only. Use 
to track to presentments. 
Table 3.8 POSTransaction Entity Definition 
 
Entity Name: Session 
Attribute Name Data Type Description 
sessionID Varchar Unique identity for each session represented as the 
primary key. 
sessionType Varchar Type of session associated with the current transaction 
(i.e phone session, web session). 
Table 3.1 Session Entity Definition 
 
Entity Name: PhoneSession 
Attribute Name Data Type Description 
sessionID Varchar Unique identity for each session represented as the 
primary key. 
phoneDeviceSournceNumber Varchar Source phone number of the call session. 
 
phoneSessionAuthChannel Varchar The channel through which the customer authentication 
took place. 
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phoneSessionDateTime Timestamp The date and time that the session was started. 
 
phoneSessionDuration Double The duration of the call session. 
 
isInitiatedByCustomer Boolean Indicates whether the call is initiated by the customer 
and not an automated procedure, or an active call from 
the bank. 
 
phoneNumber Numeric The standardized phone number associated with the 
call. 
Table 3.2 PhoneSession Entity Definition 
Entity Name: WebSession 
Attribute Name Data Type Description 
sessionID Varchar Unique identity for each session represented as the 
primary key. 
headerAuth Varchar The relevant client session information  from the http 
header data. 
userAgent Varchar The relevant client session such as web browser type, 
plug-ins, etc. 
ipAddress Varchar The client browser IP address that initiated the session.  
loginName Varchar The online user of the Internet session. Usually, there is 
a one to many relationships between party and user. 
secondFactorAuthInd Varchar Indicates whether the client passed a second factor 
authorization during the session (If applicable). 
startDateTime Varchar The date and time when the Internet session began in 
the time zone of the local web server. 
headerFields Varchar The components of the message header of the HTTP 
request that triggered the event. This should include 
both standard and non-standard Header Fields. 
browserTimeZone Varchar The difference in minutes between the browser time and 
GMT. 
screenResolution Varchar The screen resolution of the client browser used during 
the Internet session. 
Table 3.11 WebSession Entity Definition 
Entity Name: MalwareData 
Attribute Name Data Type Description 
ID Numeric Unique identity for each malware represented as the 
primary key. 
malware_description Varchar Description of the malware found. 
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malware_type Varchar  Type of malware found. 
vendor_score Double Score provided by the vendor on the malware. 
vendor_tag Varchar Additional tags provided by the vendor. 
vendori_ID Varchar  Unique id for the vendor. 
Table 3.12 Malware Entity Definition 
Entity Name: Device 
Attribute Name Data Type Description 
deviceID Varchar The unique device identifier generated using cookies. 
deviceFirstSeen Date The date a transaction was first performed with  this 
device. 
 
deviceLastSeen Date The last date a transaction was performed with this 
device. 
deviceBinding Varchar The client IP Address as detected by the system that the 
device is using. 
proxyIPDetected Boolean Indication on whether a device is behind a proxy. 
deviceScore  The probability that this device is really the device 
identified by the system. The higher the number, the 
greater the chance that the ID was correctly detected by 
the system. 
Motion detection Varchar Raw data that provides information on the motion (only 
for mobile). 
Rotation detection Varchar Raw data that provides information on the rotation of 
the device (only for mobile). 
Device position Varchar Geo information about the device. 
Pressure point Varchar  Raw data that provides information on the pressure 
point of the device (only for mobile). 
authUsed Varchar  Authentication used by user on the phone (i.e. finger 
scan, facial, PIN, etc.). 
Table 3.13 Device Entity Definition 
Entity Name: Party 
Attribute Name Data Type Description 
partyID Varchar  Identifier for a customer. 
partyName Varchar The party's name. 
 
onlineServiceJoinDate Timestamp The date the party signed up for the institution's online 
service.  Any standardized date format is acceptable, as 
long as all date formats are the same. 
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passwordUpdateDate Timestamp The date the party's password was last changed (from 
ANY channel). 
partyDOB Varchar The party’s date of birth 
Address Varchar The party's address 
partyAddressUpdateDate Timestamp The date that the party or one of his related accounts 
had the last address change (from ANY channel). 
partyEmail Varchar The primary e-mail address associated with the party. 
partyEmailUpdateDate Timestamp The date that the party's e-mail address was last 
changed (from ANY channel). 
partyInfoUpdateDate Timestamp The date that any party’s information was last changed 
(from ANY channel). 
partyLoanInd Boolean  Indicates whether the party owns a loan product. 
 
partyMobilePhone Varchar The first mobile phone number.  Any standardized 
format is acceptable.  
partyMobileUpdateDate Timestamp The date the party's mobile phone number was last 
changed (from ANY channel). 
Table 3.14 Party Entity Definition 
 
Entity Name: Card 
Attribute Name Data Type Description 
cardBin Numeric The bank’s identification for the PAN. 
activationDate Timestamp The date the card was activated. Any standardized date 
format is acceptable, as long as all date formats are the 
same. 
AmtLimit Double The maximum daily withdrawal amount for the card 
type. 
iccCardInd Boolean Indicates whether this card is an integrated circuit card 
(chip card). 
issuedDate Date The date the card was last issued. 
status Varchar A code that indicates the current status of the card (i.e., 
lost, stolen, etc.). 
expirationDate Date The date embossed on the card beyond which the card 
must not be honoured. Any standardized date format is 
acceptable, as long as all date formats are the same. 
Table 3.15 Card Entity Definition 
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Entity Name: Account 
Attribute Name Data Type Description 
accountID Varchar The unique identifier for the account. 
availiableBal Double The available balance consisting of the payee account 
balance affected by this transaction plus the payee's 
overdraft limit / Available Credit / etc. (i.e. after the 
current transactions). 
Branch Varchar The branch of the payee account. 
 
accountNumber Numeric The payee Account Number or IBAN. 
 
openDate Date  The date that the payee account was opened.   
 
overdraftLimit Double The overdraft limit of the account affected by this 
transaction. The value should be either 0 or a negative 
value. 
 
Status   
Table 3.16 Account Entity Definition 
Statistical relational learning (108) will be applied to understand the statistical strengths of 
the cross-channel data, this technique will be further explored during the implementation 
phase.  
3.2.2. Data Normalisation 
 
Figure 3.12. Feature Engineering - Data Normalisation 
As shown in Figure 3.12, this section focuses on Data Normalisation technique. From the data 
model above, the input data will be from the different range of values and types. These range 
of values could vary widely, that could impact the model performance. Data normalisation 
90 | P a g e  
 
will be carried out by fine-tuning the inputs variables to bring the entire probability 
distribution of fine-tuned values into alignment. Different data normalisation techniques such 
as shifting, and scaling will be applied to eliminate the effects of certain gross influences.  For 
example, for some of the numeric values such as amount averages can be applied, rescaling 
and decorrelation techniques can be applied so that input sequence data can be easily 
modelled by function approximators such as Gaussian Mixtures models  (109) to provide 
smoother distribution where mean is centred and the standard deviation is around 0. 
 
 
Figure 3.13. Data Normalisation requirement 
As seen in Figure 3.13 above, the input distribution needs to be fine-tuned so that it is aligned 
to the objective function for a model. The data normalisation technique will help the model 
to generalise well. 
Another approach is to create profiles and augment that to the input sequence to reduce long 
range contextual dependencies to short range (19) (110). For example, a profile of a customer 
can factor different amount ranges (min, max and average) for different timeframes and 
append this information to the input feature. 
Rescaling and decorrelation will need to be applied to the raw input prior to feeding data to 
the model. One well known technique is known as PCA (Principle Component Analysis) (111). 
Fundamental components for PCA are adders, delayers, multipliers. These components are 
similar to neural network component called neuron where inputs are multiplied by weights 
and linear combiners are in the form of activation potential. 
For example, one of the input parameters (i.e. age) can have a range from 1 to 100. While 
another input parameter such as transaction amount may range from £1 to £100,000. When 
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these two inputs are provided to a machine learning model (e.g. RNN) would result in a large 
activation function output. Since weights are fixed, multiplying these two inputs with fixed 
weight will produce large activation function. I.e. amount coefficient to be very large 
compared to age coefficient, resulting in poor model performance.   
Data can be rescaled and reshaped so all inputs are centred around 0, however, this will 
produce input vector where data is correlated. To decorrelate the data PCA can be applied 
(or data whiting) (112) by taking the average and the difference between the above two 
inputs.  
PCA definition can be given as: 
a'd = e]DG?"	e^D?$P?.]D?C!(H.]PF	]!_	GCD]DF) ∗ e]DG?"	]__D?C!	(Hℎ?@D) (eq. 3.4) 
For example  
[!F<dQF !F<deC^!D] = 	 [CP_dQF CP_deC^!D] ∗ 	 i0.05 0.13
0.1 −1.2
m + [−1.2 −1.6] 
During the pre-processing phase, min/max standardising technique can be used as given by 




(!F<e]" − !F<e?!) + !F<e?! 
(eq. 3.5) 
Where, !F<e]"	]!_	!F<e?! are the new values. 
A recent work has shown that (113) by adding more hidden layers can achieve the similar 
results to PCA whiting by letting the network determine the right level of whiting is required. 
A technique is known as batch normalisation (113) which is applied between the layer to 
renormalize the activation function before feeding the input to the next layer. The input to 





 (eq. 3.6) 
Where statistics on logits such as weighted sum and biases are computed in batches and 
rescaled by subtracting the average. Furthermore, it is then divided by standard deviation 
before the activation function.   
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3.2.3. Feature set creation 
 
 
Figure 3.14. Feature Engineering - Feature Set Creation 
As shown in Figure 3.14, this section focuses on feature set creation. Feature set creation is a 
process of selecting a set select of features that are relevant for the model to perform 
efficiency.  The technique of RFM will be used to view, create non-normalised data that can 
be used to facilitate further analysis. For example, transaction, personal and account tables 
will be merged into a single non-normalised data table and processed through for feature 
extraction as shown in Figure 3.15 below: 
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Figure 3.15. De-normalised data structure for faster analysis and processing 
The data will be presented in an offline feed for training the network and as an event in real 
time as they appear in the channel. The tables 5 to 17 listed above highlights a list of attributes 
that are available for the analysis.  
Once the data set is created, the next step will be to go through a variable selection process. 
Various techniques are used to reduce variables to a manageable subset before model 
construction is undertaken (7). Using real world data, there will be a vast number of data 
points that may result in a vast number of features. There is a need to reduce/ amalgamate 
the variables by carefully selecting interesting variables, both to ensure good system and 
model performance. One of the techniques is to use filters which examine each variable in 
turn by measuring and calculating the strength of the relationship between the predictor 
variable and the modelling objective (output). The only variables that are taken forward that 
exhibits strong correlation. Two well-known techniques used for filtering are Pearson 
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correlation and Fisher score. One more technique often use is called Cramer’s V filter which 
is based on the Chi-squared analysis (7). 
Fraud detection is an imbalance class problem. The majority of the bank’s events are genuine 
with a proportion and are executed by fraudsters. There will be a need to come up with a 
strategy to rebalance the dataset and ensure a balance of classes (fraud / not fraud) is 
maintained during the learning process. Several strategies have been defined such as 
ensemble, cost-based, distance-based, sampling (114). The sampling approach will be used to 
take a subset and use that to build an analytical model while avoiding the sampling bias. In 
fraud detection, the typical problem with sampling is that customer behaviour will change 
from time to time and this may introduce bias in the model which could result in poor 
performance and skew the results for the actual test. One technique (105) is to use Synthetic 
Minority Over-sampling technique. This technique will oversample the data and then applying 
the classifier that achieves the best False Positive (FP) and True Negative (TN) rates. The 
experiment conducted using SMOTE technique achieved 96.7% TN and 4.5% FP.  Another 
approach is to make use of the stratified sampling, where the sample will contain the same 
amount of data that represents both classes for fraud and not fraud. 
Looking only at the individual transaction for classification may not be enough since, it does 
not capture the customer behaviour, especially across multiple channels. To deal with this 
there will be a need to include time as a critical element to the feature set.  In addition to 
time new latent features such as previous amount, pervious ip-address and others across 
different time frames will be introduced. During the implementation phase, transaction 
aggregation strategy will be considered and implemented (115). This methodology will allow 
us to create a group of raw features based on time (i.e. a number of hours, weeks, months) 
and then create new sets that are based on distance algorithm such as time elapsed between 
customer first register for online banking and made the first payment. It will also allow the 
creation of further statistical counters such as a number of transactions during the last hour, 
total spend in the last hour and others.  
As seen in the table below there are different data types associated with different attributes 
such as numeric, categorical, nominal. Since the input to the model is numeric values, there 
is a need to derive categorical and nominal values into numeric values. Thus, creating latent 
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variables that will form part of the feature vector (116). For example, one of the technique 
known as one hot encoding (117) can be applied for categorical values such as transaction 
type below by listing down all the different transaction type and updating the transaction 
table as shown in Figure 3.16 below: 
 
Figure 3.16. Example of One Hot Encoding 
It is noted that some of the categorical value such as account number cannot be represented 
using one hot encoding (i.e. there could be millions of account numbers). These values will be 
treated as continuous values. The representation such continuous values will be tackled 
during the later phases. 
Finally, in order to reduce the redundant features regularisation techniques will be applied. A 
lot of features with a limited set of data causes the training data to overfit (24). Regularisation 
is applied by adding a penalty to the error function so that it limits the large variations to the 
features.  From a Bayesian, probabilistic standpoint this is equal to applying prior 
knowledge to the features so that weight mass doesn’t scatter too much. As defined by Bishop 
(24) the simplest form is known as the sum of squares of all the features so that the sum of 










∥ < ∥# 
(eq. 3.7) 
Where, ∥ < ∥# are the coefficients and λ is the regularisation term. The two standard 
regularisation methods (118) are: 
• L1 Regularisation – minimises the sum of the absolute values. 
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• L2 Regularisation - minimises the sum of squares of the absolute values. 
According to the research paper proposed by Andrew (118), applying L1 regularisation causes 
many parameters to result to zero and hence a considered a preferable candidate for feature 
selection as it speeds up the learning process.   
The topics covered in this section can be summarised as: 
• A need to ensure data is coherent and correlated. This will be achieved by normalising 
the data according to the data model and followed by flattening of data for easy of 
processing.  
• Sampling and rescaling techniques will then be applied to ensure the ratio between 
fraudulent and non-fraudulent is consistent. This will ensure the feature selection 
consists of a set of features from both fraud and not-fraud population.  
• Applying data whiting techniques such as PCA to derive a set of relevant features 
(both latent and non-latent features) that can be easily processed by the model. 
• Finally, dimensionality reduction technique such as L1 regularisation so that only the 
relevant features are selected. 
3.3. Neural network model 
 
 
                                                                   Figure 3.17. Neural Network Model 
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The findings as per chapter two, neural networks can be used to build models that represent 
non-linearity efficiently. This efficiency can be exploited in terms of its ability to detect 
complex nonlinear relationships between dependent and independent variables.  The 
research also showed neural networks is the most commonly used method for developing 
fraud models for the banks. As shown in Figure 3.17, Neural network model will be used to 
for scoring and classification of the incoming event. The model will be based on the supervised 
learning. That means in the model development environment, the model will be trained on 
the labelled data by comparing its output with expected output and making the relevant 
adjustment to minimise the overall error and learning the inherent properties of the input 
data. Subsequently classifying the inputs when deployed in a production environment as 
depicted in Figure 3.2. 
The fundamental assumption for the input to be statistically nonstationary so that a 
dynamical system can be implemented that can have the following properties: 
• A set of adjustable parameters (often referred to as weights) as the inputs to a non-
linear function so that it can capture dynamics of time varying inputs.   
• A block for error calculation, calculated as the difference between the actual output 
and the predicted output.  
• A control (learning) algorithm for the adaptation of the weights. 
• Ability to fuse data together so that it can be represented in both qualitative (symbolic 
– represented by a data model) or quantitative (engineering – represented by a 
feature vector) form. 
• Categorisation of the events into two class: 
o Class A – Fraud: This event will be marked by an expert and will be used as a 
feedback for auto-tuning as well as during the learning process. 
o Class B – Not Fraud: events not marked as fraud. 
This assumption is valid because the events are continuously produced by the bank’s 
customers and feed to the dynamical system via channels for fraud detection.  The nature in 
which the events are generated means one cannot assume the events to be identically and 
independently distributed (i.i.d). For example, the customer spend patterns on the digital 
channel will have a different distribution to the spend patterns on the cards channel. 
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However, there is a requirement that the data from different channels needs to be cross 
pollinate to form a strong correlation and improve the overall detection. For example, when 
making payments from a digital channel, one would expect the payment process to be 
completed in the digital channel. Furthermore, one do not expect a credit card payments to 
be initiated in parallel.   
Based upon the above, the model will need to have the following capabiliites: 
• Unconstrained input space to cater for variable input length for corss-pollinated data. 
• Ability to easily include contextual information based on past events. 
• Robust to noise, as the events unfold over time (119). 
The research (119), (114), (120), (121)  have highlighted a Recurrent Neural Network as the 
model that has above capabilities that will make the network desirable for fraud detection 
domain.  Furthermore, a lot of research is done on the image and video processing using 
multi-dimensional RNN as they form a directed acyclic graph that generalises well for 
multidimensional data (119) which could be useful.  
3.3.1. Scoring, SelfLearning and Classsification 
At the heart of the neural network model that will perform scoring and classification by 
sequence learning the temporal patterns of the entire customer history. Recurrent Neural 
Networks algorithm will be used as it can classify individual transactions as fraud or not 
sequences of events. The Universal Approximation Theorem for recurrent neural network 
highlights that given many hidden units can arbitrary map input sequences to output 
sequences with reasonable accuracy (120).  The usefulness of this theorem can be shown in 
the following examples that highlight how RNN can be conceptually modelled to arbitrary 
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Example 1: Normal Customer journey for online banking 
 
Normal customer behaviour where the 
following can be measured: 
• Information about the event. 
• Time spent at the event. 
• Latency introduced while moving 
from one event to another. 
 
The above diagram depicts a user navigating from one page to another on the bank’s online 
portal.  For example, time taken for a user to log into a bank and navigate to Account Overview 
is approximately 2 seconds. Subsequently, the user navigates from Account Overview page to 
Make Payment page in approximately 5 seconds and so on.  
Example 2: Malware journey for online banking 
 
The following can be measured: 
• Information about the event. 
• Time spent at the event. 
• Latency introduced while moving 
from one event to another. 
 
The above diagram depicts a malware journey for online banking, where malware logins and 
subsequently goes through the same events as a normal user in quick succession. Time spend 
on each event and in-between event is minimum. 
Example 3: Non-Repudiation attack on online banking 
 
A non-repudiation attack is when only the 
make payment event is observed. This is also 
known as the “man in the middle attack” 
where an attacker captures the event and 
replays the over after a while.  
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Example 4: Normal customer behaviour – cross-pollination 
 
Normal customer behaviour where card not 
present transaction is introduced when 
logged to the online banking. 
 
In the above example, customer login to the online banking in order to make a payment. 
However, before the make payment event is completed, the customer also initiates a card 
not present transaction. By measuring the elapsed time between Account Overview and Make 
Payment, certain inferences can be made. For example, the time elapsed is large for the 
customer to initiate a card not present transaction while in the process of making a payment. 
Contextual attributes between the different events can be considered by making an 
inference.  
Example 5: Card cloning attack – cross-pollination 
 
An example is where normal behaviour is 
followed immediately by unusual behaviour. 
In the above example, a customer does login event and moves to account overview event as 
normal, which is most immediately followed by a card not present transaction. This might be 
an example of card cloning and zero-day attack which can be quickly determined by the 
scoring model. 
Example 6: Card Fraud – velocity fraud 
 
Velocity fraud is when fraudster carries out 
few transactions for the low amount to test 
the card details are valid, followed by high 
value transactions until the card is blocked 
or no funds are available. 
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As seen in the above examples, by providing a temporal dependency for sequences of events, 
the model can store customer behaviour based on its past input and outputs as “memory” to 
influence the current network output for a given event. 
This can be further elaborated mathematically as a set of all possible events defined by I, that 
can be possible by a customer {?+, ?#, ?8, ?)} from distribution %B$<. Every W) can belong to a 
class with a label of fraud or class with not fraud.  The input space W = (ℝC) is the sequences 
of size t real value vector. Let the output space ' = u) be the sequences of u labels that can 
take the class values {fraud, not fraud}. The derived variables called features will be 
calculated. Let 8 be set of all possible features {"+, "#, "8, ")} drawn from the discrete time 
event #(D). The objective is then to use I to train fraud detection algorithm ℎ: 8 → ' to label 
outputs in a test set WD 	⊆ 	%B$<in a way that minimises the error measure. The representation 
of the typical RNN is shown in Figure 3.18 below: 
 
Figure 3.18. RNN Architecture 
The RNN architecture will be like an ANN architecture but weights will be shared across 
evolving time stamp. RNN consists of an input layer that contains event at discrete time stamp 
(DH). The number of nodes will be created based on the number of features in a feature set 
("), the number of hidden nodes (ℎ) will be based on trial and error and the output will 
consist of a single node (#).  
For online banking the input feature vector will be: 
8- = (w-)E  (eq. 3.8) 
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• id - state transition id. For example, login page, authentication page, landing page, 
view statements page, view account page, make payment to new beneficiary, make 
payment to existing beneficiary, change of details, confirm payment, logout. 
• latency – is the time difference between the page navigation. 
• CFV – context feature vector. For example, ip address, malware flag. 
• AFV – authentication feature vector. For example, authentication type. 
• TFV – transaction feature vector. For example amount, transaction type, 
payeeaccount number, etc. 
For credit/debit card the input feature vector will be: 
"1 = [HD]DF	?_				?$	]__GFHH				]eC^!D				D?eF	HD]e$				eFG.ℎ]!D	?_			]..C^!D	!C]  
 
The state of the currently hidden nodes will depend on some objective function that takes in 
the state of the pervious hidden nodes and input vector at time D.  
ℎ- =	@:(ℎ-/+, "-) (eq. 3.9) 
 
Where ℎ- is the new state, ℎ-/+ is the old state, "- is the input at time D. This provides a 
feedback into the network and can be considered as introducing memory to the network. 
Since, the network can hold memory it can be better utilised for classification and prediction 
tasks, when compared to other neural networks. Such a feedback at the hidden layer is 
referred to as local feedback, global feedback is out of scope for this thesis (121). If the tanh 
is used as an objective function @: for the hidden layer, then the above equation becomes: 
ℎ- = (tanh(<33ℎ-/+ +	<33"-)) (eq. 3.10) 
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 Tanh is a logistic function that is non-linear and continuously differentiable. This enables the 
study of the properties of neural networks for developing learning algorithms.  
The values of the output layer y(t) are predicted based on the current input, weighted by the 
coefficients wi of all the past input. The aim is to minimise the error by incrementally adjusting 
the parameters of the algorithm to optimise the objective function ℎ-	during training.  The 
prediction error, e(t) thus becomes: 
F(D) = #(D) −	#q(D) (eq. 3.11) 
  
While for regression models, typically the sum of squared error or squared Euclidean 
distances is used. For parametric models, it is generally mean squared error that is used, 
E[F#(D)], where E[.] represents the statistical expectation operator and {#(D)} is assumed to 
be statistically independent (122). 
 
The classifier output node will produce 1 if fraud is detected or 0 otherwise. A probabilistic 
classification approach is preferred to calculating conditional probabilities $(.P]HHwG]^_|"). 
This will allow probabilities to be retained in a consistent manner. This classifier will accept xi 
describing input Ii and will produce a probability score that belongs to a class Ci. The output 
will be based on the SoftMax function that output a cross-entropy loss and given by the 
equation: 
a(Å = @G]^_	|"-) = 	
F:++$,
∑F:+-$,
 (eq. 3.12) 
 
Based on the above equation the output can be given by: 
0	 ≤ a(?! 	 ∈ ')|"!) 	≤ 1 (eq. 3.13) 
For example, the output of the above equation will be between 0 to 1 outlining the probability 
of the event. If the probability is above a certain threshold the system will output 1 as fraud 
else 0. 
In order to learn the sequences of events and their classification accurately, an error needs to 
be calculated and propagated back through the network using the gradient decent algorithm 
known as Back Propagation Through Time (BPTT) (123). The advantage of using BPTT is that 
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linear and non-linear constraints between the shared weights can be easily incorporated. It 
will allow the model to generalise well to temporal dependencies of different states. For 
examples, let’s say one started off satisfying the following constraints ℎ+ =	ℎ# and one need 

















Using the above equations, one can start to build forward pass that determines user state at 
each timestamp and followed by a backward pass by computing the error derivatives at each 
time stamp. One can then add together the derivatives of all the time stamp for each weight 
and then change all the copies of the weight by the same amount which is proportional to the 




                                            Figure 3.19. Back Propagation Through Time for RNN 
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The above diagram can be summarised as: 
1. Events are passed into the unfolded time and error is calculated based on some 
constraint at each time stamp. For example, when an event is misclassified as legal 
while it is fraud.  
2. Error is then fed back into the network and weight deltas are calculated and associated 
weights are updated by calculating the sum of all the deltas. 
3. The process is repeated for each training epochs until the desired error measure is 
achieved.  
 
Another approach to propagating error is known as real time recurrent learning (122). In this 
process, the gradient information is calculated in real time as the inputs are presented to the 
network. This will be useful when the fraud model will be required to be updated in real time 
as a self-learning approach. 
During the implementation of the model, the model will be first trained using the batch 
learning approach and once the model is sufficiently trained, online learning method for self-
learning can be used. The batch learning approach will be used in the model development 
environment and on the historical data in order for the model to quickly converge as learning 
can be done in batches. In order for the model to be adaptive to new fraud MOs in real time, 
online learning approach will be used in the model execution environment (production).  This 
was as the new fraud emerges, the model’s internal state will be updated along with 
detection, hence providing the self-tuning aspects of the framework. 
The steps for the batch process can be summarised as: 
• Randomly initialise all the weights. 
• Iterate over training data based on a particular pattern (batch size). 
o Pass input data through, based on the batch size. 
o Calculate the mean sum of errors after each run based on the expected output 
vs the currently predicted output. 
o Update all the weights based on the chain rule by calculating the error 
difference. 
o Stop the process when some threshold in error performance is reached or no 
other further improvement is observed. 
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As discussed in the several research papers (119), (123), both above algorithms fail to learn 
where there are long-time lags between the input events and their associated errors flowing 
back through time or when the network grows from t to t+n. As discussed in the paper 
published by (123), the error derivatives of the hidden layer consist of Jacobin maps. These 
maps will consist of eigen values, which when goes through differential equations resulting in 
values converging to zero when values are less than one. This is called vanishing grading 
problem. However, if the values are greater than zero, they are pushing away from optimal 
minima resulting in exploding grading. These issues of exploding and vanishing gradients was 
addressed by Hochreiter and Schmidhuber by inventing a new RNN model called Long Short-
Term Memory (LSTM) (124).  
The LSTM network can be used alongside hidden layer or can be used as a hidden layer to 
overcome the vanishing and exploding gradient problem. The properties of the LSTM memory 
block are outlined in Figure 3.20 below: 
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Network cell description is outlined in Table 3.17 below: 
 
Component Description 
The Constant Error Carrousel (CEC) The purpose of CEC is to store information over a long 
period. The core function of CEC is to act as a memory 
function. 
Input Gate The purpose of the input gate is to control the input 
to a memory cell. Its core function is to allow data 
into the memory cell and to protect the memory cell 
from noise from other network units. 
Output Gate Similar to the input gates, the purpose of this gate is 
to control access to the memory cell’s content. Its 
core function is to protect the memory cell from 
noise. 
 
Forget gate The purpose of this gate is to forget the memory the 
cell has acquired during earlier time stamp as the 
content becomes irrelevant. 
Peephole connections Provides further waited connections that connects a 
memory cell CEC with the memory block gates to 
provide additional feedback. 
Memory blocks Multiple memory cells are grouped together to form 
memory blocks. In memory blocks, input and output 
gates are shared. Each memory block consists of CEC 
to ensure constant error flow even if there are no 
inputs or error flowing through. It is this property of 
the LSTM network that solves the vanishing gradient 
problem (123). 
  
Table 3.17 LSTM Cell Definition 
This section highlighted a potential use of RNN to improve the cross-channel fraud detection. 
RNN seems to be the natural fit as it can efficiently deal with temporal dependencies of the 
sequence classification problem which can be used for dealing with events from internet 
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banking that is part of an internet banking session as well as a chain of card events from POS 
and e-merchant terminals. The recent advancement in RNN such as LSTM has resulted in a 
significant improvement to the network overcoming the vanishing and exploding gradient 
limitation.  This means that modelling of events over a long period of time to truly understand 
customer behaviour over multiple channels can now be implemented.  
3.3.2. Framework Performance Evaluation 
This section presents our initial ideas for evaluating the effectiveness of our proposed 
methodology.  A common method for testing, the framework efficiency is to measure the 
expectancy ratio such as: 
• True Positive Rate (TPR): legal events detected as legal. The model correctly classified 
not events as not fraud correctly. 
• False Positive Rate (FPR): fraudulent events detected as legal. i.e. model misclassified 
fraud as a not fraud. 
• True Negative Rate (TNR): legal events detected as fraudulent. i.e. model misclassified 
not fraud as fraud. 
• False Negative Rate (FNR): fraudulent events detected as fraudulent. i.e. model 
classified fraud events as fraud.  
The measure generally is given by confusion matrix as shown in Table 3.18 below (125):   
 
  True Class (5') 
  Fraud  
5' = 1 
Not Fraud 
5' = 0 
Predicted Class (57') Fraud 
57' = 1 
TP (True Positive) FP (False Positive) 
Not Fraud 
57' = 0 
FN (False Negative) TN (True Negative) 
Table 3.18 Fraud Confusion Matrix 
Once the confusion matrix is produced, the following metrics can be calculated: 
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Misclassification: 1 −	 EHIEA
EHIEAIJHIJA











F1 Score = 2 (HK9@!L!;)	×O9@?<<)(HK9@!L!;)IO9@?<<)  
(eq. 3.18) 
 













 (eq. 3.20) 
 
The aim of the model is to lower the False Positive Rate and True Negative Rate and increase 
the True Positive Rate and False Negative Rate. 
 
The above two metrics can be plotted against each other to calculate a curve called Receiver 
Operating Curve (ROC) as shown in Figure 3.21 below: 
 
 
Figure 3.21. Example of a ROC 
In general terms, an interest is in the section called Area Under the Curve (AUC) for the ROC 
above which gives the indication on the generalisation of the model. The higher the curve the 
better the model performance.  
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ROC will be used as a measurement for all the experiments that are conducted.  For each 
experiment, FRP and TPR will all be presented. 
 
The activity diagram below provides an overview of the learning process and real time scoring 
and decision-making process will work. 
3.4. Synthetic data 
3.4.1.  Introduction 
Fraud detection on the retail channel is not a trivial task, to classify transactions as either legal 
or fraud in real time is difficult and complex. While machine learning techniques can be 
applied to learn from past experience, Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 describes the problems in 
detail that affect the performance parameter for any machine learning classifier in fraud 
detection domain. This is summarised as: 
1. To detect fraud, it requires complex statistical models and hence requires a large 
amount of data that is not readily available.  
2. There is also a class imbalance problem and unlabelled data problem, resulting in 
reduce accuracy for any classifier.   
3. Due to the proprietary nature of the data around fraud losses, there are legal issues 
resulting in no standard benchmarks on the accuracy. 
4. Privacy concerns around the PII data leakage, resulting in companies not openly 
willing to share data. 
Often, in order to compensate the above concerns, an approach to lean towards the synthetic 
data generation is taken to determine the effectiveness of new algorithms. This section 
provides a novel approach of generating synthetic, with an aim to generate data quickly and 
efficiently that is a close representation of the real data. By a close representation meaning, 
keeping the statistical relationship intact while, increasing the volume of data. The goal is to 
identify control measures, given a set of conditions to generate new data, where is it difficult 
for a machine learning algorithm to differentiate between generated data and real data. An 
approach described here, is to examine a set of common sequences of events that a user will 
carry out on a retail channel. Then using this data generate a large amount of synthetic data 
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that is used for training, testing and evaluating purposes. This approach aims to preserve the 
statistical inherence properties of the original data and generate additional data that forms a 
similar nature to original within certain bound of error confidence and hence reduce the 
overfitting problem in order for models to generalise better. It is necessary to define a list of 
good characteristics on what this data should like, which this section will aim to capture: 
• Data is clean and accurately labelled 
• Large dataset to avoid underfitting and overfitting problems 
• Balanced labelled data to avoid any biased creep 
3.4.2. Related Work 
Very few papers discuss the use of synthetic data for fraud detection. Most of the papers used 
real data for training, testing and evaluating purposes. With the advent of technology and 
explosion of data, it is now possible to capture micro behaviour data on individuals and the 
demand of such publicly available dataset is growing in the field of fraud detection. However, 
privacy and reputational damage of an organisation since remains major concerns.  
Surendra H and Mohan H. (126) provides a detail review of the synthetic data generation 
methods for privacy preserving data. Their approach is to classify synthetic data into fully 
synthetic, partial synthetic and a hybrid. Fully synthetic approach is where all the data and 
the attributes are completely generated based on some hypothesis (i.e. normal distribution) 
and generation is not dependent on real data. A partial synthetic approach makes use of the 
real time data, but all the sensitive attributes are replaced by synthetically generated values. 
Hybrid approach is where the combination of fully and synthetic data is used to generate 
additional data. According to their survey, synthetic data generation based on fully and partial 
techniques are highly active research fields. However, a lot more attention is required in the 
hybrid space, this chapter will be focused on using the hybrid approach, where sensitive 
attributes will be transformed into a set of non-sensitive features and these features will be 
used to generate additional data. 
One of the most commonly used approach to synthetic data generation for fraud detection is 
called Synthetic Minority Over-Sampling Technique (SMOTE). It was discussed in detail by 
Nitesh V. Chawla, et al. (105) and provides perspective around the use of SMOTE to construct 
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a dataset where there is a high imbalance class problem. A high level of accuracy is achieved 
when they used over sampling techniques from the minor label and under sampling 
techniques for the majority labels. Class priors then used with classifier such as Naïve Bayes 
and the ROC curves demonstrates that this approach outperforms other methods. However, 
a limitation with this approach is that it works well when there are only two class labels and 
additional classes will introduce complexity and will different clustering strategies be required 
to ensure the minority and majority sampling on multi-class is done appropriately. The most 
traditional approach to fraud detection has a label fraud and not-fraud and hence SMOT 
technique is quite useful. For the purpose of our study there are different fraud labels 
depending on the fraud scenarios and hence the use of technique will require a significant 
amount of time to evaluate. This approach is extended in (127) by Haibo He, et al. where they 
present approaches such as Adaptive Synthetic Sampling Approach for Imbalanced Learning 
(ADASYN) and Kernel Adaptive Synthetic Sampling Approach for Imbalanced Learning (Kernel 
ADASYN) (128). Their papers showed that by applying a mean weighted distribution, one can 
approach to a multi-minority class. Different weights can be applied around a cluster of class 
label by determining the level of difficulty in learning.  This approach of weighted distribution 
helps reduce the class biased and adaptively fine tune the decision boundaries.  
Emilie L, et al. (129) provides a comprehensive methodology around generating fraud data. 
The paper describes deriving synthetic data from original data based on the characteristics of 
the relationship between different attributes. This methodology generates a set of user 
profiles from data, followed by modelling of legal and attack flows. Legal and attack 
simulators are used to generate additional synthetic data. Their methodology is further 
outlined in (130), where the authors applied the methodology to detect fraudulent IP based 
video on demand service. Their approach proved that user and system can be modelled using 
synthetic data that maintains the statistical relationship among the attributes and then 
subsequently used to train a fraud detection system.  
3.4.3. Data generation methodology 
The data generation methodology provided below allows the repeatability of the data 
generation process as the complexity of the raw data and latent features increases. The main 
components are: 
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• The specification of user behaviour represents as events in the historical database 
• The specification around features that needs to be created for user profile creation,  
• An algorithm that reads the profiles and output synthetic data.  
The data generation methodology provided in this chapter is a variant of the methodology 
provided by Emilie Lundin (129) and summarised in Figure 3.22 below: 
 
Figure 3.22. Data Generation Methodology 
The figure above illustrates the methodology, the first step is to analyse the historical dataset 
that is the representative of the real dataset and contains a set of users and events (user 
journeys). The second step is to create a set of statistical latent features such as page 
navigation time. The third step is to create a set of profile for each customer and their 
sessions, in terms of page navigation time for each of the user journeys. The fourth step is to 
create different scenarios that need to be modelled (legal scenarios and fraud scenarios are 
modelled here as user behaviour). The fifth step is to implement an algorithm to generate 
synthetic data. 
3.4.4. Analysis of the historical data 
Data was extracted from a database of a big retail bank that contained retail transactional 
events. This is a representation of an Internet Banking dataset, where a lot of users would 
login to check their balance, make payment to existing and new beneficiaries and use services 
such as change password and consist of: 
 
1. Fraud Label: There are 22,889 transactions from 305 unique users, with transactions 
labelled as fraud. 
2. Non-Fraud dataset: There are 100,000 transactions from 68,425 unique users.  
 
The number of parameters that are important to this research were analysed. The data was 
then rearranged in a way that allowed transition state to be created for each of the user’s 
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session. This approach is then used to model user behaviour. An example of a number of 
sequences and for each user is Figure 3.23 below.  
 
 
Figure 3.23. Number of Users & their Sequence of Events 
As shown in the figure above the minimum sequence length is 4, maximum is 794 and an 
average length is 75. Compare that to the non-fraud dataset, the minimum sequence length 
is 1, maximum is 82 and average is 1.5.  This is due to the data that was extracted from the 
database, this disproportionate sequence length makes it hard for sequence analysis to occur.  
The order to prove the hypothesis that data generation technique can be applied, a simpler 
approach is required.  
Figure 3.24 below provides an overview of the most common sequences that are found across 
both datasets. 
 
Figure 3.24. Common Sequences in Dataset 
 
In order to test the hypothesis, the following, sequence is used as user state as shown in 




Fraud Dataset Non-Fraud Dataset 
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State Description 
Login User is logged into the banking portal 
Add Beneficiary User added a new beneficiary 
Make Payment User made a payment to the newly added beneficiary 
Table 3.19 Sequence To-Be Used for Different Experiments 
The rationale behind this is that it covers more user journeys than the rest of the above 
sequences. Further data analysis around the above sequence resulted in a reduced dataset of 
280 transactions for non-fraud dataset and 361 transactions for fraud dataset.  This approach 
will substantially simplify the analyses of the data distribution and would easily allow us to 
impact assess the test instances. As a next step, the time taken between the login event and 
add payeeevent were analysed for both of the datasets. Results are shown in Figure 3.25 
below: 
 
Figure 3.25. Average Transition Time Between Fraud and Non-Fraud Sequence 
The above graph indicates that there is an intrinsic difference between fraud and non-fraud 
dataset. Examining the set of sequences for the both fraud and non-fraud, it is clear that the 
transition time between fraud is longer than non-fraud. This can be used as a core feature on 
which a set of profiles can be created. The statistical profile contains a list of sequences per 
each user session and a distribution function with fitted parameters for the transition time.  
Based on the above information, the following attributes are used to derive a profile as 
depicted in Table 3.20 below: 




UserID Unique user id that is used for profiling 
SessionID Unique session id for which  
Event 1 Name of first event 
Timestamp 1 Time it took from the first event to the second event 
Event 2 Name of the second event 
Timestamp 2 Time it took from the second event to the third event 
Event 3 Name of the third event, an end state 
Overall Time Overall time it took 
Fraud_flag Fraud flag 0 = no fraud and 1 = fraud 
Table 3.20 Attributes Used for Modelling 
 
3.4.5. Data Generation Approach 
The activity flow diagram depicted in Figure 3.26, provides an approach to generating data 
based on the data generation methodology and set of sequences described above. 
117 | P a g e  
 
 
Figure 3.26. Activity Diagram for Data Generation 
The activity steps for the data generation process is given as: 
• Read all the raw data from database that contains both fraud and non-fraud dataset. 
• Get a list of unique users and for each user 
o Get a list of sessions and for each session 
§ Get a list of event sequences 
§ Check to see if the event sequences match the pattern defined in 
Table 3.19 (i.e. Login, Add Payeeand Make Payment) 
o For list of sessions, that have matched the above pattern, calculate a set of 
features as defined in Table 3.20 
o Check if the generative mode is enabled. In this mode, the system will use a 
list of sessions and features calculated above to generate new data. 
o In baseline mode, it will invoke evaluate process 
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o Evaluate process will apply a classifier to discriminate between a fraud and 
non-fraud events 
3.4.5.1. Baseline Mode 
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of generated data, a baseline is required that allows a 
classifier to evaluate the original dataset. For a purpose of evaluating the original data is by 
the K-Means algorithm with cluster setting of 2 (fraud and non-fraud). A confusion matrix is 
created in Figure 3.27 below, False Positive Rate and True Positive Rate are the two 
parameters used to evaluate the original dataset. 
 
Figure 3.27. Confusion Matrix on Original Dataset 
As seen above the k-means algorithm gets most of the non-fraud label right (97%) but gets 
most of the fraud label wrong (90%). This means the model operates on a 90% false positive 
rate. This is not surprising as per the graph above that a small number of sequences the fraud 
transition time is not differentiable. Please note the intent of this approach is not to analyse 
the effective of the k-means algorithm but base the results and compared against the 
generated dataset. The intension is to maintain this base while increasing the size of the 
dataset. 
3.4.5.2. Generative Mode 
 
Research highlighted that recently Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) (133) has become 
quite popular in expanding real dataset by making use of the real dataset to generate 
synthetic dataset. Lots of experiments have been carried in the field of computer vision where 
using images to generate additional images. This has achieved a good level of success in an 
image generation (131). Maayan F, et al. (132) applied GAN on medical image segmentation 
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of 182 liver lesions. Their approach is to create synthetic images that provides different 
permutation of liver lesion and using this data to augment the original dataset. This approach 
has significantly increased their model accuracy for Liver Lesion classification. 
This section investigates the use of GAN to model the underlying statistical distribution of 
transactional data described above in section 4 to generate synthetic data that can be used 
to augment the real training data. The use of GAN has several advantages such as reducing 
the variance to noise ratio (133), while preserving the discriminative features as well as 
removing the need to hand-craft features. GAN has an ability to learn from a parallel set of 
features and infer this model to generate and augment directly from the available data. 
Figure 3.28 below provides an architecture view of the system used to build the generative 
mode. The core component is the function @(") which makes use of the GANs. 
 
Figure 3.28. Generative Mode Architecture 
Function @(") is a generative model that is used to create a sample from a real distribution 
by applying Gaussian fit to the data. That is, for each class #{@G]^_	|	!CD	@G]^_}, $(#|") is 
modelled rather than modelling directly $("|#). Since the data is of continuous nature, 
continuous distribution is derived from the maximum entropy for a specified mean and 
variance. This approach is used to provide continuous probability distribution of the random 
variables (for example, time taken to move from one state to another) which is shown in 
Figure 3.29 below. 
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Figure 3.29. Probability Density Function on Original Data 
 
For each user, the data modelling $("|# = ^HFG) is based on a single Gaussian fit. The pdf in 
the above diagram shows a data generation of a continuous random variable (time taken 
between login page and add payeepage) that has many local maxima and the peak of a data 
generation and the mean distribution has multiple peaks. This make sense in our case as not 
every user spends the same amount of time on each page, but it can be imagined that there 
are only finite amounts of time is spent on each page by different user. This is reflected in the 
data that has been generated with much higher peak.  
The statistical relationship of original data is then learnt by the GAN network to generate 
synthetic data. An example of such synthetic data generation is shown as a graph in Figure 
3.30 below. Based upon an approach defined in Figure 3.26, a random user is chosen from 
the list, a set of events (as described in Table 3.19) and the network then learns the relevant 
features:  
 
Figure 3.30. Applying GAN to Learn from Original Data 
As seen from the above diagram the GAN as learnt the behaviour of an individual user and 
has able to replicate the user behaviour. The table below provides an insight on how close 
the GAN network came to generating data that matches the original data: 
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Event Mean Original Time 
(seconds) 
Mean Generated Time (seconds) 
Login to Add Beneficiary 3.185 3.169 
Add Payeeto Make Payment 2.352 2.436 
Table 3.21. Attributes Used for Modelling 
 
 
As seen in the table 3.21 above, the mean generated transition time for a given sequence of 
events, is closely similar to the mean original transition time. In order to compare with the 
baseline, K-Means is applied with the same settings used in the baseline mode. The results 
are shown in the diagram below: 
 
Figure 3.31. Confusion Matrix on Generated Dataset 
As seen above in Figure 3.31, based on just two data points (transition time from Login to Add 
Payeeand transition time from Add Payeeto Make Payment), the K-means algorithm has 
reduced on the False Positive rate from baseline of 90% to 84% while the non-fraud detection 
rate remains the same. This proves our hypothesis that synthetic data can be used for testing 
and evaluating fraud detection system and GAN network can successfully generate a better 
dataset that can be used to augment original dataset for training and evaluating. Next step is 
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3.5. Conclusion 
This chapter discusses the core elements that will provide the major contribution to this 
thesis, namely, feature engineering, neural network model, model evaluation. Furthermore, 
this chapter detailed fraud detection framework and different components can be used in 
different environments. Feature engineering process proposed in this chapter, is focused on 
taking transactional data, personal data, account data and behavioural data transforming the 
data into features and latent features that can be consumed by sequence learners and 
ensembling classifier.  The importance of session length and time taken to complete an event 
is also discussed in detailed. In order to address the class imbalanced and lack of data 
problems, GAN is proposed to generate additional data without losing the statistical 
relationship. Neural network presented in this section provided additional context and insight 
into sequence learners such as LSTM network is suitable for scoring, self-learning and 
classification of the real banking events. The next chapter presents the implementation 
methodology that will allow us to run a series of experiments on the data sets using LSTM, 
SVM and Markov models, during which the resulting performances of each algorithm will be 
computed using the chosen performance measure. These results can then be analytically 
compared to see how the three algorithms compare to each other when applied to a non-
trivial real-world problem. This will either prove or disprove our original hypothesis. 
3.6. Key Summary 
This section describes the high-level summary of the content of this chapter. 
• Proposed a novel cross channel fraud detection framework for efficiently and quickly 
detect fraudulent events using event-based sequence learners. 
• Details a Logical data model for cross-channel fraud detection. 
• Technique to perform feature engineering and data normalisation is discussed. Focus 
is specifically on creating features that are based on sequences and technique to 
normalise the data so that it can easily fit to a sequence-based model. 
• Provides insight into the use of recurrent neural network model as sequence learner 
and how it can be adapted to fit the customer journeys for online banking. 
• Model development and model execution environments are presented for separation 
of concerns. 
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• Discusses related research into the data generation technique and proposed a novel 
data generation technique using GAN. 
• Framework for model performance and evaluation is presented for testing such as 
TRP, FRP, TNR and FNR. 
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4.  
CCFDS – In Practice (Sequence learning models for fraud detection 
using real life banking transactions) 
4.1. Model development 
In Chapter 3, a novel payment fraud detection framework consisting of sequential data inputs 
across multiple channels, Feature Engineering and Neural Network model components to 
detect anomalous events is conceptualized. In this chapter framework is detail to develop an 
integrated Payment Fraud Detection System (PFDS) model with a real-life scenario dataset 
from a large European bank. The model can dynamically evolve to maintain the efficiency with 
minimum input based on data sampling, feature engineering and multiple intelligent 
algorithms. The overview of the model is shown in Figure 4.1.  
The model involves five main modules, i.e., Feature Engineering and Data Sampling, Fraud 
Detection Models, Deep Neural Network Ensembler, Model Evaluation Module and Rule 
System. The Feature Engineering and Data Sampling building block examines and analyses the 
events collected from remote banking channel and create latent variables to form a feature 
matrix that can be processed easily by Fraud Detection Models. It also creates training and 
testing sample datasets based on original datasets and synthetic datasets.  The Fraud 
Detection Models perform scoring and classification by sequence learning the temporal 
patterns of the entire customer history. This involves two steps; first, multiple models are 
developed based on a featured data pool generated by Feature Engineering and Data 
Sampling module and a model pool, where each model produces a score with a range of [0, 
1]. Then, the results are ensembled by a deep neural network model to produce an optimized 
classification. This research implements Events Sequence Model using LSTM, Markov and 
SVM models. Subsequently the models and their results are evaluated, and rules are stored 
into the Rule System.  
The architecture is planned to be developed in two stages. The Deep Neural Network 
Ensembler module is not included in the first stage development. The IP Address model, UA 
model, RFM model and Benford model have been developed at the first stage but not linked 
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to the Model Evaluation module, so their details are not included in this section. However, 
their implementation can be found in Appendix – A. At the second stage, the research 
develops an integrated Payment Fraud Detection System (PFDS) model and implements Long 
Short-Term Memory (LSTM) family of Recurrent Neural Network model, SVM model and 
Markov model as an event sequence learner for detecting fraud in remote banking. 
Subsequently, the research adopts a comprehensive approach to evaluate and compare their 
performances based on well-defined indicators and datasets. 
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4.2. Data and pre-processing 
4.2.1.  Data source and description 
The datasets are obtained for event sequence learning from a large European bank. They are 
anonymised before taken offline for analysis. The datasets are the online payment 
transactions which include four web pages, i.e. Login, Second Factor Login, Adding 
Beneficiary, and Making Payment pages and corresponding browsing activities. For the fraud 
detection analysis two types of datasets can be further classified, i.e. fraudulent datasets and 
legitimate/non-fraudulent datasets. In total, the fraudulent datasets contain 22,880 records 
and the non-fraudulent data has 100,000 records. This highly unbalanced dataset fraud labels 
for 0.172% of all transactions. A snap of the data samples with a two-dimensional structure 
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The full description of the data attributes is listed here:  
Features Description 
EVENT_TYPE Type of event e.g. Customer Login, Make Payment etc 
TRANSACTION_ID Transaction ID 
CHANNEL_IDENTIFIER A way that customers can interact with a bank. This can be via 
telephone, internet banking, branch, mobile.  
FINANCIAL_INSTITUTE Financial Institute name 
SUB_CHANNEL Sub-channel name  
PARTYID Customer ID 
PARTY_TYPE Customer party type code 
PARTY_RELATIONSHIP_TYPE Customer’s relationship type 
PARTY_BIRTH_DATE Customer’s birthday date 
PARTY_EMAIL_ADDRESS Customer’s email address 
PARTY_MARITAL_STATUS Customer’s marital status 
PARTY_FIRST_NATIONALITY Customer’s first nationality 
PARTY_OCCUPATION Customer’s occupation 
PARTY_REGISTRATION_DATE  
PARTY_TELESERVICEREGISTERDT Registration date of telephone service 
PARTYTL Customer’s Title 
PARTY_FIRSTNAME Customer’s first name 
PARTY_MIDDLENM Customer’s Middle name initial 
PARTY_SURNAME Customer’s Surname 
PARTY_PMRADDRESSLINE1 Customer’s account primary address line 1 
PARTY_PMRADDRESSLINE2TX Customer’s account primary address line 2  
PARTY_PMRADDRESSTOWNNM Town name of the account primary address 
PARTY_PMRPOSTCODE Account  Postcode 
PARTY_PMRCOUNTRYCD Account Country code 
PARTY_ADDRESSLINE1 Customer’s address line 1 
PARTY_ADDRESSLINE2 Customer’s address line 2 
PARTY_ADDRESSTOWNNM Town name of the address 
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PARTY_POSTCD Postcode 
PARTY_COUNTRYCD Country Code 
PARTY_MAILADDRESSLINE1 Customer’s mail address line 1 
PARTY_MAILADDRESSLINE2 Customer’s mail address line 2 
PARTY_MAILADDRESSTOWNNM Customer’s town name of mail address 
PARTY_MAILPOSTCODE Customer’s mail address postcode 
PARTY_MAILCOUNTRY Customer’s mail address country code 
PARTY_HOMEPHONENO Customer’s home phone number 
PARTY_MOBILEPHONENO Customer’s mobile phone number 
PARTY_OFFICEPHONENO Customer’s office phone number 
CORRESPONDENCE_NAME Account correspondence name 
ACCOUNT_SORTCODE Account’s sort code 
BANK_ACCOUNTNO Account’s bank account number 
ACCOUNT_TYPE Account type  
ACCOUNT_AVAILABL_BALANCE Account’s available balance 
ACCOUNT_CURRENCY Currency code of the account’s available balance 
ACCOUNT_OPENDT Open date of the account 
RISK_INDICATOR Risk indicator code 
EXISTCAHELDIN  
COMMERCIAL_BANKINGCUSTIN Commercial banking 
CREDIT_CARDHELD Credit card held in 
INSURANCE_PRODUCTHELDIN Insurance product held in 
PD_INVESTMENTPRODUCTHELDIN Investment product held in 
LOAN_PRODUCTHELDIN Loan product held in 
MORTGAGE Mortgage in  
BUSBANK_PRODUCTHELDIN Business bank product held in 
SAVINGS_HELDCD Savings held code 
RISK_SCORE Risk score value 
BENEFICIARY_NAME Payeename of transaction 
BENEFICIARY_SORTCODE Payeesort code 
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BENEFICIARY_ACCOUNTNO Payeeaccount number 
BEN_ADDRLINE1 Beneficiary’s address line 1 
BEN_ADDRLINE2 Beneficiary’s address line 2 
BEN_ADDRTOWN Town name of beneficiary’s address 
BEN_POSTCODE Postcode of payeeaddress 
BEN_COUNTRY Country code of payeeaddress 
TRANSACTION_AMOUNT Transaction amount 
TRANSACTION_CURRENCY Currency code of transaction amount 
TRANSACTION_PMTDATE Payment date of transaction  
TRANSACTION_SPEED Transaction speed (e.g. Real time, several days, faster, as soon 
as possible) 
PAYMENT_INDICATOR Faster or Standard Payment indicator: Faster (1) or Standard (2) 
STANDING_ORDER_FREQ Standing order payment frequency code (e.g. weekly, monthly) 
FIRST_PERIODICPAYMENT_AMNT Amount of first periodic payment 
FIRST_PERIODICPAYMENT_AMNTCUR Currency of first periodic payment amount 
STANDINGORD_AMOUNT Standing order amount 
STANDINGORD_CURR Currency of standing order’s amount 
LAST_AMOUNT Last amount 
LASTAMOUNT_CURR Currency code of last amount 
FINALPAYMENT_DT Final payment date 
TNSX_REFERENCE Transaction reference 
LOCAL_DIRECTOR_OFFICENM Local director’s office name 
LOAN_TYPE Loan type code 
REJECT_CODE Transaction reject code 
AUTHENTICATION_CODE Authentication code 
TRANSACTION_TIMEZONE Time zone of transaction 
INTERNET_SESSIONID Internet session ID 
INTERNET_SESSION_STARTTIME Start timestamp of internet session  
CLIENT_SCREEN_RESOLUTION Client screen resolution 
PROXY_AUTHO Proxy authorization 
TRANSACTION_USER_AGENT User agent 
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BROWSER_LANGUAGE Browser language 
USERID User ID 
IP_ADDRESS IP address 
DEVICEID Device ID 
DEVICE_RISKSCORE Device risk score code 
SESSIONDR  
TEL_SESSIONID Telephone session ID 
CALL_TIME Call timestamps 
CONTACT_PHONENO Contact phone number 
PARTY_INICALLIN  
TRANSACTION_TIME Transactions timestamps 
EVENT Event of transaction 
AUTO_RESPONSE Auto response 
PARTY_SMSPHONENO Customer’s SMS phone number 
LATENCY Latency 
PARTY_EIAPHONENO Phone number for Enhanced Internet Authentication (EIA)  
PARTY_EMAIL2 Customer’s second email address 
PARTY_EMAIL3 Customer’s third Email address 
LOGIN_TYPE Login Type 
AUTH_TYPE1 Authentication Type 1 
AUTH_DETAILS1 Authentication details 
AUTH_DETAILS2 Authentication details  
AUTH_DETAILS3 Authentication details  
AUTH_TYPE2 Authentication Type  
AUTH_TYPE3 Authentication Type  
BEN_BANKID Payeebank ID 
BENF_BANKNAME Payeebank name 
BENY_ROUTINGTYPE Payeerouting type 
INTERNATIONAL_TRANSACTIONAM International transaction amount 
BENBANK_COUNTRYNM Payeebank country name 
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BENBANK_ADDRLINE1TX Payeebank’s address line 1 
BENFBANK_ADDRLINE2TX Payeebank’s address line 2 
BENFBANK_ADDRTOWNNM Town name of payeebank’s address 
BENFBANK_POSTCD Postcode of payeebank’s address 
BENFBANK_COUNTRYCD Country code of payeebank’s address 
TRANSACTION_CHARGES Amount charged for transaction 
Table 4.1. A full description of the data sample features extracted from real banking database 
The datasets exhibit a set of the events that customers have from the time of logging into 
their online banking to the completion of the transactions. The fraudulent events were 
collected between the dates 7/09/2015 and 7/07/2016, whereas the given legitimate events 
were collected between the 00:00am and 01:43am on 15/10/2012. 
In total there are 124 features for each row. To reduce the dimensionality and bias of the 
modelling, some of the features with dominant missing values are either removed or filled 
with well-tuned values (e.g. the last known value) during the modelling. Overall there are 47 
features that do not possess any significant values and few other features with very limited 
values or repetitive values across all the transactions. These features are predominantly 
personal information about the customers such as email address, birth date, phone number, 
country code and the bank’s detail.  
The modelling favours the features such as Transaction amount, Event type, Latency, IP 
address, User agent, Transaction time, Payee’s account number and sort code, Beneficiary’s 
account number and sort code. Customer ID attribute is also included in the modelling process 
as it helps to aggregate and analyse the datasets with identified features. In this case, the 
personal information, mainly IDs, and the account information are anonymised for 
confidentiality. The data selection and pre-processing are further illustrated in more specific 
detail in the data pre-processing subsection and model implementation section with respect 
to specific models. 
4.2.2. Exploratory analysis 
The explanatory analysis in this section is intended to understand and determine the 
probability distributions of the datasets and the key data features used by the model, and 
subsequently identify possible outliers. 
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The features used for this analysis include Transaction Amount, User Agent, IP Address and 
the transaction datetime. Only the records tagged with ‘PaymentRequest’ are analysed while 
zero payment request transactions are ignored. In total, 18,169 legitimate transactions and 
4,322 fraudulent datasets are selected. In the fraudulent datasets, however, not all the 
transactions are fraudulent, out of which 916 transactions are labelled as being fraudulent 
while the rest 3406 are considered as being legitimate. The analysis here explores all these 
three types of datasets.  
The distributions of fraud transactions, legitimate transactions and legitimate transactions in 
fraudulent datasets are overlaid in Figure 4.3 for comparison. The transactions at lower 
amounts are more frequent for both legal and fraudulent events, as shown from their 
distributions. To more clearly show the frequency of the right end of the x-axis, i.e., the high 
amount of payment transactions, two more distribution plots without overlay are generated 
in Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5, where Figure 4.5 shows the logarithm distribution by amounts. 
From both figures, the payment amounts in the legal transactions are largely below £2,000 
and the legal payment in the fraud data are largely than £1,000, which demonstrate that the 
personal customers are cautious of their online banking activities. The payment amounts of 
most of the fraud transactions are spread between one penny and £3,000. However, some 
fraud transactions occurred with very high payment up to £25,000. The distributions of legal 
transactions are smoother than the fraud transactions which rightly demonstrate it happens 
more sparely. Figure 4.4 shows that there is 0.5% more probability that a transaction with 
small amount of payment (i.e., < £1,000) is fraudulent than legitimate. A table below (i.e. 
Table 4.2) is also included to show the occurrences of fraud transactions, legitimate 
transactions and legitimate transactions in fraudulent datasets with payment amount ranges.  
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Figure  
Figure 4.1. Distributions of the fraudulent and Legit transactions with payment amounts with overlay 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Distributions of the fraudulent and Legit transactions with payment amounts without overlay  
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Figure 4.3. Log Distributions of the fraudulent and Legit transactions with payment amounts with overlay 
 
Amount range Legit Frequency Fraud Frequency Legal in fraud Frequency 
0-999 16826 771 3001 
1000-1999 866 61 187 
2000-2999 183 33 75 
3000-3999 70 15 35 
4000-4999 49 10 32 
5000-5999 53 3 13 
6000-6999 12 1 6 
7000-7999 10 3 3 
8000-8999 10 3 7 
9000-9999 5 2 2 
10000-10999 32  14 
11000-11999 1  2 
12000-12999 4 2 2 
13000-13999 3   
14000-14999 2   
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15000-15999 8 1 8 
16000-16999 1   
17000-17999 2   
18000-18999 3   
19000-19999 3 1  
20000-20999 6 1 1 
22000-22999 1   
23000-23999 2   
24000-24999 2   
25000-25999 7 9 9 
30000-30999 1  3 
34000-34999 1   
40000-40999 1   
51000-51999   4 
74000-74999 1   
75000-75999 1   
95000-95999   1 
97000-97999 1   
168000-168999   1 
300000-300999 1   
314000-315000 1   
Table 4.2. Occurrences of the fraudulent and legitimate transactions with payment amount ranges 
Here, the specific time frames when the data were collected is explored. The legitimate 
transactions were collected between 12:00am and 1:45am on 12 October 2012, over a time 
of 1 hour and 45 minutes, while the fraudulent events were collected over about a year. 
Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5 overlay the two pieces of the datasets with transactions spanning a 
day, where Figure 4.4 is a natural distribution and Figure 4.5 is a log logarithmic distribution 
of the transaction payment amounts. In the pictures, the red data points show the legitimate 
transactions. The green and blue points represent the legitimate and fraudulent transactions 
respectively. The figures show that both the legitimate and fraudulent transactions from 
fraudulent events occurs more often since the midday. The amounts of the legitimate 
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transactions from legitimate events in red are more evenly distributed than the amounts of 
the fraudulent transactions. 
 
 
Figure 4.4. Fraud and Legal Transactions Over Time in Hours by Logarithm in Y-Axis 
 
 
Figure 4.5. Fraud and Legal Transactions Over Time in Hours  
If one plots the fraudulent data which only happens over a day, as shown in the Figure 4.7, 
logarithmic version is depicted in Figure 4.8, one may find that between 2:00am and 8:00am 
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there are the least fraud transactions, whereas from midday up to 4:00pm and after 8:00 pm 
the occurrences of fraudulent events are much higher.  
 
Figure 4.6. Fraud Transactions Over Hours of the Day 
If one investigates deeper into the time when a fraudulent event occurs, most fraudulent 
events happen at the beginning and end of each month - from the 1st up to the 7th and then 
from 30th to 31st, as shown in Figure 4.8. The left figure shows an inverted bell shape. In the 
mid-month, the detected fraudulent events drop and rise again at the end of month. The 
figure also shows that the legitimate transactions in the fraudulent data follow the same 
pattern as the fraudulent events. The right figure shows that May and June are most active 
for fraudsters. There are more than 500 fraudulent transactions detected during June on the 
top list of the months, May is also highly active for the fraudsters with approximately 300 
fraud transactions. On the other hand, legitimate transactions in the fraud datasets occur 
more often in April, March and May, exhibiting a non-correlation between this two. 
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Figure 4.7. Number of Fraudulent and Legal Events in Days (left plot) and Months (right plot)  
By clustering IP addresses based on the leading three bytes, one can identify the locations of 
fraudulent events as well as the locations of the legitimate events. As shown in Table 4.3., the 
large share of fraudulent events (i.e., 54) occurred in Canada followed by UK regions including 
Warrington, Exeter, Uxbridge Thetford and London from our data samples. One of the reasons 
is that the data were collected from a bank located in the UK. In the meantime, the IP 
addresses of the legitimate transactions from the fraudulent datasets show that they are 
mainly originated from the locations including Brighton, London, Wakefield, Warrington and 
Thetford. 
Fraud Location IP address  
(3 bytes) 
Count Legal Location IP address Count 
Canada 
(Windsor) 
135.207.48 54 Brighton 92.40.249 52 
Warrington 211.205.252 46 London 81.96.8 51 
Exeter 211.205.194 28 Wakefield 92.40.248 50 
Uxbridge 84.23.59 18 Warrington 86.9.118 50 
Thetford 
(Norfolk) 
81.255.233 16 Thetford 
(Norfolk) 
85.255.233 48 
London 82.81.143 14 Ashford 94.197.120 45 
Utley 183.69.144 12 Manchester 164.39.65 41 
Bridport 88.132.212 10 Derby 86.156.151 41 
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Crewe 89.229.51 10 Exeter 213.205.194 41 
London 144.92.120 9 Warrington 213.205.252 37 
Table 4.3. Top 10 locations of fraud and legal (in fraud) events 
In the legitimate datasets, most customers are from Maidenhead, Wales, Lewisham and 
Waterloo as shown in Table 4.4. Some of the locations appear twice in the tables such as 
Maidenhead and Waterloo, as these cities have more than one type of class-c networks. None 
of the top locations match between the two datasets. By removing another byte from the 
addresses, there is a wider range of the locations for each one.  
Location IP address (3 bytes) Count 
Maidenhead 93.40.254 257 
Wales 215.183.128 186 
Lewisham 98.197.127 176 
Maidenhead 91.40.253 174 
Waterloo 92.186.23 102 
Waterloo 98.186.31 72 
Cambridge 218.183.140 58 
Maidenhead 99.41.251 46 
Slough 81.132.248 46 
Elmswell 198.176.105 32 
Table 4.4. Top 10 Locations of Legitimate transactions 
Figure 4.10 shows the transaction amounts by time for the three datasets based on their top 
locations. All the legitimate transactions in Maidenhead occurred between midnight and 
1:40a.m and the maximum legal transaction amount is £2,500. The fraudsters in Canada tend 
to take smaller amounts, with three times £190, fifty times £20 and £10 once. These 
transactions happened between 10:00am and 3:00pm. The legitimate transactions in 
Brighton began from 8 o’clock in the morning up to midnight with no much variety of the 
amounts, whereas the legitimate transactions in Maidenhead show more diversity in terms 
of amounts.   
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Figure 4.8. Top Location of Fraud and Legal Transactions Over Time in Hours 
Another interesting variable is the User Agent. User Agent provides information about the 
browser and operating system of the device used to connect with the web server. The cross 
channel fraudulent events identified as shown in Table 4.5 (in total, 424) used Windows 
operating systems. The second most popular operating system for fraud is iOS with 238 user 
agents. Another popular operating system used by fraudster for transactions is Android on 
either tablet or mobile devices. Chrome OSs are not preferred by the fraudsters. From the 
table, Windows, iOS, Android and Mac OS are the top four most popular operating systems 
used by fraudsters, account for more than 98% of the total transactions. 








Windows 424 iOS 1367 Windows 9530 
iOS 238 Windows 1282 iOS 4275 
Android 192 Android 577 Android 1524 
Mac OS X 39 Mac OS X 101 Mac OS X 1195 
Ubuntu 12 Windows 
Phone 
58 BlackBerry OS 357 
  




7 Chrome OS 14 Windows 
Phone 
49 
Linux 3 Linux 7 Ubuntu 38 
Chrome OS 1   Linux 37 
Table 4.5. Popular operating systems used by customers in the datasets 
With further investigation on the datasets, one finds that none of the detected events for 
both datasets occurred by a bot; 63% of legitimate transactions were carried out on PCs by 
customers; 53% of fraudulent records were made using PC and the rest are split between the 
mobile and tablet devices, with mobile accounting for the 39% and tablet for 8.6%.  
In general, the preferred mobile devices are iPhone and iPad. However, a quite large 
proportion of the transactions occurred on some unidentified devices. In total there are about 
30 different devices in the fraudulent dataset, 57 devices used for the legal transaction in the 
fraud dataset and 218 unique devices appear in the legitimate datasets.  
4.2.3. Data pre-processing 
As part of the data pre-processing, Feature Engineering technique is used for feature selection 
and development. The Feature Engineering building block examines and analyses the events 
collected from remote banking channel and create latent variables that will form a feature 
matrix that can be processed easily by intelligent algorithms such as neural networks. The 
features are generated through an iterative extraction-selection-validation process. First, a 
set of features are developed based on the raw data and RFM technique. Then the features 
are selected based on a set of rules. Finally, the features are analysed and validated by running 
a set of experiments. The process is repeated, and more features are subsequently identified.  
The iterative process is applied to define and represent features of the online payment 
transactions. Let  ! = {$!, $", … , $# , … $$} be the set of all possible events of a customer in 
remote banking. Mathematically, it is the vector representation set of the information 
available for n events. Let f be a classifier with its binary range ( =
{)*+,-*.+/, 0.12,-*.+/}, then one can define the payment fraud detection model as a 
functional mapping, 0: ! → 5. 
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If one considers a customer journey on the Internet banking site such as customer login, 
adding a payeeor making payment, then the possible events X can be visualised as shown in 
Figure 3.1 of chapter 3.  Each page shown as a circle is represented as a “state” of a customer 
and each “event” is represented as “state transition” which is shown as an arrow. The 
description of the states for an online payment transaction is shown in Table 3.5 of Chapter 
3. 
The information describing the events in Remote Banking Fraud Detection Framework 
includes transactional data, personal and account data, and behavioural data. Transactional 
data captures key attributes of a customer transaction that defines their characteristics and 
generally stored in Online Transaction Processing (OLTP) relational databases. This includes 
monetary events (i.e. Account Bill Pay) as well as service events (i.e. change of address). When 
applied to the fraud domain, this type of data can be used in the setting of RFM where data 
can be aggregated in accordance with a various time dimension (109).   
The input data have a different range of values and types. These ranges could vary widely, 
which may impact the model performance. Data normalisation is then carried out by fine-
tuning the input variables to bring the entire probability distribution values into alignment. 
Different data normalisation techniques such as shifting, and scaling can be applied to 
eliminate the effects of certain gross influences. Feature set generation is a process of 
selecting a set of features that are relevant for the model to perform better.  The technique 
of RFM is used to create non-normalised data that can be used to facilitate further analysis. 
According to the data model, there are different data types associated with different 
attributes such as numeric, categorical, nominal. Page and transition times are numeric 
whereas page id is a categorical value. One-hot encoding (117) is applied for categorical values 
by listing down all the different states or web pages of a transaction. Further illustration based 
on specific model cases is included in the next section.  
Subsequently, an object-oriented data model is developed to provide a unified view of the 
dataset. Four data classes to model the states, events, page navigations, customers and 
remote banking transactions have been identified, i.e., WebPage, PageNavigationGraph, 
Customer and BankingTransaction as shown in Figure 4.11. 
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Figure 4.9. Class Diagram for Remote Banking Fraud Detection 
Here, WebPage models the different states of a remote banking transaction.  It stores 
information such as page id, page latent time, page label and information about the 
neighbour web pages and their corresponding transition time and probability.  It has 
operations for adding neighbour pages, retrieving the most likely neighbour and all potential 
neighbours, retrieving transition probability and time of a neighbour. PageNavigationGraph 
is a set of related web pages that represent a remote banking transaction such as payment 
transaction.  It stores the starting web page and other related web pages are retrieved 
traversing the page navigation graph. 
 For the numeric values such as page duration time and transition time (i.e., latent time), the 
mean, rescaling and decorrelation techniques are applied so that the input sequence data can 
be modelled by a function approximator, i.e., Gaussian Mixtures Models (GMM) (109) to 
provide smoother standard distribution with zero mean and standard deviation as one. The 
Min/Max Standardising technique (7) to scale the numeric features such as page and 
transition times is also used. In the datasets, there are different data types associated with 
different attributes such as numeric, categorical and nominal data types, where page and 
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transition times are numeric whereas page id is categorical. One-hot encoding (134) is applied 
for categorical values by listing down all the different states or web pages of a transaction. 
From the proposed conceptual framework for remote banking fraud detection, an online 
payment transaction is a sequence of states and state transitions.  Each web page is a state. 
The events (e.g., submitting the form or clicking on links to navigate from one web page to 
another web page) are state transitions. In our case here, a state is defined by dwell time 
which is the time spent by a customer on a web page and a state transition is represented by 
flight time which is the time taken to navigate from one state to another. Therefore, a 
transaction sample that includes four web pages is a sequence of eight-time steps 
represented by either a dwell time feature or flight time feature as shown in Figure 4.12. 
 
 
Figure 4.10. Representation of the Payment Transactions as a Sequence of States and Event Transitions 
As the learning task of an LSTM model is to classify a payment transaction sample, X, into 
trueFraud or falseFraud, each sample is labelled using probabilistic score either as [1, 0] for a 
falseFraud sample or [0, 1] for trueFraud as shown below. 
 





                                                      (eq. 4.1) 
 
Where Y is the class label of sample, DTi is the dwell time or time spent on page i, FTi is the 
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Most of the features in both datasets have missing data. Observations with just few missing 
values (e.g. < 0.1%) are not removed in order to avoid bias in the models. Bespoke data pre-
processing is also applied to specific models.   
More specifically, for Support Vector Machine (SVM) model, one-hot encoding is used mainly 
for features whose data types are string. One-hot encoding is a method that maps each 
category to a vector that represents value of 1 when the feature is presence and value of 0 
otherwise. The number of vectors defer based on the number of categories (135). This 
method has a numerical nature; hence a machine learning model can easily incorporate such 
categorical feature information by learning a separate parameter for each dimension (136). 
One-hot encoding is applied on IP Address and User Agent attributes. Table 4.7 shows a 
sample of one-hot encoding representing the information of IP addresses. 
IP Address 90.205.141.119 93.186.22.232 217.41.36.115 
90.205.141.119 1 0 0 
93.186.22.232 0 1 0 
217.41.36.115 0 0 1 
Table 4.7. One-hot encoding representation of IP Address 
Transaction Amount is another feature applied for identifying fraudulent transactions. It is 
used by a model in its original numerical format. The four features for SVM model are applied 
with different combinations in order to find the best combination to predict fraudulent 
transactions.  
For Markov Model, the data is extracted vertically as a sequence of time stamped events 
based on individual customers and the time of each event occurring. Combining fraudulent 
and non-fraudulent event sessions grouped by customer are aggregated to 64,538 sessions. 
Table 4.8 shows the most frequently occurring event sequences for both fraudulent and non-
fraudulent transactions. It is observed that both datasets have the same sequences at the top 
four positions. Hence, it can be said that these four sequences would not be able to predict if 
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Table 4.8 Most frequent occurring sequences in the fraudulent and non-fraudulent data 
Further observation shows that the fraudulent data has 324 unique sequences whereas the 
legitimate data has 494 unique sequences. In order to limit the number of states in the model, 
event sequences exceed the 97th percentile of the observations are obtained from the data. 
Overall, there are 42 fraudulent and 14 non-fraudulent sequences that exceeded the 97th 
percentile.  Using the 42 fraudulent sequences, frequent state of events is extracted in order 
to construct a mapping. These state events are shown in Table 4.9. 
Event Sequence Frequency 
Fraud 
Customer Login 11601 
Customer Login -> Internal Transfer 1078 
Customer Login -> MakeFasterPayment 616 
Customer Login -> MakePaymentP2P 250 
Customer Login -> AddPayeeP2P -> MakeFasterPayment 200 
Customer Login -> Amend Telephone Number 187 
Non-Fraud 
Customer Login  61046 
Customer Login -> Internal Transfer 6044 
Customer Login -> MakeFasterPayment 1697 
Customer Login -> MakePaymentP2P 1598 
Customer Login -> Internal Transfer -> Internal Transfer 658 
Customer Login -> MakeFasterPaymentBillPay 389 
State Events 
Add Payee Make  Faster Payment P2P  
Add Payee Recurring Add Payee P2P 
Customer Login Make Payment P2P 
Make  Faster Payment Bill Pay  Amend Telephone Number 
Device Registration Amend Password 
Session Update Successful Password Reset 
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Table 4.9. State events above the 97th percentile 
This mapping is implemented on the training data by encoding the states and in case there 
are additional states, which are not included in the table above, are grouped together and 
labelled as zero.  
For the Markov model to make predictions, it is necessary to calculate the dwell times 
between two state events in a sequence over a specified sampling period. However, the dwell 
time for the final event session is not given, thus for those events a dwell time value is 
assumed. The value is set to 1 second as it is the minimum dwell time that exists in the 
datasets. 
For the Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) model, a sequence of events based on each 
customer is extracted for both fraudulent and non-fraudulent data. Because not all the events 
are fraudulent in the fraudulent data, only the events flagged with ‘Fraud’ are considered in 
order to limit the sequence length of each customer. Therefore, the fraudulent data contains 
4,945 rows and the legitimate data 100,000.  Figure 4.13 shows the sequence length for each 
customer from both datasets. Most of the customers associated with fraudulent datasets 
have the sequence length less than 100 events, with some outliers that exceed the number. 
The legitimate customers all have sequence length up to 40 events except one customer with 
80 events.  
 
Add Payee Bill Pay Internal Transfer 
Amend Email Address Make  Faster Payment Bill Pay  
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Figure 4.11. Fraudulent and Legitimate Sequence Length 
Comparing the two figures shows that the lengths of the most fraud event sequences are 
longer than most of the legitimate sequences. In the model, a maximum sequence length is 
set to reduce the complexity of the modelling and meanwhile have a good comparability 
without jeopardizing its prediction accuracy. A sequence length of 40 is set because most non-
fraudulent event sequence lengths lie between 1 and 40. 
Before being fed into the model, the data is randomly shuffled so that the fraudulent and 
non-fraudulent sequence categories are not clustered. One-hot encoding is used to transform 
the event types from categorical data into integer. The encoding size needs to be consistent 
between runs. However, due to the randomness of fraudulent path selections the encoding 
size varies. Therefore, the maximum possible number of unique event types (here, 100) is 
applied to keep consistency. After applying the one-hot encoder, the dataset is normalized 
into a three-dimensional format. The number of the rows is 68,727 with 40 columns or so-
called sequence length and 100 one-hot encoded events.  
In practice, TensorFlow library is used for the model development. A two-dimensional array 
is used to store all customer sequences with fix length, where the sequences whose lengths 
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4.2.4. Data sampling 
To overcome the lack of large dataset, especially the scale of fraudulent dataset, a sampling 
technique is applied. In practice, a synthetic dataset which combines the real and simulated 
datasets are developed. The simulated dataset is generated based on the real remote banking 
events using probabilistic generative models on the set of features that are time dependent 
such as time spent on a page and time taken between the pages.  
The data sampling technique is developed based on the GAN described in Chapter 3, that uses 
Gaussian Mixture Model. It supports unsupervised methods by applying the Expectation 
Maximisation Algorithm (EM) to adjust component distributions, which is typically Gaussians 
(137). The EM-algorithm is derived from Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) given by; 
>(@) = 	∏ C(@'|$'
$
' )                                                                (eq. 4.2)   
Where, $'  is the training data and @' is individual Gaussian components. The use of the product 
rule is to ensure that conditional probabilities are uncorrelated. EM is then given by, 
argmax
(!
[>J@'K]                                                                      (eq. 4.3) 
A typical application of the Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) is to approximate probability 
distributions from sample data, with the resolution being set by the number of components 
(Gaussians) being fitted along with a variance regularizer. Each data point is treated as a 
component with independent mean and variance (138). By sampling the model’s output 
represented as probability distribution function of real user’s data, the simulated 
transactional dataset samples are generated as shown in the Figure 4.14. 
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Figure 4.12. Example of a Generated Sample Base on GMM 
The blue points represent original data and the red points represent generated data produced 
through random sampling. The contours are drawn to highlight the learnt probability 
distribution from the probability distribution function at different level (i.e. 0.001, 0.01, 0.02, 
0.5). This technique resulted in the generation of 500,000 transactions that was 
representative of 80% of legitimate transactions and 20% of fraudulent transactions. 
To compare the classification performance of LSTM and SVM, three data scenarios are 
developed by varying the size and non-linearity complexity of the generated datasets. The 
non-linearity complexity of the generated dataset is controlled by two parameters, i.e., 
starting point (b1) and width (b2) of a truncated normal distribution. Three different 
combinations of b1 and b2 are used to set up the three scenarios.  In each group of the 
modelling, the size of the sample varies from 20,000 to 500,000. An example of the generated 
datasets is shown in Figure 4.15. 
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Figure 4.13. Example Demonstration of Dataset Generated 
In the above graph, red dots represent the real user journeys in terms of time spent on a page 
and time spent on navigating to a different page. The green dots represent synthetic data 
derived based on GMM. The sample ratio of fraud to non-fraud and test to train ratio may 
vary for the three groups. The method gives a well coverage of data points centred at the 
mean as well as outliers.  
4.3.  Model implementation 
Three fraud detection algorithms in the proposed conceptual framework are developed, i.e., 
Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) as a type of Recurrent Neural Networks (RNN), Support 
Vector Machine (SVM) and Markov Model. Event sequences are extracted from the 
fraudulent and non-fraudulent datasets. The models then perform the scoring and 
classification by sequence learning the temporal patterns of the entire customer history. 
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4.3.1. Recurrent Neural Networks 
Recurrent Neural Networks can efficiently deal with temporal dependencies of the sequence 
classification problem which can be used for dealing with events from internet banking that 
is part of an internet banking session. The Universal Approximation Theorem for Recurrent 
Neural Network highlights that in the case of multiple hidden units it can arbitrarily map the 
input sequences to output sequences with reasonable accuracy (120).  The usefulness of this 
theorem is shown in the following examples in Figure 4.16, which highlight how RNN can be 
modelled conceptually to map the input sequences and to perform fraud detection. 
 
Example 1. Normal Customer journey for online banking 
 
 
Example 2. Malware journey for online banking 
 
 
Example 3. Non-Repudiation attack on online banking 
Figure 4.14. Examples of Non-Fraud and Fraud Events 
For normal customer behaviours, one may measure the information of an event, time spent 
at the event and latency introduced while moving from one event to another. The Example 1 
here depicts a user navigating from one page to another on the bank’s online portal.  For 
example, the time taken for a user to log into a bank and navigate to Account Overview is 
approximately 25 seconds. Subsequently, the user navigates from Account Overview page to 
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journey for online banking, where malware logins and subsequently go through the same 
events as normal user in quick succession. Time spent on each event and in-between event 
here is minimum. A non-repudiation attack is when only the making payment event is 
observed as depicted in Example 3. This is also known as the “man in the middle attack” where 
an attacker captures the event and replays over after a while.  
Let  ! = {$!, $", … , $# , … $$} be the vector representation set of the information available for 
n events of a customer in remote banking, where the event label t corresponds to the time t. 
Let us assume that the feature vector size of each event $# is m, the input ! = (ℝ)) are 
drawn from a distribution D, and the output space 5 = ($ be the sequences of ( =
{)*+,-*.+/, 0.12,-*.+/}. The objective is then to use X to train fraud detection algorithm 
0: ! → 5 to label outputs in a test set !* 	⊆ 	7 in a way that minimises a defined error 
measure. Here, the representation of the typical Recurrent Neural Networks (RNN), which 
calculates such a function, is shown in Figure 3.18 of chapter 3. 
The RNN architecture is similar to a Neural Network architecture but weights are shared 
across evolving time stamp. As shown in Figure 3.18, RNN consists of an input layer that 
contains event at discrete time stamp (ts), a memory or hidden layer and an output layer. The 
number of input nodes is created based on the number of features in a feature set (x), the 
number of hidden nodes is created based on trial and error and the output is a single node 
(y). For online banking, the time-series of input feature vectors in matrix is shown below. 
 
where id refers to a transition state such as login page, view bank statements page, make 
payment to new payeepage and change details page, and latency is the time difference 
between page navigation. The Context Feature Vector (CFV) feature includes IP address and 
malware flag etc., the Authentication Feature Vector (AFV) feature includes authentication 
type etc., and the Transaction Feature Vector (TFV) feature include transactional data such as 
transaction amount, transaction type and payeeaccount number etc. 
The current state (t) of the hidden nodes depends on the objective function (122) that takes 
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(eq. 4.4) T 
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                                           																			ℎ# =	0+(ℎ#,!, $#)        (eq. 4.5) 
Where ℎ# is the new state, ℎ#,! is the previous state, $# is the input vector at time t. This 
provides a feedback into the network and can be considered as introducing memory to the 
network. Since the network can hold memory it can be better utilised for classification and 
prediction tasks, when compared to other neural networks. Several research studies (122), 
(123), (124) showed that hyperbolic tangent have been widely used as an objective function. 
For the hidden layer of RNN above, one may rewrite the equation 5 as follows; 
ℎ# = (tanh(R--ℎ#,! +	R-.$#))  (eq. 4.6)                                                                              
Where R-- and R-. are the weights between the previous state and current hidden nodes, 
and between input nodes and hidden nodes respectively. Tanh is a logistic function that is 
non-linear and continuously differentiable. This enables the study of the properties of neural 
networks for developing learning algorithms. The values of the output layer y(t) are predicted 
based on the current input, weighted by the coefficients wi of all the past input. The aim of 
the learning algorithm is to minimise the error by incrementally adjusting the parameters of 
the algorithm to optimise the objective function ℎ#	during training.  The prediction error, e(t), 
is; 
,()) = T()) −	TV()) (eq. 4.7) 
  
For regression models, typically the mean squared error or squared Euclidean distances, i.e., 
E[,"())]) is used, where the error is assumed to be statistically independent (122). 
The classifier outputs 1 (i.e. trueFraud) if the fraud is detected or 0 otherwise (i.e., falseFraud). 
A probabilistic classification approach is preferred to calculate conditional probabilities 
C(T|$). This allows the probabilities to be retained in a consistent manner. The classifier 
accepts xt and produces a probability score that belongs to the class C as defined previously. 
The output is based on the SoftMax function which outputs a cross-entropy loss by the 
equation as follows; 
C(T = 0*.+/	|$#) = 	
,+"#.$
∑,+"#.$
, (0 ≤ C ≤ 1) 
(eq. 4.8) 
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The output of the above equation outlines the probability of the event. If the probability is 
above a defined threshold the system will output 1 as fraud or 0 otherwise. 
4.3.2. Long Short-Term Memory  
For RNN to learn the sequences of events and classify them accurately, an error needs to be 
calculated and propagated back through the network using the gradient decent algorithm 
known as Back Propagation Through Time (BPTT) (123). The advantage of using BPTT is that 
linear and non-linear constraints between the shared weights can be easily incorporated. It 
will allow the model to generalise well to temporal dependencies of different states. For 
examples, let’s say one started off satisfying the constraint of ℎ! =	ℎ", and one needs ∆ℎ! =






 based on the model and error term for ℎ! and ℎ".  
Based on the above, one may build the forward pass that determines user state at each 
timestamp and followed by a backward pass by computing the error derivatives at each time 
stamp. The derivatives are added together for all of the timestamps for each weight and then 
all the copies of the weight are updated by the same amount which is proportional to the sum 
of those derivatives. 
As highlighted in the research (120), (123) the above algorithm fails to learn where there are 
long-time lags between the input events and their associated errors flowing back through 
time or when the network grows from ) to ) + Z  (120), (123).  
The LSTM network is used alongside hidden layer or as a hidden layer to overcome the 
vanishing and exploding gradient problem. The properties of the LSTM memory block are 
outlined as depicted in Figure 3.20 of chapter 3. 
The architecture of LSTMs consists of three gates, i.e., input, forget and output gates. The 
purpose of the input gate is to control the input to a memory cell. Its core function is to allow 
data into the memory cell and to protect the memory cell from noise.  An output gate is 
responsible for regulating the flow of cell activations into the rest of the network. The purpose 
of the forget gate is to forget the memory that has been acquired during earlier time stamp 
as the content becomes irrelevant. 
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The first step of LSTM is to update the forget gate that decides which information to 
remember and forget from the cell state (139). The equation for the forget gate is given by; 
 
                  0# = 	[	(\1 . [ℎ#,!] +	 1̂)        (eq. 4.9) 
 
The second step is to update the cell state. First, a sigmoid layer decides which values of the 
state cell to update and then a hyperbolic tan (tanh) layer creates a vector of new candidate 
values that can be added to the cell state (139).  The update equation is formulated as follows, 
 
                                _# = [(\2 . [ℎ#,!	, $#	] + 	^2 	)                                           (eq. 4.10) 
 
                                                        Ĉ# = tanh	(\3 	. [ℎ#,!	, $#] +	^3                                       (eq. 4.11) 
       
The previous cell state (Ct-1) is updated to a new cell state (Ct) by combining equations (4–
5).  First by multiplying the previous cell state by ft (i.e., forgetting factor) and then add the 
new candidate values (Ĉt) scaled by it (i.e., the amount of update to each state value). 
 
(# =	0# ∗ 	(#,! +	_# ∗ 	Ĉ#                                                    (eq. 4.12) 
 
The final step of LSTM is to determine the output based on the new cell state and a sigmoid 
layer, 
 
                                                        b# = 	[(\4[ℎ#,!, $#	] + 	^4)                                            (eq. 4.13) 
 
                                                                ℎ# =	b# ∗ tanh	((#)                                                    (eq. 4.14) 
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In practice, LSTM classifies web session event sequences into fraudulent and non-fraudulent 
categories, where fraudulent event sequences can be further classified as one of the types 
below. 
Table 4.10. Fraudulent types for event sequence data modelling 
For each customer a sequence of events is extracted for both fraudulent and non-fraudulent 
data. Because not all the events are fraudulent in the fraudulent datasets, only the events 
flagged as ‘Fraud’ is considered to limit the sequence length of each customer. Hence the final 
fraudulent datasets contain 4,945 rows and the legitimate datasets contain 100,000 rows. As 
the lengths of the fraud event sequences are usually much longer than the legitimate 
sequence lengths, a maximum sequence length is set to reduce the complexity of the 
modelling and meanwhile have a good comparability without jeopardizing its prediction 
accuracy. A sequence length of 40 is set because most non-fraudulent event sequence lengths 
lie between 1 and 40 in fraudulent datasets. 
In practice, 80% of the datasets are taken as training datasets and 20% as testing datasets. 
The parameters of the model are tuned based on model performance. Other proportions and 
alternative model parameters are also tested at the model evaluation stage through a 
systematic approach in order to find an optimal performance in next chapter. The table below 
shows the parameters used by the model. 
Parameter Value Parameter Value 
Learning rate 0.0014 Keep probability 0.5 
Training steps 1000 Hidden neurons 85 
Batch size 267 Hidden layers 2 
Fraudulent type Description 
CoT Change of Telephony 
Sim swap Fraudster contacts mobile network and obtains new sim in 
the name of the user, uses it to gain access to account 
Social engineering - Device takeover Remote access Trojan 
Social engineering - Account at risk Fraudster impersonates bank staff to gain access 
  
159 | P a g e  
 
Display step 10 Number of classes 2 
      Table 4.11 Tuned parameters of model 
4.3.3. Support Vector Machine (SVM) 
SVM is a supervised non-probabilistic machine learning method that acts as a discriminative 
classifier by a separating hyperplane (140) and outputs an optimal hyperplane when 
classifying new data given labelled training data. It is a popular machine learning technique 
used in the fraud detection domain and often ensembled with other machine learning 
techniques (73), (74), (75). SVMs are useful alternatives to neural networks when the learning 
objective is a non-convex problem represented as multiple local minima. In such 
circumstances, neural networks tend to get stuck in an area known as saddle point (76), (137).  
Another advantage of SVM over neural networks is the large number of hyperparameters that 
are required to be tuned in neural networks (137) which often slows down the training. A 
hyperplane is defined by the following function (140). 
 
                                                                 0($) = 		 c4 +	c
5	
							.	                (eq. 4.15) 
 
Where, β is the weight vector and βo is the bias. An absolute value of the above function can 
be used to get an optimal hyperplane and can be expressed as;  
 
                                                                    	d		c4 +	c
5	
							.	d = 1                              (eq. 4.16) 
 
where x is the closest training dataset to the hyperplane. This training dataset is called support 
vectors. The distance between x and a hyperplane (β, βo) is given by; 







          (eq. 4.17) 
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The objective of the SVM algorithm is to find an optimal separating hyperplane that 
maximises the margin of the training dataset [39]. The maximum margin, for an optimal 
hyperplane, is given by, 
 
                                                                           	f = 		
|"|
‖8‖
                                               (eq. 4.18) 
 
Finally, in order to maximise M, one need to minimize an objective function >(c); 
 
                                                                     >(c) = !
"
∗ ‖c‖"	                                                   (eq. 4.19) 
 
Subject to constraints (140); 
 
                                                                     T2(c5 +	c4		) 	≥ 1		∀2 		                                        (eq. 4.20) 
 
Where, T2  represents the label for each training data. The constraints imposed on the 
hyperplane is used to accurately classify training samples !2.      
The above minimization problem can be solved using Lagrange multipliers to obtain the 
weight vector β and the bias βo of the optimal hyperplane (140). 
The implementation of SVM model is to find a linear separator in the feature space that can 
best separate legitimate and fraudulent training data. The data used for fraud detection is the 
payment records. In the fraud datasets, that is the payments flagged as ‘Payment Fraud’. 
There are 770 fraudulent records and 8,350 legitimate records in total. Fraud detection is an 
imbalance class problem. Commonly, the majority of the data are legitimate transactions, and 
only a small proportion is fraudulent. One approach to rebalance the dataset and have equal 
classes is to use Synthetic Minority Over-sampling (SMOTE) technique (105). By using this 
technique, the minority class will be oversampled with synthetic samples.  
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Not all features are included in the model. Some of the features are not relevant to the 
fraudulent behaviours but only widen the high dimensional search space. To find the best 
combinations of the attributes for the model, a forward stepwise predictor selection process 
is executed by starting with one attribute/variable and continuing adding one by one, until 
the best performance is identified. For the variables with their data types being strings such 
as IP Address and User Agent, one-hot encoder is used. The encoder takes a column of 
categorical values and then converts them into a vector of 1s and 0s based on their presence 
in a scenario. 
4.3.4. Markov Model 
In general Markov property assumes the probability of an event depends only on the state 
attained in the previous event.  
Let us assume the stochastic process {!()), ) ∈ 6} and its state space k. Then, the Markov 
property is expressed in conditional probability as, 
 
C(!()$) = $$|!()$,!) = $$,!, … , !()!) = $!) = C(!()$) = $$|!()$,!) = $$,!) 
 
Where $2 ∈ k. A stochastic process {!()), ) ∈ 6}satisfying Markov property is called Markov 
process. Markov chain is a special case of Markov process dealing with discrete time and 
states, which is which is often seen in applications. The equation above implies a transition 
per t or per step. A more general case may contain l steps.  
 
C(!()$) = $$|!()$,)) = $$,), m) = C(!()$) = $$|!()$,)) = $$,)) 
 
For simplicity, here notion m is used to represent a subset of earlier events. Obviously, Markov 
chain is a one-dimensional random walk. The process starts from one state to another with a 
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r = C(l) 
  
Here state space k = s.!, .", … , .<t and l represents the number of steps. C(l) can also be 
written as up2'(l)v , _, w ∈ [1, … , x]. To calculate C(l), according to the Chapman-
Kolmogorov formula (122), for any time +, y ∈ 6,  
 





Which states that the probability of going from state .2  to state .'  through + + y steps can 
be found from the probabilities of going from .2   to an intermediate state .=  through + steps 
and then from .= to .'  through y steps. In a matrix format,  
 
C(+ + y) = C(+)C(y) 
 
Based on the equation above, one obtains; 
 
C(l) = C(1)C(l − 1) = CC(l − 1) = ⋯ = C) 
 
That is, the calculation of the transition matrix of steps l is equal to the one-step transition 
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One may also be interested in the state probability distribution along the time (i.e., steps), l. 
For each state .2  along the timeline m, one has the state probability (represented by lower 
case p) after the time ) = l,  
 








The equation gives probability of states. The equation can be further deduced based on Bayes 
Theorem, 
 
p{!(l) = .2} = zp{!(0) = .= , !(l) = .2}
<
=>!





Based on the transition matrix, the equation can be written in short, 
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|(l) = |(0)C(l) 
  
Where, | is the vector of states and C is the transition matrix. It shows that the distribution 
of Markov chain at time m is determined by its initial distribution and transition matrix.  
Markov Model is often used for modelling time series data, where it represents the 
probability distribution over sequences of observations. In our model, the data is extracted 
as a sequence of time stamped events based on individual customers and the time of each 
event occurred. Combining fraudulent and non-fraudulent event sessions grouped by 
customer aggregate 64,538 sessions. Examining the most frequently event sequences, there 
are 324 fraudulent and 494 non-fraudulent frequent sequences. The best way to limit the 
number of states in the model is to obtain event sequences above the 97 percentiles 
according to occurrences in an incremental order. Based on that, default states are extracted 
in order to construct a mapping and implement it on the training data. These state events are 
depicted in Table 4.12 below; 




















                          Table 4.12. States of online banking event sequences 
The states are encoded in the Markov model. In case there are additional states, which are 
not included in the list above, they are grouped together and labelled as zeros. In order to 
estimate the model, it is necessary to calculate the dwell times between two state events 
over a specified sampling period. For the final event sessions whose dwell time is not given, 
the minimum dwell time value of the datasets (i.e.1 second) is used.  





B>!  of the observed sequence X!:A in a length normalised manner. If the 
scores are not normalized, there is a high probability for the classifier to predict fraud and 
non-fraud based on the sequence length due to its larger values. The use of log likelihood for 
the predictions is because it simplifies the mathematical analysis and signifies the small 
probabilities that would otherwise be difficult to manipulate and represent.  
Classifying the observed sequence, the Markov model is applied for each class of the observed 
training data. Using fraudulent and non-fraudulent training data the normalised log 
likelihoods µ?+,-./(X!:A) and µ?010+,-./(X!:A) are calculated respectively. And the 
classification score is obtained by the normalised log likelihood ratio µ?+,-./(X!:A) −
	µ?010+,-./(X!:A). For each of the two classes in both training and testing data, an arbitrary 
count value is set to 1 for each event in order to overcome the problem where an event has 
zero frequency.  
4.3.5.  A systematic modelling process 
The models are developed based on LSTM, SVM and Markov techniques for detecting fraud 
from event sequences. And subsequently, their performance is analysed and evaluated. In 
practice, Python with Google’s Tensor Flow library is used to build the integrated Payment 
Fraud Detection System. The general modelling process to implement the models for 
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detecting fraudulent remote banking transactions is shown in Table 4.13 and a corresponding 

















17. Generate datasets based on Feature Engineering and prior knowledge of the data. 
18. Data normalization based on each feature. 
19. Split dataset into train, validation, and testing. 
20. Define model structures and functions, including input and output variables. 
21. Initialize model parameters (memory size, learning rate, batch size and epochs). 
22. Compute the outputs based on training and validation datasets. 
23. Repeat: 
1. Compute training error. 
2. Compute validation error. 
3. Minimize errors. 
4. Update model parameters. 
24. While epochs are less than maximum. 
25. Predict for testing dataset using trained models. 
26. Produce model performance indicators, e.g., confusion matrix and F1 score. 
27. Iterative model evaluation (steps 3-15) using various datasets. 
28. Model selection for prediction. 
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Figure 4.15. Modelling Process for Remote Banking Fraud Detection 
4.4. Conclusion 
The sophistication of the fraud Modus Operandi (MO) requires us to rethink on the Payment 
Fraud Detection System approaches. Meanwhile, intelligent methods such as SVM and LSTM 
are not well utilized in remote banking fraud detection. In this chapter an integrated Payment 
Fraud Detection System with three models, i.e., Support Vector Machine, Markov Model and 
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is capable of automated training and tuning of the models based on thresholds with high F1 
scores and novel analytics.  
Detecting fraud is a no-easy computational task and the searching for the optimal model is 
complex, which can be influenced by model types, model characteristics and the data itself. 
In this research, the data collected for the analysis is imbalanced, with 22,880 rows of fraud 
datasets and 100,000 rows of legitimate datasets. The exploratory analysis is applied to both 
legitimate and fraudulent datasets for feature investigation and selection. Only features 
exhibiting the identities of fraudulent and legitimate events such as Amount, Time, IP address 
and user agents are selected. 
In the exploratory analysis, the distributions of the datasets show a set of characters. For 
example, most of the fraud happened between noon and 4:00pm; the popular months for 
fraudulent activities are April, March and May, most frequently at the start and end of the 
months; and the transactions turn to be specific country-oriented and device-specific. 
The SVM model is trained by starting with one variable and continue by adding one by one 
based on features, Amount, User agent and IP address. The model performed better with 
Amount as the only input. It gave an F1 score 71%, an EER of 0.3 and the lowest False Positive 
Rate of 27%. The overall time to run the specific model was 26 seconds. Markov model uses 
frequent sequences of states of events classifying fraud and non-fraud by calculating the 
normalised log likelihood of each class. The model is compared among 5 sampling rates – 20s, 
10s, 5s, 2s and 1s. The lowest EER (≈ Ñ. ÑÖ) is obtained with the sampling rates 5s and 2s, 
whereas the highest accuracy (≈ Ñ. ÜÖ) is acquired with the sampling rate of 20s. Lastly, the 
LSTM-based Recurrent Neural Network model is used to uncover suspicious activities on the 
retail banking channel. The LSTM classified event sequences by customer and achieves an EER 
of 0.05 approximately and an overall accuracy of 97%. The lowest False Positive rate is 3.6%. 
The overall running time of this model is 3 seconds whereas the Markov model runs 55 
minutes. 
4.5. Key Summary 
This section describes the high-level summary of the content of this chapter. This chapter 
follows on from Chapter 3 where a conceptual framework was highlighted and in this chapter,  
it is applied on real dataset. 
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• Discussed framework in detail for developing CCFDS with a real-life scenario dataset 
from a large European bank. The conceptual framework was described in Chapter 3. 
• Details data source and outlines exploratory analysis to understand and determine the 
probability distributions of the datasets and the key features used by the model. 
• As part of pre-processing, latent features are created based on feature engineering 
technique described in Chapter 3. 
• LSTM, SVM and Markov Model are explored in this chapter and the real dataset can 
be applied to these models. 
• A systematic modelling process is created to evaluate the performance of the models. 
  
  




CCFDS – Evaluation and Validation (Comprehensive comparative 
analysis and evaluation of the sequence learners) 
5.1. Modelling results and analysis 
Applying the technique SMOTE for balancing the data between the two classes before training 
the SVM model, the following sets are obtained as depicted in Table 5.1 below: 
 Fraud Non-Fraud Total 
Training 6680 6680 13360 
Testing 1670 1670 3340 
                               Table 5.1 Datasets split into training and testing 
The feature selection is based on a forward selection process by adding the features one by 
one to the SVM model. The features are normalized before fed into the model. The evaluation 
of results is based on the computation of the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves 












C*,e_2_àZ = 6C/(-C + 6C)	
å,e.11 = 6C/(6C + -ç)	
Here TP, FP and FN represent True Positive, False Positive and False Negative respectively. 
The scores corresponding to each class give the accuracy of how well the SVM model classifies 
the data of a class compared to another class. Table 5.2 shows the F1 scores fraud and non-
fraud class for individual or combinational features. The features are analysed in the 
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As it can be noticed from the table, as more variables are added to the model, the F1 score 
drops for both classes. The experiments show that the classifier is capable of detecting non-
fraudulent transactions with good accuracy. The combinational features, Amount and IP 
address, score the lowest. The best performance according to the F1 score is given by the 
individual feature, Amount with 72%. However, observing the ROC curves in Figure 5.1, the 
model with combinational inputs, i.e., Amount and User Agent, achieves highest accuracy 
with a moderate Equal Error Rate (EER) (≈ 0.327). It also suggests that the Amount and IP 
address variables should be better used with the User Agent variable, which scores 68% 
accuracy and with 0.366 EER. The optimal thresholds for all the cases are between 0.45 and 
0.51. 







Non-Fraud 0.72 0.67 0.60 0.63 
Fraud 0.72 0.61 0.62 0.61 
Average 0.72 0.66 0.61 0.62 
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Figure 5.1. ROC curves of SVM model with inputs (a) Amount, (b) Amount and User agent, (c) Amount and IP 
address and (d) Amount, User agent and IP Address 
Markov Model and LSTM used a different approach for fraud detection. Sequences of events 
are taken from data and imported into the models.  The Markov model was evaluated using 
the 3-fold cross validation in an arbitrary selection of set of sampling rates, i.e., 20s (i.e., 
seconds), 10s, 5s, 2s and 1s. A rate lower than 1ms does not provide significant results as the 
sampling rate of 1ms is the lowest time span in the dataset. Figure 5.2 presents the ROC 
curves with the five sampling rates. The difference between sample rates are not significant, 
where the sampling periods of 20ms and 10ms achieve slightly better Area Under the Curve 
(AUC), equivalent to 96.8% and 96.3% respectively. However, the two lowest EERs, both 
approximately 0.066, are obtained with 2ms and 5ms.  
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Figure 5.2. ROC curves of Markov model for sampling rates 20s, 10s, 5s, 2s and 1s 
The bidirectional LSTM model is developed with specified tuned parameters. The testing 
datasets contain 13,690 legitimate events and 56 fraudulent events. With the data the LSTM 
model running time is 120 seconds to produce the prediction results. The results show that it 
performs better on legitimate sequence events with an F1 score close to 99% as shown in the 
confusion matrix in Figure 5.3. The F1 score on the fraudulent events is 92%. Out of the 56 
fraudulent events, 52 events are predicted as fraud and the other 4 as legitimate. The overall 
model prediction rate is 97%. 
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Figure 5.3. Confusion matrix of the LSTM model 
The classifier achieves an AUC (Area Under the Curve) equal to 99% and an error rate of 5%, 
which is lower than the Markov Model error, as illustrated in Figure 5.4.  
 
Figure 5.4. ROC of the LSTM model 
The highest performance of the model is achieved when the threshold is 0.6, giving the lowest 
rates in False Positive and False Negative. False Positive Rate with 3.6% means the model 
classifies a small proportion (i.e. 3.6%) of the fraudulent events as legitimate. This rate is 
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equivalent to the 95% of True Positive Rate (i.e., the proportion of the legitimate sequence 
events are classified correctly as legal). The model classified only 5% of the legal events as 
fraud (False Negative Rate).  
5.2.  Model evaluation (SVM, RNN, Markov Model) 
5.2.1. Model validation 
The model validation may refer to verify model performance and limitations, and justify the 
model results based on data, statistical and modelling techniques. In the research, a grid 
search technique is used to find optimal parameters of the SVM models. The grid search 
technique builds a model on each possible parameter combinations. It iterates through every 
parameter combination to find the optimal model (141). The learning parameter ranges set 
for SVM in prior are shown in Table 5.3.  
Parameter Name Value 
Kernel Radial Basis Function (RBF) 
Cost (C) [0.001, 0.01, 0.1, 1, 10] 
Gamma coefficient [0.0001, 0.001, 0.01, 0.1, 1] 
K-fold cross validation 5 
            Table 5.3. Learning parameters of SVM 
The Radial Basis Function (RBF) kernel is fixed in SVM model as it is useful for the nonlinear 
classification and meanwhile the linear kernels used by SVM model are often computationally 
expensive and time consuming. Five possible values are set for gamma coefficient i.e. 0.001, 
0.01, 0.1, 1 and 10 and five cost values or Cs, i.e. 0.0001, 0.001, 0.01, 0.1 and 1 are also set. 
Then the optimal values of C and Gamma are determined automatically by the grid search 
technique which searches all possible combinations to the optimal based on cross validation 
(here, 5-fold). The best performance is achieved by a parameter combination with Gamma 1 
and C 10.  
 
The datasets are then split into training, validation and testing dataset by 80%*80%-
80%*20%-20%. Table 5.4 shows the F1 scores of the four SVM models based on the validation 
and testing datasets, where SVM 1 models the Transaction Amount on, SVM 2 models the 
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Transaction Amount and IP address features, SVM 3 takes features Transaction Amount and 
User agent and SVM 4 has all the three features i.e. Transaction Amount, IP address and User 
agent. SVM 1 has the lowest performance in all models while model 2 produces the best 
performance. It indicates that the two features, Transaction Amount and IP address, are most 
relevant to the identification of fraudulent and legitimate events. All these models 
outperform the results of the default model as shown in Table 5.4. 
Table 5.4. F1 scores of four SVM models based on features, validation and testing datasets  
The LSTM model learning parameters are similarly tuned to determine the optimal parameter 
combination, as shown in Table 5.5. 
Parameter Name Value 
Learning rate [0.1, 0.01,0.001, 0.0001] 
Epochs 1000 
Batch size 100 
Number of layers 2 
Number of hidden units 85 
Loss function Soft-max Cross Entropy 
Optimiser Adam Optimiser 
Number of features 100 
Number of classes 2 
     Table 5.5. Learning parameters of LSTM model 
Model name Features Validation dataset Testing dataset 
SVM 1 Amount 0.7219 0.7155 
SVM 2 Amount, IP address 0.9463 0.9225 
SVM 3 Amount, User agent 0.9378 0.9364 
SVM 4 Amount, IP address, User agent 0.9418 0.9384 
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In LSTM model, the Soft-max Cross Entropy and Adam Optimiser are used as loss function and 
optimiser respectively. The learning rate is chosen from a range of values i.e. (0.1, 0.01, 0.001, 
0.0001). By testing, the optimal learning rate 0.001 is obtained. 
Figure 5.5 shows the accuracy and loss levels over the number of training steps (here, 0 – 
1000 epochs) that the model takes. As the number of epochs increases, the training and 
validation loss instability decreases, and the loss value reaches zero. It means that the over 
fitting does not occur. On average, the accuracy is above 80% and the loss is close to zero. 
Fitted with the unseen datasets, the LSTM model manages to correctly predict almost all 










Figure 5.5. Accuracy and Loss of LSTM for training and validation datasets 
 
The Markov model is evaluated with a set of sampling rates, i.e., 20s (i.e. second), 10s, 5s, 2s 
and 1s. The selection of sampling rates is arbitrary. However, a sampling rate lower than 1s 
would provide no significant results as the sampling rate is the lower time boundary in the 
dataset. Table 5.6 shows the F1 scores of the model by sampling rates.  The performance 
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range of the model is between 92.5% and 93.5%. The highest score is achieved with a 
sampling rate of 5s.  
Table 5.6. F1 Score of a selection of sampling rates 
The performances of the three models, i.e., LSTM, SVM and Markov models, are also 
evaluated with experiments based on a range of k-fold cross validation from 2 to 10. That is, 
the data is split into k subsets where each exhibits the same class distribution as the full 
datasets. The models are then trained on k-1 subsets and evaluated on the testing datasets. 
The average cross validation accuracy for each k is shown in Figure 5.6 for all the models.  
The average cross validation score for LSTM increases as the number of k increases. For k 
equal to 8, 9 and 10, the average score is approximately the same, with 9-folds giving slightly 
higher score (0.9727).  The four SVM models have a very stable performance across the k 
range without much fluctuation. Here the 9- and 10-folds have better performances than the 
smaller ones for SVM models. On the other hand, the Markov model exhibits more 
fluctuation, with the highest average score 0.94 at 4-fold with sampling rate 5s. The sampling 
rates 5s and 2s show better performance than the other sampling rates. 
 Sampling rate = 
20s 








F1 Score 0.9279 0.9246 0.9345 0.9312 0.9259 
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Figure 5.6. K-fold cross validation accuracy for (a) LSTM model, (b) SVM models and (c) Markov model 
The most efficient model is LSTM model. It only takes the model 5 minutes on training and 
testing. With the same number of datasets, however, it takes the Markov model 
approximately 1 hour to complete the training and testing. The time varies for the SVM model 
series, dependent on the numbers of features used. The SVM 1 model, with the Amount 
feature only as the input, spends 44 seconds to achieve the same target. The SVM 2 with 
Amount and IP address features needs approximately 32 minutes for the training and testing, 
while the SVM 3 model with Amount and User agent features needs 28 minutes. The model 
that spends the longest time on the task is the SVM 4 model, approximately, 1 hour and 40 
minutes. It is also the model that takes on the most features, including Amount, User agent 
and IP address.  
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5.2.2. Model robustness 
For robustness test and reducing generalization errors, various proportions of noises are 
added into the datasets before training the models. The effect of mislabelled data, more 
specifically, the robustness of the three models in the presence of noisy class labels is 
evaluated. 
Since the labels in the dataset are either 1s or 0s, the label noise is modelled by randomly 
selecting a percentage of samples and flipping their labels. In practice, the robustness of the 
models is evaluated with 0.1% and 1% added noises to the label. The F1 score results of the 
SVM, LSTM and Markov models against random label flips are shown in Table 5.7. It shows 
that the performance of all models drops when the noise rates increase. The SVM models and 
LSTM model perform better than the Markov models at 1% noise rate of the label. The 
Markov models’ performance deteriorates with increased noise rates, showing less 
robustness than other models.  Individually, the SVM 3 model outperforms the other three 
SVM models for any of the experimental percentages of noises. Between the five sampling 




0%  0.1%  1% 
SVM 1 (Features: Amount) 0.7251 0.6620 0.7001 
SVM 2 (Features: Amount, IP address)  0.9518 0.9493 0.9243 
SVM 3 (Features: Amount, User agent) 0.9515 0.9556 0.9577 
SVM 4 (Features: Amount, IP address, User agent) 0.9590 0.9413 0.9446 
LSTM 0.9771 0.9654 0.9654 
Markov Model (T = 20s) 0.9279 0.7661 0.5456 
Markov Model (T = 10s) 0.9246 0.7635 0.5489 
Markov Model (T = 5s) 0.9345 0.7688 0.5432 
Markov Model (T = 2s) 0.9312 0.7715 0.5319 
Markov Model (T = 1s) 0.9259 0.7661 0.5426 
Table 5.7. F1 score for different percentage of noise of SVM, LSTM and Markov Model 
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Another way to establish the reliability or uncertainty of a model is to calculate the results’ 
confidence intervals. Confidence intervals provide a range about model’s performance and a 
likelihood that the performance of the model will fall between the ranges when making 
predictions on new data.  A robust way to calculate confidence intervals for machine learning 
algorithms is to use the bootstrap. This is a general technique for estimating statistics that 
can be used to calculate confidence intervals by building a sampling distribution for a statistic 
by resampling the data. Suppose a random sample ê = {!!, !", . . . , !$} is drawn from a 
population C = {$!, $", . . . , $C}. Now suppose that one is interested in some statistic @ë =
)	(ê) as an estimate of the corresponding population parameter @ = )	(C) where @ is a vector 
of parameters and @ë is the corresponding vector of estimates. The traditional approach to 
find confidence intervals is to make an assumption that the population is normally distributed 
and along with the random sampling, to derive the sampling distribution of @ë. However, the 
distribution of @ë can be complex hence the non-parametric bootstrap is applied as it allows 
estimating the sampling distribution of statistic @ë without making any assumptions about the 
distribution of the population. The way non-parametric bootstrap works is elegantly simple. 
First, a random sample of size Z is drawn, with replacement, from ê. It is necessary to sample 
with replacement otherwise the original sample ê will be reproduced. Since ê approximates 
C, the unknown distribution of @ë is approximately the distribution of the resulting bootstrap 
sample, based on ê. That approximating distribution is used to set confidence intervals. This 
procedure is repeated a number of times å selecting å bootstrap samples (142). 
Next, follows the construction of a confidence interval for the parameter @. Since the 
bootstrap samples are treated as if it is the population, the (100 − í)% bootstrap percentile 
interval contains the middle (100 − í)%	of the bootstrap distribution taking the í 2⁄  and 
(100 − í 2⁄ ) percentile of the bootstrap distribution as interval endpoints: 
 
ïxD "⁄
∗ , x!%%,D "⁄
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However, this does not take full account of the difference between @ and @ë. But assuming 
that the percentiles of the sampling distribution and the bootstrap distribution is 
approximately the same, the confidence interval is obtained by the endpoints (143): 
 
ï2@ë − xD "⁄
∗ , 2@ë − x!%%,D "⁄
∗ ñ  
 
For the 95% confidence interval for the proposed models, this means that with 95% of the 
chance, the true statistic falls between the 2.5th percentile of the bootstrap samples and the 
97.5th percentile. By taking into account the time each model needed to run and empirical 
evidence (144), here  å was set to 50. The statistic parameter over which the confidence 
intervals are estimated is the F1 score. Table 5.8 lists the 95% confidence interval of each 
model’s F1 score, which most likely lies between the lower and upper boundaries.  The F1 
scores for SVM 2 model and Markov model with sampling rate equal to 20s are outside their 
confidence intervals though by a very small amount, indicating unreliable predications. The 
width of a confidence interval indicated how reliable the estimated performance of a model 
is. Observing the table, one sees that the LSTM model has a narrower confidence interval than 
the other models, indicating that the estimated F1 score (97.71%) is fairly reliable, with 95% 
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 F1 Score Confidence Interval 
Lower limit Upper limit 
SVM 1 (Features: Amount) 72.51% 69.8% 72.8% 
SVM 2 (Features: Amount, IP address)  95.18% 93.7% 94.5% 
SVM 3 (Features: Amount, User agent) 95.15% 95.1% 96.1% 
SVM 4 (Features: Amount, IP address, User 
agent) 
95.9% 94.5% 95.9% 
LSTM 97.71% 97.6% 97.9% 
Markov model (T = 20s) 92.79% 90.5% 92.6% 
Markov model (T = 10s) 92.46% 91.1% 93.6% 
Markov model (T = 5s) 93.45% 91.8% 94.1% 
Markov model (T = 2s) 93.12% 92.5% 93.8% 
Markov model (T = 1s) 92.59% 91.8% 93.4% 
    Table 5.8.  95% confidence intervals of model statistic F1 score 
5.3. Conclusion 
Detecting fraud is a no-easy computational task and the searching for the optimal model is 
complex, which can be influenced by model types, model characteristics and the data itself. 
In this research, the data collected for the analysis is imbalanced, with 22,880 rows of fraud 
datasets and 100,000 rows of legitimate datasets. The exploratory analysis is applied to both 
legitimate and fraudulent datasets for feature investigation and selection. Only features 
exhibiting the identities of fraudulent and legitimate events such as Amount, Time, IP address 
and user agents are selected. 
Based on the integrated Payment Fraud Detection System model developed, three models, 
i.e., Support Vector Machine, Markov Model and LSTM model are implemented for fraud 
detection in Chapter 4. Subsequently, a comprehensive model evaluation is carried out in this 
chapter.  
Various tests are carried out to evaluate the performance and robustness of the proposed 
models. In the tests, indicators such as F1 score, False Positive Rate (FPR), False Negative Rate 
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(FNR) and confidence intervals are used. Among all the SVM models the SVM 4 model 
achieves the best performance, based on the features including Transaction Amount, IP 
address and User agent, while among all the Markov type models the model with sampling 
rate of 5s provides the best results. Table 5.9 below compares the indicators among the best 
types of models developed in the modelling. 
 SVM 4 Markov model (T=5s) LSTM 
F1 Score 0.9590 0.9345 0.9772 
False Positive Rate (FPR) 4.67 6.55 6.78 
False Negative Rate (FNR) 8.02 6.56 2.27 
Number of attributes 3 4 1 
Speed of learning 1h 40min 58 min 5 min 
Tolerance to noise (1% Noise) 0.9446 0.9612 0.9963 
95% Confidence Interval [0.945, 0.959] [0.918, 0.941] [0.976, 0.979] 
Data size 9120 64538 68727 
     Table 5.9. Comparison table of SVM, Markov Chain and LSTM 
Here, the FPR measures the likelihood the model incorrectly classifies the fraud events as the 
legitimate events, while the FNR measures the likelihood that the framework incorrectly 
classifies the legitimate events as the fraud events.  
From the table, one can see that the SVM 4 model has the lowest FPR, but the LSTM model is 
with the lowest FNR. The SVM 4 model is the most expensive model to run among all the 
models, whereas the LSTM model spends the least amount of time for learning. The optimal 
models concluded in the table are competitive and able to tolerate a small percentage of label 
noises in the data. The LSTM model achieves a F1 score of 97.7% whereas the SVM 4 model 
and Markov model achieve 93.5% and 95.0% respectively. Overall, the LSTM model performs 
better than the SVM and Markov models in terms of all the indicators listed here, which 
indicate a huge potential to be used in Payment Fraud Detection System. 
5.4. Key Summary 
This chapter provides comprehensive approach to evaluate and compare the performances 
of the models based on well-defined indicators and datasets. 
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• SMOTE technique is implemented in this chapter for balancing the data between the 
two classes before training for all the models. 
• All models are validated using K-fold validation technique. The grid search technique 
is used to build a model on each possible parameter combinations.  
• Optimal model hyper parameters are highlighted and discussed in detail for each of 
the model. 
• To test the robustness of all the models, noise is introduced to reduce generalization 
errors. The effect of mislabelled data, more specifically, the robustness of the three 
models in the presence of noisy class labels is evaluated. 
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6.  
Conclusion and Future Work: 
6.1. Introduction of the main achieved work 
This research seeks to advance the field of payment fraud detection by creating a novel 
framework with LSTM RNN architecture. The approach adopted was to design and implement 
this framework by prototyping in order to provide evidence on the feasibility of this 
framework. Introduction of the LSTM model demonstrated its advantage over several other 
traditional classifier such as SVM and Markov Model. Introduction of a unique feature 
engineering technique that allows the creation of temporal features, which allows LSTM to 
train directly on the raw data. In this chapter, this study will be concluded and will provide a 
closing remark on the problem statement as well as the effectiveness of proposed solution. 
Furthermore, recommendations and future research areas that can improve the fraud 
detection are discussed as well. 
 
With the surge of internet usage, identify theft has become more efficient. Advance fraud MO 
as seen in this research demonstrates that fraudsters can mask themselves by faking the data 
points sent to the bank and defrauding the bank’s security and fraud controls. Our research 
in Chapter 1 has also showed that simply rejecting any suspicious looking activities comes at 
a high operational cost. Our research also showed that traditionally online payments were 
limited to credit card payments only; however, there are now a number of different payment 
channel for customers to interact with due to innovation in technology. However, because of 
this there is also an increase in fraudulent activities such as social engineering and malware 
attacks. Fraudsters no longer have to walk into a bank’s branch to carry out an attack they 
can simply use someone’s identity or steal the information through means of hacking. The 
damage caused by these fraudulent activities goes beyond direct monetary loss for any 
financial institutions and affects their brand and market share.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 2 many of the existing fraud detection system, such as those that are 
based on rule based systems and suffer limitations such as low detection rates and high false 
positive rates that is often caused by either a delay in a feedback loop as a result of human 
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investigative process involved or purely due to the fact of human error by miss-classifying the 
fraud labels. The limitations are further compounded by fraudsters’ ability to continuously 
change their tactics in order to avoid detection and the machine learning models to adapt to 
these changing tactics in a timely manner. Research carried out in this study provided a proof 
of our hypothesis that retail banking transactions can indeed be modelled as sequences of 
time series events and generalised model can be achieved with a good model accuracy and 
lower false positive rates. After several empirical and analytical analysis as described in 
Chapter 3, Figure 6.1 below summarises different phases as the output of the framework that 
lead to the proposed better fraud detection model.  
 
 
Figure 6.1. Implementation Phases 
 
• Phase 1 was focused on gathering dataset that is relevant to this research. This 
phase included:  
o Identifying dataset: identifying and labelling events belonging to victims of 
confirmed Social Engineering and Malware fraud for a given timeframe. The 
dataset contained 916 events that were labelled as being fraudulent, while 
the rest 3406 are considered as being legitimate. 
o Pull: retrieving and extracting all session-related information (session 
journey) from historical dataset. 
• Phase 2 included pre-processing, and feature extraction.  
o Elect: creating a sample by randomly selecting from a current time window to 
extract live transaction. The sampling rate was limited to 5 minutes so that a 
broad set of coverage can be gathered. For prototyping, 100,000 random 
samples were selected that contained completed sessions. Additional label 
field was added so that fraud and non-fraud dataset can be easily separated. 
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o Standardise: this pre-processing step was used for organising, sorting and 
normalising the data so that user’s journey can be easily visualised and 
analysed.  
o Explore: involved examining the data for the presence of indicative fraud 
patterns. This focused specially on social engineering and malware fraud. For 
each fraud account, transactions in the fraud sessions were compared with 
transactions of other legitimate accounts. Features were created by applying 
dimensionality reduction techniques. 
• Phase 3 provided details on design and implementation of testing and validation 
strategy, using predefined performance metrics such as accuracy, precision, recall 
and F1-score. 
o Test: this included dataset division strategy was defined by splitting the 
dataset into train, test and validate. Hypotheses were expressed in a form of 
a model and features and testing was done on both fraud and non-fraud 
accounts. An estimated performance was measured using performance 
metrics. 
o Model: when enough features demonstrating their abilities to sperate frauds 
from non-frauds to a sufficient degree were obtained, they were combined in 
the form of an ensembled model whose performance was estimated on the 
historical data.  
 
The design and implementation defined in the above phases was used to test the 
performance of three different inference classifiers, namely SVM, Markov Model and LSTM 
using varying dataset defined by dataset division strategy, explained in detail in Chapter 5.  
The best performing model was LSTM with an accuracy of 97.7% when compared other 
classifiers. The worst performing model was Markov classifier and SVM performed relatively 
close to LSTM, however speed of training became a bottleneck as the data grew. The results 
prove that LSTM has advantages in modelling sequential data such as customer behaviours 
over other models used in the research. Based on the data analysis in Chapter 4, it was 
apparent that Fraud MOs such as social engineering is sensitive to the temporal impact and 
hence the performance of LSTM is not surprising since problems such as vanishing and 
exploding gradings weren’t observed.   
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Overall, Table 6.1 below provides an overview of how the aim, objectives and research 
questions proposed in Chapter 1 are addressed. 
 
Aim & Objectives Status Summary 
To investigate the current state of research 
in fraud detection and to identify the main 
problems, existing approaches and available 
methods for achieving fraud detection with 
improved performance. 
Met Details can be found in Chapter 2. Existing 
research spans across traditional statistical 
rule based expert system, classical machine 
learning systems and deep neural network 
based. Not a lot of research has been done on 
using deep learning concepts to detect 
fraudulent events on retail banking. Very few 
papers exist on using RNN on credit card data. 
the main goals of this research will remain un-
changed as the research showed a significant 
amount of work is still required to look at the 
financial data set for efficient fraud detection. 
To investigation data availability across 
multiple channels to produce appropriate 
data sets and criteria that will form to be 
subject to the analysis. Also, to investigate 
how to process raw dataset for fraud 
detection. 
Met Further details can be found in Chapter 3. 
Generic data model described in this chapter 
can be used to model data from any channel. 
The feature engineering section describes how 
latent variables can be created and techniques 
for creating a set of features. Exploratory 
analysis can be found in Chapter 4. 
To research into the methods for machine 
learning for analysing of the 
multidimensional banking data represented 
as profiles and real-time transaction 
data. For example, anomaly detection on the 
customer spends pattern and behaviour 
could be analysed using techniques such as 
neural networks.  
Met Further details can be found in Chapter 4. In 
this chapter an integrated Payment Fraud 
Detection System with three models, i.e., 
Support Vector Machine, Markov Model and 
the LSTM model are implemented based on 
the framework developed in the previous 
chapter 3. 
To determine the best design ensemble and 
select the best ensemble classifier. To 
implement and execute fraud framework 
that ensembles deep learning and other 
deterministic models on a suitable platform 
in a context of fraud detection.  
Demonstrating that customer behaviour 
during a banking session can be used to 





Details on the design on design can be found in 
Chapter 3. Implementation is left for future 
work 
To analyse the use of the constructed fraud 
model, the efficiency of the selected 
methods and compare the results obtained 
at the end of the ensemble with the results 
obtained from individual algorithm. Evaluate 
the efficiency by performing validation, 
offline and online testing. Validation of the 
developed framework will be performed 
Met  A comprehensive model evaluation is carried 
out in chapter 5. Various tests are carried out 
to evaluate the performance and robustness of 
the proposed models. In the tests, indicators 
such as F1 score, False Positive Rate (FPR), 
False Negative Rate (FNR) and confidence 
intervals are used. Overall, the conclusion is 
that LSTM model performs better than the 
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using both benchmark data and real-life 
data; offline testing will be carried out using 
historical data and then online testing will be 
performed with real-time data. 
SVM and Markov models in terms of all the 
indicators, which indicate a huge potential to 
be used in the Payment Fraud Detection 
System. 
Research Questions 
Can events across multiple channels be considered as 
time-series events in order to build a classifier that can 
detect inherent anomaly regardless of the skewness, 
noise in the data? 
 
Chapter 3 provides a conceptual framework 
for cross channel fraud detection system and 
demonstrates that classifier can be built using 
sequence learning technique. For more 
information see Section 3.3.1 
How to reduce uncertainty of the model prediction by 
reducing false negative rate when there are only a few 
labelled data, or the observed labels are noisy as a result 
of manual measurement imprecision during labelling?  
 
Chapter 5 provides a technique on how noise 
can be introduced and its impact on model 
performance. Section 5.2.2 highlights LSTM as 
the best performant model, when 1% of noise 
is introduced  
Can a correct use of model and technique be used (i.e. 
sequence-based machine learning techniques such as 
HMM or RNN) to represent customer behaviour as they 
interact with the online channel? 
Chapter 4 provides details on the model 
implementations of several sequence learners. 
Sequence of events can be modelled as time-
series and evaluation of such models are 
described in Section 4.3.5 
Can a model structure be able to generalise to new 
abnormal behaviour not seen during training? Thus, using 
point estimates to model deterministic function that 
contains uncertainty information in order to reduce false 
negative rate. 
 
Generalisation of models and its effectiveness 
are described in Chapter 5. The model 
validation technique described in Section 5.2.1 
is used to verify model performance and 
limitations, and justify the model results based 
on data, statistical and modelling techniques. 
Table 6.1. An Overview of the aim, objectives and research questions achieved 
6.2. Research Contribution 
 This section gives a list of contributions as outcomes to this research. The core contribution 
of this research is to formalise a conceptualisation of the fraud detection framework that can 
be generalised across different channels for banks.  The heart of the concept consists of: 
• Feature engineering technique that combines contextual and temporal data points 
such as monetary data, behavioural data, and personal data. a bi-directional LSTM 
inference model that will out a score between 0 to 100.  
• A logical data model for cross channel fraud detection system that can cater for static, 
contextual, transactional and reference data from different channel, namely remote 
banking and cards. 
• LSTM model to demonstrate that sequence learners are useful for learning patterns 
of unknown length such as our social engineering use case, as they have ability to 
operate over sparse dataset that have higher-level temporal features such as our 
banking dataset.  
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• Synthetic data generation technique: Another major contribution is providing a novel 
approach of generating synthetic that can generate data quickly and efficiently. The 
quality of generated data is a close representation of the real data for fraud 
detection domain. This novel approach makes use of GAN network to generate a 
better dataset that can be used to augment original dataset for training and 
evaluating. As seen in Chapter 3, this output of the GAN closes matches the real 
dataset while increasing the number of samples.  
• Model evaluation technique to verify model performance and limitations, and justify 
the model results based on data, statistical and modelling techniques. Core focus is 
based on utilising the F1 score to measure the effectiveness. 
6.3. Recommendations for future research 
Avenues for future work are many and varied. The conceptualisation of the fraud framework 
that is proposed in this thesis can be used for various different data points across the various 
bank’s channel. However, the overall fraud management tasks are challenging, it would be 
interesting to model fraud management using NIST’s cyber security framework [145] across 
identity, protect, detect, respond and recover functions.  
 
Furthermore, in relation to fraud detection itself one could further explore the domain by: 
Increasing data set: in order to compensate for lack of amount of data, synthetic data 
technique was used, however to in order to truly evaluate the model performance, real data 
is required over a longer period for training, testing and evaluating. Also, more data means 
more complex model can be evaluated such as Convolution Recurrent Neural Network and 
more complex latent features can be extracted by convolution kernels before applying to 
recurrent neural networks. 
 
Implementing ensemble technique: a technique to create ensemble classifier was discussed 
in Chapter 3, however due to time limitation the implementation was incomplete. This 
technique is focused on using a weak classifier. Using such weak classification technique 
overall framework’s performance can be improved as weak algorithm such as RFM and 
Benford’s law for fraud detection can be easily plugged in.  
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Adding additional dataset such as credit card (card present and card not present data): 
Conceptualisation of the fraud framework described in Chapter 3 is a generic framework that 
can generalised over different cross channels for a bank. However, due to time limitation only 
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IP address-UA model 
During the exploratory analysis it was discovered that a probability of a fraudulent transaction 
is high when there is a password reset event and then immediately a login event. Therefore, 
all the event types that have “PasswordReset” followed by “CustomerLogin” were extracted 
from the dataset. In total, there are 110 customers that follow this sequence where 77 of the 
customers were flagged as fraud and the remaining 40 as genuine. (There were 220 
fraudulent types and 80 genuine event types.) Additional attributes such as IP Address, User 
Agent and latency and others are deemed good indicators for fraud identification and 




Event Type Session 
ID 
Latency IP address User 
agent 
Flag 
276506 PasswordReset … 345 100.35.356.35 … 1 
276506 CustomerLogin … 135 100.35.356.35 … 1 
932765 PasswordReset … 235 123.45.57.68 … 0 
932765 CustomerLogin … 109 123.45.57.68 … 0 
... ... ... … ... ... ... 
Sample of raw data based on Password Reset - Customer Login sequence 
Before fitting the data into the model, a pre-processing stage occurs to some of the features 
in order to be transformed into a suitable format for the model.  At first user-agent string was 
analysed using user agent parser library. Once the user agent string is passed through the 
parser, it provides the information shown in figure below. 
 
 
Information of user agent string passed through a user agent parser 
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An example of the parsed string for fraud and non-fraud label is shown below: 
Non-Fraud 
{   'device': {'brand': None, 'family': 'Other', 'model': None}, 
    'os': {   'family': 'Windows', 
              'major': '7', 
              'minor': None, 
              'patch': None, 
              'patch_minor': None}, 
    'string': 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like ' 
              'Gecko) Chrome/50.0.2661.102 Safari/537.36 CACHE CLEAR 1440x900', 
    'user_agent': {   'family': 'Chrome', 
                      'major': '50', 
                      'minor': '0', 
                      'patch': '2661'}} 
Fraud 
{   'device': {'brand': 'Spider', 'family': 'Spider', 'model': 'Desktop'}, 
    'os': {   'family': 'Other', 
              'major': None, 
              'minor': None, 
              'patch': None, 
              'patch_minor': None}, 
    'string': 'Jambot/0.1.x (Jambot; http://www.jambot.com/blog; ' 
              'crawler@jambot.com)', 
    'user_agent': {   'family': 'Jambot', 
                      'major': '0', 
                      'minor': '1', 
                      'patch': None}} 
 
An assumption of using the user agent string is that it should stay consistent across different 
events within a session and for sessions that are close enough in time. However, during 
account take over, the malware it operating as a “man in the browser” or session replication 
attack is taking place, the user agent string will change. One need to be able distinguish 
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between genuine user agent updates (i.e. customer using a different browser or a browser 
upgrade) to a fraudulent attack such as Bot performing account takeover.  
In order to prove the above hypothesis, Locality Sensitive Hashing (LSH) algorithm is applied 
to cluster different browsers and OS, along with the score card to include as prior knowledge 
such as minor forward upgrade to browser is fine but backward upgrade is not. For each of 
the session the user agent will be examined using the above parser. For each of the class such 
as device, OS, Browser a Jaccard distance algorithm will be applied to measure any deviation. 
The Jaccard similarity function is given by: 





Once the Jaccard similarity is calculated, the following score card is applied to the similarity 
score: 
If the device family is off type Spider add 60 base points to the device score. 
If the device family is off type Spider and model is Desktop add 10 base points to the device score. 
If the OS family is Windows add 10 base points 
If the current browser major version is upgraded minus 5 base points 
If the current browser minor version is upgrade minus 20 base points 
If the current browser major version is degraded add 20 base points 
If the current browser minor version is degraded add 30 base points 
 
The overall sum is then calculated using the weighted sum, where the weights are the base 





Once the overall scores are computed, the score along with the original user agent string are 
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Hence the overall score can be given as: 
ê($) = 	z0($)2 +û($)2 + ^2  
where 0($)is the Jaccard distance, û($) is the LSH and ^ is the overall biased. Picking from a 
sample populate the effect of the above can be seen as follows (Table 2): 
 
CustomerID Event UserAgent String  Score 
894993166 CustomerLogin Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; Android 5.1.1; SM-
G920F Build/LMY47X; wv) 
AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) 
Version/4.0 Chrome/49.0.2623.105 
Mobile Safari/537.36 CACHE CLEAR 
1440x2560 
0 








1112788017 CustomerLogin Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; Android 4.4.2; en-gb; 
SAMSUNG GT-I9505 Build/KOT49H) 
AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) 
Version/1.5 Chrome/28.0.1500.94 Mobile 
Safari/53 CACHE CLEAR 1080x1920 
0 
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Overall score on user agent string on a sample of the dataset 
Lists for IP address and user-agents are gathered from the Internet including fraudulent IP 
address and user agents’ families of operating system, device and browser. A filter is built to 
check if an IP address in the dataset exists in the bad list. In the case there is a bad IP address 
in the dataset, the filter outputs 1 for fraud otherwise is 0.  The IP and UA filters are used for 
both PasswordReset and CustomerLogin events separately.  Table 3 below presents a sample 
of the new dataset after the filter are applied. 
Password Reset Login  
IP Latency UA UA score IP Latency UA UA score Flag 
0 233 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 
0 345 0 0.43 0 130 0 0 1 
0 180 0 0 0 67 0 0 1 
0 547 0 0.023 0 480 0 0 1 
Sample of the dataset after the IP address and UA filters are applied 
The new processed data were feed into an LSTM model with a many-to-one architecture. A 
many-to-one architecture takes a sequence of values as input and generates an output.  The 
first input is the password reset with sequence of 4 and then customer login with the same 
length sequence as password reset.  
The LSTM model learning parameters are tuned to determine the optimal parameter 
combination, as shown in Table. In LSTM model, the Soft-max Cross Entropy and Adam 
Optimiser are used as loss function and optimiser respectively. The optimal learning rate is 
0.0014. 
Parameter Name Value 
Learning rate 0.0014 
Epochs 1000 
Batch size 100 
Number of layers 1 
Number of hidden units 85 
Loss function Soft-max Cross Entropy 
Optimiser Adam Optimiser 
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Number of features 4 
Number of inputs 2 
Number of classes 2 
     LSTM tuned parameters of IP address and UA model 
The figure below shows the loss levels over the number of training steps that the model takes. 
As the number of epochs increases, the training and validation loss instability decreases, and 
the loss value reaches zero. To evaluate the performance of the models F1 score, False 
Positive Rate (FPR) and False Negative Rate (FNR) are used. Fitted with the unseen datasets, 
the LSTM model managed to achieve a F1 score of approximately 98% as shown in Table 5. 
The FPR is zero meaning that the model classifies all the legitimate events as legitimate. Very 
close to zero is FNR, which indicates that very few fraudulent events are classified incorrectly 
as legitimate events.  
 
Training and Validation loss of LSTM model 
 
 LSTM 
F1 Score 0.9772 
False Positive Rate (FPR) 0 
False Negative Rate (FNR) 0.045 
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Benford's Law model 
Benford’s law states that if one randomly select a number from any naturally occurring tables 
of numerical data, the significant digits are not uniformly distributed as might be expected, 
but instead follow a particular logarithmic distribution. It states that the leading digit is not 
equally likely to be any one of the nine digits 1,2,..,9, but is 1 more than 30% likely to be and 
9 less than 5% of the time. The probabilities for each of the nine digits to be the leading digit 
decrease monotonically. The probability for the first significant digit is  
 
C(7! = /) = 	 1àü!%(1 + 1 /† )  for all d = 1,2,…,9 
 
The total fraudulent transactions used were 916 and the legitimate transactions were 21,733. 
The probability of a specific digit to be found in the dataset at the first, second, third and 
fourth position was calculated. Based on the probabilities found in the dataset and the 
expected Benford’s law probabilities the Euclidean distance and chi-square was computed. A 
sample of the new dataset is shown in the Figure 3 below. 
 
 
Data frame of Benford’s law model 
The data was imported into an LSTM and SVM model in order to test their performance. But 
before that the features were normalised and sampled. The sampling was made because the 
fraudulent transactions were very limited and for that reason the results of the model would 
not be skew.  
The tuned parameters of LSTM and SVM model are shown in the table below: 
LSTM SVM 
Parameter Name Value Kernel Radial Basis Function 
(RBF) 
Learning rate 0.0014 Cost © 10 
Epochs 1000 Gamma coefficient 1 
Batch size 100 K-fold cross validation 5 
Number of layers 1   
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Number of hidden units 85   
Loss function Soft-max Cross Entropy   
Optimiser Adam Optimiser   
Number of features 11   
Number of classes 2   
Tuned parameters of LSTM and SVM model 
The table below shows the results of the two models. The SVM model has the lowest FPR as 
well as the lowest FNR. The low rates indicate that the classification of fraudulent and 
legitimate transactions was mostly correct. Also, the SVM has a better performance than the 
LSTM model with a F1 score of 70% whereas the LSTM model achieved 62%. 
 LSTM SVM 
F1 Score 0.6250 0.7028 
False Positive Rate (FPR) 0.404 0.289 
False Negative Rate (FNR) 0.346 0.313 
F1 score, FPR and FNR of LSTM and SVM 
RMF  
RFM (Recency, Frequency and Monetary) model is an analysis tool used to analyse the 
behaviour of a customer and then make predictions based on the behaviour in the dataset. 
Recency represents the time length since the last transaction, while frequency indicates the 
number of transactions within the specified time period and monetary denotes the amount 
of money spent in the specified time period. 
In the fraud domain, transactional data such as transaction amounts can be used in the FRM 
technique where data can be aggregated in accordance with various time dimensions. Then 
different learning algorithms can be applied to identify fraud. 
 
Due to time constrain the RFM model is not complete but some features were developed 
based on the raw data. From the dataset, the features TRANSACTION_AMOUNT and 
TRANSACTION_TIME were transformed in order to give the recency, frequency and monetary 
value for each customer. From TRANSACTION_TIME two new features were extracted: the 
day of the year and the time based on the 24-hour clock. TRANSACTION_AMOUNT was 
aggregated according to time resulting to the total amount of money and number of 
transactions each customer had in the specified time. Figure 4 below shows a sample of the 
new features grouped by the customer ID. 
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RFM data frame 
 
 
